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The impacts of cyclical economic volatility on state-level fiscal imbalance levels have 
gained attention, given that beginning in late 2007, the United States experienced the 
deepest and longest-lasting recession in its history.  The problem addressed in this study 
is how cyclical impacts on a state’s economic and demographic factors are related to 
fluctuations in fiscal imbalance levels.  The purpose of this study was to evaluate 
relationships between socioeconomic factors and state-level fiscal imbalance levels in the 
48 contiguous U.S. states, and to assess how the statistical presence and strength of these 
relationships varied during years 2000 to 2010.  Musgrave’s theory of public economy, 
Oates’s fiscal federalism theory, and Buchanan’s fiscal imbalance theory served as the 
theoretical foundation.  This longitudinal, time-series-cross-sectional study used multiple 
linear regressions to assess the statistical relationships between the federal agency-
provided datasets of unemployment, age demographics, per capita income, poverty, 
entrepreneurial activity, gross state product, and the fiscal imbalances levels in the 48 
contiguous U.S. states during years 2000 to 2010.  The study results provided evidence 
that the set of independent variables explained fluctuations in fiscal imbalance levels 
during the years 2000 to 2010, and that the independent variables of unemployment rate, 
percent of population under the federal poverty level, and gross state product were related 
to fiscal imbalance levels with varying degrees of significance and strength from one year 
to the next.  The implication of the study for social change is that policy makers who 
understand these relationships may construct better policies to mitigate fiscal imbalance 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
The defining characteristic of public sector economics is the continual struggle 
between the demands placed on governmental entities to provide public goods and 
services and the desires of the constituency and the fiscal capacity of public jurisdictions 
to finance those demands (Joyce & Pattison, 2010).  Faced with one of the longest and 
broadest economic recessions in United States history, public sector entities have 
experienced sharp declines in critically needed tax revenues precisely when the demand 
for governmental safety-net services has soared (Gerst & Wilson, 2010).   
From January of 2006 to February of 2009, the national unemployment rate rose 
from 4.7% to 9.5%, with 44 states incurring fiscal deficits of over $78 billion or 
approximately $260 per person (Inman, 2010).  Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
negative for five of six quarters of 2008 and 2009 falling by 3.8%, with state and local 
government revenues virtually collapsing on average over 10% on a year-over-year basis 
(Connaughton & Madsen, 2012; Gerst & Wilson, 2010).  Simultaneously, consumer 
demand pressure for public support in healthcare, education, Medicare and Medicaid, and 
retiree benefits increased dramatically (Joyce & Pattison, 2010).   
The responsibility for absorbing these revenue contractions and expenditure 
expansions falls squarely on public entities mandated with the task of collecting 
economic resources in the form of taxes, and subsequently redistributing these resources 
to the public in the form of public goods and services.   
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Conceptually, the collection and subsequent redistribution of tax revenues in the 
form of public goods and services is to some extent straightforward.  However, the 
application of these processes in practice becomes complicated when neither the burden 
of who pays taxes nor the benefit of who receives public goods and services are 
distributed equally throughout society (Hyman, 2008; Oates, 1972).  The relationship 
between the structural form of a governmental entity, whether centralized of 
decentralized, and its ability to equitably and efficiently respond to regional fiscal 
inequalities may be more problematic than is conceptually realized for the following 
reasons: 
1. The most frequently cited structural problems of a decentralized government 
entity are the lack of capacity at subnational levels of government to exercise 
responsibility for public services and the effect of differences in political 
ideologies between jurisdictions leading to a misalignment of fiscal 
responsibilities (Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah, 2006; Oates, 1972). 
2.  In centralized governmental structures, public entities are relatively 
unconstrained in their choice of policies for reducing regional inequalities, 
whereas in decentralized public entity structures, the segregation of political 
decision making powers amongst hierarchical levels of government curtails 
federal flexibility in policy choice (Shankar & Shah, 2001).   
Under the federal form of government in the United States, a distinct group of 
problems occurs when a federal entity contains, within its geographical boundaries, 
several smaller state-level subdivisions also possessing taxing and spending authority 
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(Buchanan, 1950, p. 583).  Federal revenues, typically in the form of taxes, are generated 
from within each state jurisdiction based on the nature, composition, and fiscal capacity 
of their respective internal socioeconomic characteristics.  Independent of these revenue 
generation factors, these same state jurisdictions possess differing degrees of public 
demand pressure for federally-provided goods and services in such areas as social 
security, public assistance for health and welfare, transportation, and higher education.   
In an optimally proportional fiscal environment, each individual jurisdiction 
would possess the necessary fiscal capacity to generate the dollar amount of federal 
revenues required to fund an equivalent dollar value of federally provided public goods 
and services, thereby presenting an economic environment absent a measureable level of 
fiscal disparity between contiguous jurisdictions (Tanzi, 1982).  Inevitably, however, 
fiscal imbalances occur when either the level of fiscal capacity for tax revenue generation 
or the level of demand for public goods and services are nonequivalent between entities 
within a federal polity (Buchanan, 1950, p. 584).   
From a microeconomic perspective, the anatomical configuration of fiscal 
imbalances occurring between jurisdictions may vary depending on the direction of 
comparison being made between two or more independent public entities in a federal 
system.  A vertical fiscal imbalance exists when the revenues of two differing 
hierarchical tiers of government are not sufficient to fund each member's expenditure 
requirements (Brenton, 1996; Dahlby, 2005; Walter, 2004).  A horizontal fiscal 
imbalance occurs between two jurisdictions sharing a similar tier on the federal 
government hierarchy when differences exist in the ability of each jurisdiction to either 
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raise a comparable level of tax revenues, or when two differing jurisdictions experience 
different expenditure levels for providing public benefits and services (Dahlby, 2005; 
Walter, 2004).   
Focusing on the horizontal fiscal imbalance definition, the purpose of this study 
was to observe and analyze aggregated fiscal imbalance levels existing across the 48 
contiguous state-level entities of the United States federal population.  From a 
microeconomic perspective, the fiscal imbalance disparity level for each individual state 
is represented by each state’s fiscal imbalance ratio of federal spending received divided 
by federal taxes remitted to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  From a 
macroeconomic perspective, aggregate fiscal imbalance refers to the relative single 
measure of the total statistical dispersion of fiscal imbalance disparity across the entire 48 
contiguous state-level jurisdictional population within the United States.   
Ultimately, the maintenance and improvement of the standard of living for a 
population is the principal objective of public fiscal policy and a fundamental expectation 
of the governed (Sen, Muellbauer, Kanbur, Hart, & Williams, 1987).  The concern of 
federal decision makers, who are interested in reducing the range of fiscal disparity 
between state-level jurisdictions nationwide, centers on cyclical fluctuations in the 
economic environment eliciting disproportionate fluctuations in the nominal levels of 
fiscal imbalance of each state, which in turn may cause the overall "bandwidth" in 
aggregated fiscal imbalance disparity levels nationwide to expand or contract in a 
negative manner (Lee & Lemieux, 2010).  Accordingly, this study was needed to 
investigate how state-level nominal fluctuations in fiscal imbalance occurred over time as 
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well as to observe how fiscal imbalance disparity levels nationwide may converged or 
diverged during cyclical changes in the economic environment.   
The effects of fiscal policy on public sector growth and sustainability have 
received considerable attention since the late-1970s (Bartik, 1991; Crain & Lee, 1999; 
Phillips & Gross, 1995; Wasylenko, 1997).  Through the continued focus of this attention 
on the development of federal tax and expenditure policies, federal decision makers could 
develop a preemptive methodology to mitigate fiscal imbalances by gaining an 
understanding of how fluctuations in key socioeconomic factors potentially exacerbate 
aggregate fiscal imbalances and how structural elements in a fiscal economic system may 
be particularly sensitive to recessionary pressures.   
By directly addressing these potential structural deficiencies, decision makers 
may develop the preventative processes necessary to directly mitigate the basal causes of 
aggregated fiscal imbalances, including the introduction of regional economic 
development strategies designed to promote economic growth and regional fiscal 
equivalence.  For example, Moon (2003) suggested that if aggregated fiscal imbalances 
occur due to interjurisdictional variances in production infrastructure, then decision 
makers could focus on increasing infrastructure investment in less-developed regions (p. 
3).  Simultaneously, if the policy objective is to enhance the quality of life in fiscally 
deficient jurisdictions, more emphasis could be focused on developing policies that 
promote social design and development.  In both of these scenarios, the ultimate goal is 
to insulate each jurisdiction from those factor impacts that potentially increase the level 
of aggregate fiscal imbalance during periods of cyclical volatility. 
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The following sections of this chapter highlight the historical and theoretical 
background regarding aggregated fiscal imbalances, a detailed explanation of the 
problem and purpose of the study, a presentation of the research questions and related 
hypotheses  as well as an analysis of the current fiscal imbalance environment in the 
United States, including the key variables involved, the gaps in current literature, and 
suggestions as to how this proposed multiyear interjurisdictional analysis will benefit 
federal decision makers. 
Background 
From the beginning of the most recent economic recession in December of 2007, 
the resulting fiscal downturn has affected nearly every component of commercial and 
private economic condition (Chernick, Reimers, & Tennant, 2013).  Although the United 
States economy has marginally improvement over the last several months, minimal 
economic gains and a continuing global economic downtown cast doubt on any hope of a 
full recovery in the near future (Congressional Budget Office, 2014; Cynamon & Fazzari, 
2013).  While the negative impacts of the recession on international trade, per capita 
income, unemployment, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are a few of the most 
commonly referenced economic measures of concern to federal decision makers, an 
equally important federal issue is how cyclical volatilities in the economic environment 
may negatively impact the range of aggregated fiscal imbalance occurring within the 
United States.  Large regional inequities between states represent serious threats "with the 
state's inability to deal with such inequities creating potential for disunity" (Shankar & 
Shah, 2001, p. 1422).  
7 
 
Due to each individual state government having its own intrinsic socioeconomic 
characteristics, a state jurisdiction’s fiscal imbalance ratio, calculated as the quotient of 
the dollar amount of federal goods and services expenditure received divided by the 
dollar amount of federal taxes generated, may vary considerably from that of its 
jurisdictional peers.  The sheer number of possible economic factors potentially 
impacting jurisdictional fiscal capacities and expenditure demand levels makes the 
development of a measurement methodology of regional disparity difficult since, 
according to Moon (2003), “regional disparity is a multi-faceted occurrence 
encompassing various inequalities in income, production capacity and social 
infrastructures…there is no single comprehensive method of assessing its various 
dimensions” (p. 4).  Crain and Lee (1999) described the lack of systematic guidance 
regarding which variables to include when constructing and evaluating cross-state 
economic growth models:  
The appeal of cross-state empirical analysis derives from the fact that while states 
differ in relevant dimensions, they are not so different as to make omitted 
variables an overwhelming source of error....investigators feel secure in 
considering a relatively small number of control variables in an attempt to 
establish a statistical relationship between state economic performances and a 
particular variable of interest...these specification differences make it hard to 
evaluate and compare the results of existing studies. (p. 242) 
In an effort to construct a measure of the impact of the 1981-1982 economic 
recession on state and regional economies, Connaughton and Madsen (1985) examined 
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the effects of the 1981-1982 recession on gross production and output by annualizing 
rates of change in Gross State Product (GSP).  In subsequent research, Connaughton and 
Madsen (2009) expanded their previous research by investigating the impact of the 2001 
recession on GSP by employing a state by state comparison.  Berry and Kaserman (1993) 
studied the percentage change in employment in the manufacturing sectors of the 50 U.S. 
states while analyzing GDP economic growth during multiple economic events occurring 
between the years of 1929 and 1987.  From a different perspective, Moon (2003) 
presented weighted coefficient of variation and weighted GINI coefficient values 
measuring the aggregated change in per capita GDP and per capita regional consumption 
expenditure in all 16 provinces of South Korea to measure the level of regional inequality 
shifts occurring as a result of state implemented decentralization policies.   
While each of these researchers highlighted different economic factor variables to 
quantify the impacts of cyclical economic events on cross-state economic growth 
dynamics, they subtly illustrated a gap in the literature being the continued lack of a 
universally accepted methodology of specifically defining and measuring the level of 
aggregate fiscal imbalance disparity occurring within and between a cohort of state-level 
jurisdictions.  Accordingly, this study was needed to address this variable of interest, not 
by proposing a fixed set of variables to comprehensively measure the impact of cyclical 
business cycles on the U.S. economy, but by enhancing and expanding previous research 
through observing and understanding of how certain specified economic variables 
impacting aggregated fiscal imbalance levels fluctuate within the population of U.S. 
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states—fluctuations that may, in turn, cause relative imbalances in the quality of life and 
economic potential in all regions over time. 
Statement of the Problem 
Shankar and Shah (2001) published that the regional inequalities within 
geographically large countries represent a significant development challenge, with 
converging or diverging measurements of fiscal imbalance levels accentuating fiscal 
disparities between contiguous jurisdictions (p. 8).  Connaughton and Madsen (2012) 
presented that during the 2008-2009 economic recession real gross domestic product 
(GDP) was negative for five of six quarters, over eight million jobs were lost, and the 
national unemployment rate nearly doubled from five percent to over ten percent.  The 
overall issue is that, while these numbers themselves are staggering, the impacts of these 
economic fluctuations may affect one state differently than its jurisdictional peers.  
Accordingly, the problem addressed by this study was whether there is a statistically 
significant relationship between certain socioeconomic and demographic factors and 
fluctuations in fiscal imbalance levels in the 48 contiguous U.S. states, and if so does the 
presence and relational strength of these relationships vary during different phases of an 
economic cycle.   
Understanding this relational phenomenon is critical in today's volatile economic 
environment as federal decision makers are concerned that interstate variances in either 
fiscal capacity or expenditure demand levels may result in high levels of fiscal imbalance 
disparity within a population of state-level jurisdictions (Garrett, Wagner, & Wheelock, 
2007, p. 16).  If all jurisdictions within a federation were endogenously homogenous in 
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both economic factor endowment and public demand levels for public goods and 
services, the overall measure of aggregate fiscal imbalance would be minimal.  By 
contrast, if the same economic factors existing within all jurisdictions of a federation 
were endogenously heterogeneous, the overall measure of aggregate fiscal imbalance 
could be wide and varied (Tanzi, 1982).  While each jurisdiction’s economic factors may 
be quantified as a snapshot measurement of fiscal imbalance at a specific point in time, 
these same economic factors may expand or contract over successive periods of time 
when either uncertainty or demand shocks generate a rapid slowdown and subsequent 
rebound in economic activity (Bloom, 2009, p. 3).  Figure 1 illustrates the impact of 
cyclical economic fluctuations on the rate of GDP within the U.S. economy over time. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Cyclical fluctuations in GDP during recessionary periods. 
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research (2014).  U.S. business cycle expansions 





When cyclical economic shocks create a variety of uneven state-level fiscal  
disparities in the collection and distribution of public resources, the federal government, 
in effect, acts as a redistribution mechanism by its transferring excess tax revenue 
resources from fiscally affluent states to fund the deficit expenditure demands in fiscally 
poorer states (Rector & Kim, 2008).  While these redistribution payments artificially 
equalize the fiscal relationship between the supply of and demand for federal resources, 
regional resentment may brew as poorer states requiring a subsidy may consider fiscal 
inequalities a manifestation of regional economic justice, while richer states may view 
their connection to poorer states as a hindrance to their efforts to increase the prosperity 
of their citizens (Shankar & Shah, 2001, p. 1421).  Regardless of each individual state’s 
perspective, the concern to federal decision makers is how the volatility of 
socioeconomic factors occurring on a macroeconomic level impacts the expansion or 
contraction elasticity of aggregated fiscal imbalance levels nationwide.   
Rather than taking the traditional approach of measuring the affect of one or more 
economic factors against the productivity performance of GSP (Connaughton & Madsen, 
2009; Moon, 2003; Shankar & Shah, 2001), the research scope of this study filled a gap 
in the literature by examining the fluctuations in several key socioeconomic factors to 
observe how these fluctuations may be related to corresponding fluctuations in aggregate 
fiscal imbalance in the United States during cyclical periods of economic volatility.  
Armed with this observational information, decision makers would be better prepared to 
make forward-looking decisions on such issues as the economic redevelopment of 
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depressed local economies, the redesign and implementation of tax structures that are 
insulated against economic shocks in the fiscal environment, the financial support of the 
poor and infirmed, and the overall improvement in the standard of living of all people in 
the United States. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this quantitative, descriptive, longitudinal, TSCS study was to 
provide a deeper understanding of the impact of cyclical changes in the economic 
environment on aggregated fiscal imbalance levels within the 48 contiguous U. S. state 
jurisdictions.  This objective was achieved, in two phases, by using large amounts of 
historical economic data, obtained from U.S. government agency datasets, to observe 
possible relationships between the predictor variables and state-level fiscal imbalance 
levels, and to statistically measure if the existence and relational strength of these 
relationships fluctuated during the during the period of years 2000 through 2010.  The 
implication of the study for business and social change is that policy makers who 
understand these cyclical relationships may better construct fiscal policies designed to 
mitigate fiscal imbalance volatility and to encourage state-level fiscal equivalence across 
the 48 contiguous U.S. state jurisdictions. 
The initial phase of this study measured, described, regressed, and analyzed year 
2000 measurements of the unemployment percentage rate by state, the percent of state 
population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by state, the percent of state 
population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial 
Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the 
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United States may be related to fluctuations in state-level fiscal imbalances across the 
United States prior to, during, and immediately following the 2007 to 2009 economic 
recession.   
The second phase of the analysis measured, described, regressed, and analyzed 
how the relationship between unemployment percentage rate by state, the percent of state 
population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by state, the percent of state 
population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial 
Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the 
United States and state-level fiscal imbalances was either strengthened or weakened over 
time and, accordingly, which economic factors best related to a state’s fiscal imbalance 
throughout the 11-year period. 
The potential findings may provide elected officials, public sector economists, 
municipal planners, and other public sector stakeholders an analytical tool to assist in (a) 
developing tax structures that are highly insulated to the negative effects of an economic 
recession, (b) establishing economic policy that encourages the channeling of funding for 
economic development to those regions that experience a higher level of fiscal imbalance 
fluctuation than other jurisdictions, and (c) providing guidance and analytical capabilities 
to public sector decision makers so that operational effort may be focused on solving 
fiscal imbalance disparities by understanding and addressing  the actual causes of adverse 




Considering the potential for adverse fiscal constraints experienced within the 
United States during the cyclical periods of economic volatility, combined with the 
probable variances in federal tax revenue generation and public good demands within and 
between state government entities, I observed how fluctuations in socioeconomic factors 
may be related to corresponding fluctuations in the dispersion of aggregate fiscal 
imbalance in the United States.  The following research questions and related hypotheses 
set the framework for studying this alteration: 
Research Question 1: Quantitative- Is there a relationship between fluctuations 
in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate fiscal imbalance 
ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment percentage rate by 
state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by state, 
the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for 
Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of per 
capita GDP in the United States, during the four measurement time periods of: (a) the 
2000 to 2007 prerecession expansion, (b) the 2007 to 2009 economic recession, (c) the 
2009 to 2010 postrecession recovery, and (d) the entire 2000 to 2010 11-year period? 
H101: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and fluctuations in the year 2000 independent variables of 
unemployment percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the 
level of per capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal 
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poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per 
capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 
2000 to 2007 expansionary period of time. 
H1A1: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2007 
expansionary period of time. 
H102: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2007 to 2009 recessionary 
period of time. 
H1A2: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
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percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2007 to 2009 recessionary 
period of time. 
H103: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2009 to 2010 recovery 
period of time. 
H1A3: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2009 to 2010 recovery 
period of time. 
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H104: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2010 
encompassing period of time. 
H1A4: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2010 
encompassing period of time. 
 Research Question 2: Quantitative - How does the relationship strength between 
the dependent variable, fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income 
by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman 
Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a 
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percentage of per capita GDP in the United States fluctuate throughout the years 2000 to 
2010? 
 H20: The relationship between fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables of 
unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per 
capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States does not fluctuate throughout the 
years 2000 to 2010. 
 H2A: The relationship between fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables of 
unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per 
capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States fluctuates throughout the years 2000 
to 2010. 
Theoretical Framework 
An econometric study of public sector fiscal imbalance requires a theoretical 
understanding of the importance of government in a free market economy, the manner in 
which intergovernmental structural hierarchy impacts revenue and expenditure 
allocations, how interjurisdictional inequities occur between public sector entities, and 
the interrelated nature of changes in socioeconomic factors and fluctuations in the 
aggregate level of fiscal imbalance between sublevel jurisdictions in a federal system.  
Due to the multifaceted nature of governmental economics, however, no single theory 
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adequately addresses the myriad number of economic challenges that may occur in the 
public sector (Arnett, 2012; Rubin, 1990).  Accordingly, in this study, I proposed an 
amalgamation of a number of complicated and unique theories that, while separately 
distinct, create an intertwined framework used to identify and define the concept of 
interjurisdictional fiscal imbalance.  As such, the theoretical framework for this study was 
based on three primary conventions of study (a) voluntary theory of public economy, (b) 
fiscal federalism theory, and (c) fiscal imbalance theory.   
Musgrave's voluntary theory of public economy centers on the question of why 
should the governmental sector be involved in the economy when a free market system 
should be all that is required for the optimal delivery of goods and services to the public.  
A free market economy is driven by individual motivation, competition, and market 
demand, all of which combine to determine pricing, wages, and market responsiveness to 
consumer preferences for goods and services.  Musgrave (1959) was concerned that the 
objectives of market efficiency and equity would be violated if a free market economy 
operated without a public sector presence.  Primarily, Musgrave believed that free market 
economies could fail as the distribution of income is unfairly controlled by private 
individuals who own the necessary resource inputs and outputs of the market, thereby 
giving owners too much control over market pricing.  In addition, a free market economy 
would not maintain sufficiently high levels of output and employment as cyclical 
volatility would both periods of idle capacity followed by periods of excess spending and 
inflation.  Finally, differences in resource allocation, consumer preferences, and market 
driven externalities would cause variances in the levels of production between 
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jurisdictions.  Musgrave asserted that these potential failings reflect the need for 
governmental market intervention to allocate income equitably, to stabilize levels of 
employment and prices, and to efficiently allocated resources.   
Musgrave's theory is relevant to this study as the analysis of fiscal imbalance 
disparity requires an understanding of the general purpose of governmental involvement 
in delivering public goods and services to the public.  Public sector entities each have 
varying levels of fiscal capacity, economic resources, and demand requirements for 
public services, with all of these factors impacted by fluctuations economic conditions.  
The role and purpose of government, therefore, is critical in establishing macroeconomic 
stability. 
 Fiscal federalism theory is based upon the fundamental work of Oates (1972), 
who suggested that one of the most efficient public sector structures for the optimal 
allocation of public goods occurs when the responsibility for decisions falls across 
multiple tiers of government.  Fiscal federalism theory relates to the approach of this 
study by establishing the structural basis for a federal government’s centralized 
involvement in the distribution of certain public goods and services.  The authority for 
taxation and the provision for public goods and services could be assigned locally rather 
than centralizing the functions at the federal level.  However, there are certain theoretical 
concepts involving the methodology in which tax burdens are assigned and public goods 
are allocated that may be only be resolved through a multitiered governance structure.   
While highlighting both the positive and negative attributes of both centralized 
and decentralized governmental structures, Oates originally championed decentralized 
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structures by his stressing that regional or local governments are better suited to adapt 
outputs of public spending to the preferences and environmental situations of a public 
entity's local community (p. 12).  When structurally decentralized political entities within 
a federal system are given greater autonomy over the funding for and provision of public 
goods and services, higher levels of economic growth, accountability, and responsiveness 
of government officials to local demands and needs are realized (Amagoh & Amin, 2012; 
Bjedov & Madies, 2010).   
Ironically, Oates (2008) later readdressed the centralized versus decentralized 
debate by acknowledging that centralized governments are better suited for the 
assignment of providing a public good when doing so mitigates the allocative distortions 
caused by the existence of interjurisdictional spillover effects (p. 315).  Hillesheim (2012) 
supported Oates's amended logic by suggesting that, while decentralized public good 
provisions are closely matched to regionalized preference, centralized governments make 
it possible to internalize spillover effects.  Watt (2006) agreed by stating that a central 
government should play the directing roll in stabilizing and redistributing public goods 
and services, yet acknowledged that central government methodologies negate the ability 
of local governments to allocate goods and services in a manner that best reflects local 
citizen’s tastes and preferences (pp. 8-10).  Lorz and Willman (2005) concluded that the 
centralized structure internalizes interjurisdictional spillovers but incurs certain costs of 
centralization.  Accordingly, the optimal degree of centralization exists where the benefit 
of spillover internalizations and the costs of centralization are in equilibrium (Lorz & 
Willman, 2005, p. 255).   
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Fiscal imbalance theory, also known as fiscal disparity theory, focuses on 
Buchanan’s (1950) addressing the level of fiscal capacity within a governmental 
jurisdiction, and the ability of a political entity's fiscal capacity to fund the demands for 
services and benefits from the jurisdiction's citizenry.  This study involved a direct 
analysis of interjurisdictional fiscal imbalances occurring within and between state-level 
entities in the United States.  The key concept of fiscal imbalance is the understanding of 
how the fiscal capacity of a jurisdiction may or may not match the level of demand for 
public sector support.  Within fiscal imbalance theory are methodologies available to 
mitigate these forms of fiscal disparity.  Buchanan (1950) addressed the concept of fiscal 
disparities arising when, in a federal governance structure, a single jurisdiction has within 
its boundaries a number of smaller political jurisdictions each with its own ability to tax 
and spend public resources (p. 583).  Each of these sublevel entities differs in both their 
respective tax capacity and in the fiscal pressures they face.   
While each of these sublevel jurisdictions has the responsibility to provide 
services and benefits to its residents, some entities have a comparably higher level of 
difficulty funding these demand pressures than others (Tannenwald, 2002, p. 17).  
Sublevel entities may have a significant level of difference in their fiscal capacity to 
generate tax revenues due to variances in socioeconomic factors.  Simultaneously, 
sublevel entities have differing levels of fiscal need where each jurisdiction's 
socioeconomic conditions either increase the cost of benefits and services delivery or 
cause the jurisdiction to augments its scope of services relative to other jurisdictions.  
Integral to the study of fiscal imbalance is the understanding of equalization payment 
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strategies incorporated to mitigate disparities and to equalize citizen's access to public 
services across jurisdictions (Gravel & Poitevin, 2006, p. 1726).  The empirical literature 
highlights the debate on the effectiveness of equalization programs and the ability of 
governmental redistribution input in a free-market environment to provide public benefits 
and services in an efficient and equitable manner.  
Further discussion in Chapter 2 will provide additional theoretical detail 
highlighting why decentralized federal governments are in the business of distributing 
pubic goods and services to their sublevel jurisdictions, which structure of governance, 
decentralized or centralized, best provides for the provision of public gods and services, 
and how aggregate fiscal imbalances occur between interrelated state level jurisdictions. 
Nature of the Study 
This nature of this study incorporated a quantitative longitudinal design.  In 
quantitative research, researchers determine the topic of interest, gather data regarding 
intrinsic characteristics of a particular population or units of study, and subsequently 
examine specific measurements of the characteristics using statistical methodologies 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p.181).  A longitudinal study is a form of research that takes 
place in time, using at least two or more waves of measurement taken of the same 
participants, processes, or systems, to plot trajectories of changes in certain aspects the 
environment (Trochim, 2001, p.5).  The primary strength of a longitudinal design is the 
ability to observe and evaluate the stability and continuity of several attributes of a 
sample, through repeated measurements of the same participants, to observe changes or 
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trends within the sample population (Kagan & Moss, 1962; Newman, Caspi, Moffit, & 
Silva, 1997; Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010).   
Descriptive statistical information was provided, in the form of simplified 
summaries of data, to present quantitative descriptions in a manageable form (Trochim, 
2001, p. 268).  A researcher using descriptive statistics describes certain characteristics of 
the distribution of scores, such as the average score of one variable or the degree that one 
variable score differs from another, followed by an examination of the arranged data to 
determine how the data relates to the original hypothesis.   
For Research Question 1, the dependent variable was represented by the net 
percentage change in the fiscal imbalance ratios for each state occurring during each of 
the four time periods under observation.  Structurally similar to the econometric model 
developed by Connaughton and Madsen (2012), regressions were made using the 
dependent variable, the measured change in aggregate fiscal imbalance ratios for each of 
the four time periods under observation, and the year 2000 independent variables of the 
unemployment percentage rate by state, the percent of the state population of age 65+, the 
level of per capita income by state, the percent of the state population below the federal 
poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per 
capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States for the 
purpose of observing potential relationships.  For Research Question 2, data containing 
observations of multiple economic phenomena obtained over multiple periods of time for 
the contiguous 48 state-level jurisdictions in the United States were compiled (Baltagi, 
2008; Davies & Lahiri, 1995).  The nature of this second-phase analysis was to observe 
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how the relationship between the annual measurements of aggregate fiscal imbalance and 
the independent variables strengthened or weakened over time, and which independent 
variable best relates to a state’s fiscal imbalance throughout the 11-year period.   
Datasets containing the economic elements used to calculate the aggregate fiscal 
imbalance measurements for each year under observation were obtained from the Internal 
Revenue Service and the U. S. Census Bureau.  Socioeconomic data tables regarding the 
independent variables were obtained from the United States Department of Commerce, 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U. S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, and the 
United States Census Bureau.   
Operational Definitions 
Dependency ratio: The dependency ratio measures the percent of dependent 
people not of working age/number of people of working age. 
Externalities: The cost or benefits of a market transaction not included in the 
actual sales price.  Positive externalities are those benefits accruing to third parties 
separate from those individuals directly participating in the transaction.  Negative 
externalities are the costs to third parties other than the buyers or sellers of a good or 
service (Bruhlhard & Jametti, 2006; Hyman, 2008; Lorz & Willman, 2005). 
Fiscal capacity:  The economic measure of the ability of public sector 
jurisdictions to finance governmental services (Hyman, 2008). 
Fiscal federalism: The division of tax allocation and spending distribution among 




Fiscal imbalance ratio:  The measurement of fiscal imbalance is the quotient of 
each state’s share of federal spending for the provision of goods and services divided by 
the each state’s share of federal taxes generated.  Fiscal surplus states are those with 
fiscal inequality ratios less than 1.00—representing a lesser amount of federal spending 
received than federal tax revenue generated.  Conversely, deficit states are those with 
fiscal inequality ratios greater than 1.00—representing a greater amount of federal 
spending received than federal tax revenue generated.   
Public goods and benefits: Benefits provided by a public sector entity that are 
shared by large population of consumers.  Pure public goods are considered nonrival and 
nonexclusive (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2011; Case, 2008; Hyman, 2008; Oates, 1972). 
Spatial econometrics:  A field of study combining both geographical location and 
economic theory.  Spatial econometrics involves the analysis of physical and economic 
interactions between political entities that may not be independent (Coughlin, Garret, & 
Hernandez-Murillo, 2006). 
Spatial interdependence:  The lack of economic independence among 
observations in a cross sectional or panel data set of public entity jurisdictions (Janikas & 
Rey, 2008; Rey & Montouri, 1999). 
Spillovers: Excess benefits or costs of economic activity that affect those who are 
neither involved over the payment for the activity nor the decision regarding the level of 




The publicly available data collected and analyzed in this study were provided by 
federal government and regulatory agencies and were assumed to be genuine and 
accurate.  The relevant economic datasets were acquired from the Internal Revenue 
Service, the United States Office of Management and Budget, the United States 
Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
and Statistics, and the United States Census Bureau.   
Scope and Limitations 
The scope of the study was limited for the following reasons: 
1. Sample archival data collected for the study were limited to 2000 through 
2010, representing the annual measures of economic factors required for the 
analysis of fiscal imbalance ratios in existence before, during, and 
immediately following the 2007 to 2009 economic recession.  Sample data 
availability pertaining to federal spending by state, previously published in the 
U.S. Census Bureau's Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) were 
constrained by the congressional decision to discontinue the CFFR for public 
dissemination after 2010.  Sample data collections were further constrained by 
the limited availability of detailed economic information regarding other 
socioeconomic factors that may affect levels of aggregated fiscal imbalance.  
Additional specific information might enable further research addressing a 
more comprehensive model of fiscal imbalance study. 
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a. The federal spending-to-tax ratios used in this study were calculated based 
on raw data provided by the federal government.  Based on these raw data, 
the amount of total federal spending may have been more or less than the 
total federal income derived from tax revenues in any given year that 
reflected an aggregate level of fiscal deficit or surplus position, 
respectively.  In this study, I completed an analysis based on the actual 
cash flow of federal funds with no corresponding accrual adjustment made 
to reallocate any relative fiscal surplus or deficit, occurring in any one 
year, back to the 48 contiguous U.S. States.   
Significance  
From a public policy perspective, this research was significant in its potential to 
highlight how cyclical pressures on socioeconomic factors potentially worsen the 
distribution of fiscal imbalances across the United States.  The findings of this research 
potentially give senior policy makers a theoretical tool to shift from reactively responding 
to increased fiscal inequality disparities to preemptively developing a process of 
balancing revenue and expenditure practices to promote positive social change, service 
level sustainability, and fiscal equality across the country. 
Summary 
In Chapter 1, I included an introduction to this study highlighting the challenges 
of public sector decision makers in balancing citizen demands for public goods and 
services with the capacity of the fiscal system to finance these demands.  The statistical 
and theoretical information have been provided to develop a greater understanding of the 
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factors and issues that public sector decision makers, citizens, and other stakeholders face 
during their challenge of equitably balancing net interjurisdictional fiscal imbalances.  
The literary framework established in this study provide a conceptual foundation 
supporting the ideologies of public economy theory, fiscal federalism theory, and fiscal 
equalization theory, with further relevant discussion highlighting how these theories 
address the structure of governance and the economic variances that are inherent between 
jurisdictions operating under a federal governance structure.   
In Chapter 2, I include information regarding the purpose of public sector 
involvement in a market economy, the governance structure within a multitiered public 
sector environment, and the factors contributing to jurisdictional fiscal imbalances and 
the various forms of equalization strategies a central government may use to mitigate 
fiscal imbalances.  
In Chapter 3, I include a detailed description of the statistical methodology chosen 
to measure the empirical relationships between changes in fiscal imbalance levels and 
key economic factors that may contribute to fluctuations in fiscal imbalances within state 
governments.  Chapter 4 contains the detailed statistical analysis of the study, with the 
purpose of Chapter 5 being a summary of the key findings of the analysis, the potential 
implications of the study, recommended actions for public sector decision makers, and 
the potential application for social change.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This purpose of this study was to investigate how cyclical fluctuations in 
unemployment percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the 
level of per capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal 
poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per 
capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States of GSP, 
impacted the aggregate fiscal imbalance levels within the United States during the 11-
year period of 2000 through 2010.  Key to understanding the elements of this 
investigation is the empirical and theoretical knowledge of public entity operational and 
fiscal structure, the environmental causes of interjurisdictional fiscal imbalances, and the 
related equalization methodologies used by central forms of government to mitigate 
interjurisdictional fiscal imbalances within their political subdivisions.   
In this chapter, a review of relevant classical and contemporary literature is 
presented to analyze, compare, and synthesize the conceptual theories of public economy, 
fiscal federalism, fiscal imbalance and interjurisdictional equalization.  The goal of this 
literature review is to elucidate the underlying theoretical framework upon which 
governmental decision makers and stakeholders determine the role and level of public 
sector involvement in the economy, the optimal governance structure of the public sector 
system, and the methodologies available to equitably allocate tax burden and spending 
benefits within sublevel political jurisdictions.  The theories presented herein were 
selected because of their relationship to the problem statements in this study. 
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Strategy for Searching the Literature 
The review of literary research begins with a search for peer-reviewed literature 
found in academic and professional databases located at Walden University.  These 
database searches were conducted using ABI/INFORM, Academic Search Complete, 
Business Source Complete, ProQuest Central, Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost, 
Thoreau, and other available sources within the Walden library services.  In addition, the 
web-based search engine Google Scholar was used to locate pertinent studies, with 
follow-up searches and document recoveries on these articles executed on the Walden 
databases.   
These informational searches were initially wide ranging, with further refined 
searching performed on specific aspects of this study limited to peer-reviewed articles 
written and published within the last 8 years.  The following key terms represent the 
primary search variables used to develop this literary analysis: fiscal imbalance, fiscal 
disparity, spatial dependence, per capita income, decentralism, consumer spending, 
revenue elasticity, tax imbalance, Tiebot’s theory, ability to pay theory, fiscal federalism, 
free rider, and interjurisdictional externalities.  Furthermore, searches for definitional 
information on key variable data were performed on professional websites of the U.S. 
Census Bureau, the U.S. Department of Commerce-Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 
Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Theoretical Chronology 
No single theory stands alone in its ability to illuminate the intricacies of public 
sector fiscal economics, the persuasive power of political processes and socioeconomic 
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conditions on management choices, and the pattern of decisions public organizations will 
make in an environment of constrained resources (Arnett, 2012).  An examination of the 
theoretical concepts of aggregate fiscal imbalances requires an understanding of the 
classical theories addressing the optimal operational design of governmental structure, 
the mechanisms that facilitate interjurisdictional imbalances in taxation and resource 
distribution, and the methodologies public entities use to equalize fiscal imbalance 
fluctuations occurring within sublevel governmental units within a federal polity.   
I begin Chapter 2 with a sequential exploration of the seminal works of Richard 
Musgrave's (1939) voluntary theory of public economy, Wallace Oates's (1972) 
decentralism theorem, and James Buchanan’s (1950) theory of fiscal equalization.  
Musgrave's research on the functional role of government highlighted macroeconomic 
stabilization, income redistribution, and resource allocation as the three primary activities 
of public sector operations.  Musgrave's theory relates to the present study by 
highlighting the purposeful role of state and local government as an economic 
distribution mechanism.  Oates's decentralism theory focused on the division of economic 
functions between different tiers of government so that income is distributed and 
resources are deployed in the most equitable and efficient manner possible.  This 
multitiered analysis relates to the operational and structural form of governance in the 
United States.  Finally, Buchanan's theory on fiscal equalization addressed the topic of 
mitigating intergovernmental transfers being used to allow jurisdictions of differing 
levels of fiscal capacity to finance a consistent and equal level of public benefits and 
services using a comparatively equal rate of taxation.  The funding mechanisms outlined 
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by Buchanan illustrate the generally accepted methodologies used by decentralized 
governments to mitigate fiscal disparities existing with their sublevel jurisdictions.   
While each of these theorists addressed a separate element of public sector 
economics, the combination of these theories establishes the necessary framework 
required to understand the optimal public sector mechanisms for efficiently providing 
public goods and services in an environment of imbalance and uncertainty.  I conclude 
Chapter 2 with a definitional listing of the variables of interest to this study. 
The Economic Role of Government 
Now, more than ever, the public is inundated with media reports expounding the 
deteriorating fiscal health of the nation’s governments (Arnett, 2012).  In the United 
States, the negative effects of the 2007 to 2009 economic recession on general 
governmental revenues, public sector spending, and the economic well-being of 
individuals place local government officials in the difficult position of matching limited 
financial resources to an ever increasing demand for public assistance from their 
constituency.  With the goal of formulating a public sector fiscal policy that best provides 
both an equitable distribution of income and an efficient methodology of allocating 
resources, federal decision makers are motivated to determine the optimal structural form 
of government for the provision of public goods and services comes into play.   
It is important to analyze why the public sector should even be considered.  The 
necessity for public policy to be the impetus for determining the socially acceptable 
distribution of income and public resources has classical theoretical backing (Hyman, 
2008; Lee & Clark, 2013).  According to Hyman (2008), “governments are organized to 
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exercise authority over the actions of people who live together in a society, and to 
provide and finance essential services” (p. 4).  In a free market economy with little or no 
governmental involvement, virtually all inputs for goods and services are owned by 
private enterprise.  Prices for goods and services are determined through the free 
interplay of supply and demand, with consumers selecting products based on their own 
tastes, preferences, and economic capacity.  Furthermore, Lee and Clark (2013) asserted 
that  
civil society and free market prosperity depend on government securing…liberty 
by protecting persons and property against violence and theft, providing basic 
infrastructure and public goods unlikely to be privately provided, and enforcing 
the rules of private property and voluntary exchange.  (p. 288)   
Theoretically, a free-market economy could be considered all that is necessary to 
distribute income and allocate resources.  In describing the benefits of a free-market 
economy, Adam Smith (1776) contradicted the mainstream acceptance of the mercantilist 
model, in which the purpose of governmental intervention is to enrich the state, by 
introducing the theoretical concept that the effort of many individuals seeking to 
maximize their own individual utility will result in an outcome that is best for the entire 
economy (p. 180).  However, others recognized certain shortcomings of a free-market 
economy.  Public goods are not offered in a free-market economy due to their 
characteristics of nonrivalry and nonexcludability, and absent regulatory rules, individual 
corporate owners are in the position to control pricing and supply levels in order to 
exploit consumers (Musgrave, 1996, p. 249).  Another difficulty in Adam’s utilitarian 
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approach is that individual utility is difficult to measure and comparisons between 
individual’s tastes and preferences are nearly impossible to construct.   
The discussion among theorists subsequently shifted to the suggestion that the 
measurement of utility is therefore ordinal, with the resulting topic centered on an 
economy's achieving Pareto efficiency–where the allocation of resources occurs in such a 
manner that it is impossible for any one individual to be better off without making at least 
one person worse off.  For example, Case (2008) stated that the concept of economic 
efficiency has little to do with the character of individual preferences, whereas the 
discussion should ask only does a change in the allocation of resources, the mix of output 
or the distribution of output in “one or more people being better off than without anyone 
else being worse off…if we can answer yes we should make the change” (p. 349).   
Governmental Stabilization of a Free Market Economy 
Frequently, a free market economy is unable to efficiently provide certain goods 
and services, such as social security or national defense.  Business entities in a free 
market economy will prioritize the production and sale of certain products based on 
profitability factors while ignoring potential negative externalities such as pollution or the 
exhaustion of raw materials.  Feeling the impacts of these negative factors, individuals 
are motivated to turn to government to either acquire unavailable public goods and 
services or to submit to government authority to achieve regulatory restrictions and 
enforcement penalties on negative externality impacts.  The inclusion of government 
interaction creates a mixed market economy where the primary role of government is to 
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purchase inputs from the private sector to produce and distribute public goods and 
services (Hyman, 2008, p. 8).   
Musgrave (1939) argued that even if a purely free-market environment could 
function at full employment and with all resources being used in the most efficient 
manner attainable, the ensuing distribution of income may not always be socially 
equitable due to private ownership of both economic inputs and the related framework of 
consumer prices and outputs.  Accordingly, writers of public policy would promote 
efficiency by dictating the needed framework to distribute income efficiently and 
equitably.  Oates (1972) further concurred that a free market economy is not designed to 
attain a high level of employment and economic output and, therefore, might result in 
extended periods of idle capacity, inefficient and inequitable spending, and inflationary 
tendencies; in this case, public sector monetary and fiscal policy could be designed to 
assure high levels of output and employment with reasonable stability in the overall level 
of prices (p. 14).  Bator (1958) posited that, absent public sector involvement, resources 
could potentially be misallocated among alternative goods and services, resulting in 
excessive levels of some activities and insufficient levels of activity in others (p. 362).   
With these endogenous weaknesses present in a market-driven economy, public 
policy could necessitate “unit taxes or subsidies to induce efficient behavior or…actual 
public provision of certain goods and services…to ensure an efficient pattern of resource 
use” (Oates, 1972, p. 14).  While these inclusionary benefits of governmental interaction 
in the marketplace are evident, the question remains as to the optimal public sector 
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organizational structure and political hierarchy that best maximizes the redistribution of 
income and economic opportunity to a community. 
Musgrave’s Voluntary Theory of Public Economy 
Noting these varying and conflicting positions relating to market efficiency and 
the role of the public sector in a free market economy, Musgrave (1959) posited that the 
efficiency of an economic system can only be adequately measured by the degree in 
which the system provides an equitable distribution of income and an efficient allocation 
of resources.  By shifting the analysis of public sector versus free-market efficiency from 
the positive economics approach of asking how does an economic system work to 
normative economics and the question of how should an economic system work (Case, 
2008, p. 349).  
Musgrave expressed a level of concern regarding an economy based purely on a 
free-market system.  With a focus on the concepts of efficiency and equity, Musgrave 
(1959) opined that a free-market economy operating without a public sector is likely to 
fail in three different scenarios:   
1. Even if a free-market economy were to run efficiently at full employment, 
there is no certainty that the related distribution of income would be equitable.  
The distribution of income would be based on a system of private ownership 
of resources inputs, structure of prices, and outputs in the economy that may 
not be palatable to society.  Accordingly, the public sector is needed to attain a 
socially acceptable distribution of income. 
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2. An unregulated economy would not necessarily prompt high and stable levels 
of output and employment.  Total spending in an economy may be cyclically 
volatile, thereby creating periods of waste caused by idle capacity, offset by 
periods of excessive spending and inflation.  Public sector entities would be 
needed to establish fiscal and monetary policies designed to maintain the 
economy at high levels of output and employment with reasonable stability in 
prices. 
3. The resources required to generate alternative goods and services are likely to 
be misallocated.  Differences in product imperfections, consumer preferences, 
and market-driven externalities may lead to excessive levels of production in 
some areas and insufficient levels in others.  The public sector would be 
required to possible provide taxes or subsidies to encourage efficient behavior 
or to possible take control of the provision of certain public goods and 
services to ensure an efficient pattern of resource use (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 
1972). 
Musgrave (1959) summarized that these potential free-market failures reflect the 
need for a public sector to resolve the problems of (a) the attainment of an equitable 
distribution of income, (b) the stabilization of high levels of employment coupled with 
stable prices, and (c) the establishment of an efficient methodology of allocating 
resources use if an economic system is to reach a Pareto optimum.  
Musgrave (1959) subsequently presented his three branch taxonomy by 
segregating the proper role of government into three separable branches:  (a) allocation 
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(efficiency), (b) distribution (equity), and (c) macroeconomic stabilization.  The 
stabilization and distribution functions would be under the jurisdictional control of a 
central form of government while the remaining allocation function would be 
disseminated amongst other sublevel governmental entities (Ewetan, 2012).  Oates (1972) 
found Musgrave’s three functions to be interdependent, where the determination of a 
welfare optimum necessitates a simultaneous solution for the distribution of income and 
the allocation of resources (p. 15).  For example, if a society desires to build a new fire 
station, the required planning would address the shifting of resources to public safety, a 
redistribution of income in favor of the owners of the resources required to acquire a new 
fire station and the recipients of the new fire protections services and a recognition that 
the aggregate demand for increased fire protection services will occur.  This example 
illustrates the complexity in applying the three public sector functions to an actual 
program. 
While Musgrave (1959) approached the concept of governance structure by 
theorizing which conceptual structure should be inherent in a governmental entity in 
order to achieve a welfare optimum, Oates (1972) found Musgrave’s concept lacking in 
its applicability to actual governmental processes and public programs.  Oates (1972) 
suggested that the true determination of a welfare optimum requires a simultaneous 
solution for all three public sector processes and that any public problem could result in 
an imbalanced allocative and redistributive impact on the various parties involved (p. 15).  
Case (2008) agreed with Musgrave’s conceptual structure being theoretically based on 
the premise that both the purpose of the economic system and the role of government is 
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the improvement of the well-being of individuals or households and that a “moral 
reference point is needed to reconcile the contradictions associated with the 
responsibilities of governing and the desirability of an individual-based utility approach 
to social well being” (Case, 2008, p. 355).   
If one accepts the role of public policy to be the guide for allocative, distributive 
and stabilizing public sector processes, the question remains as to which structure of 
governance is optimal for the provision of the public goods and services to best meet 
citizen demands.  Case’ suggestion, like Musgrave’s concept, only addresses the purpose 
and structure of government being centralized around the achievement of an “optimal” 
allocation of resources based on individual preferences, moral norms, and the need to 
implement community values into the allocation process.  Lacking is a discussion on 
exactly how a public sector function should be structured to logistically and operationally 
provide the desired allocation service to its citizenry.  What is needed is a shift of the 
theoretical discussion from what a conceptual structure should accomplish via the 
allocation process to normative discussion on how an actual governance structure could 
best be designed to achieve efficiency and equity in allocating income and resources.  
The theoretical debate on governance structure is wide and varied.  Oates (1972) 
launched this direction of discussion by suggesting that Musgrave’s conceptual structure 
provides the platform for a “convenient point of departure” for a normative study of 
governmental structure (p. 14).  
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Introduction to Fiscal Federalism 
 An examination of the optimal structural design of government should 
begin with an analysis of how the public sector structure format plays an important role 
in modern welfare economics.  Both classical and contemporary studies focus on the 
concept of fiscal federalism as an optimal structural form of government.  Fiscal 
federalism is a derivative of federalism–federalism being a political concept in which 
power to govern is shared between national and sub-national governments.  For a 
federation to be sustained, decision making authority should be placed at the lowest level 
possible instead of concentrating the process at the center (Ewetan, 2012, p. 1077).   
Accordingly, fiscal federalism theory centers on the allocation of taxing and 
expenditure responsibilities between hierarchical levels of government.  Each successive 
tier is independent in its authority to level taxes for the local of provision of public goods 
and services, yet each tier is complementary to other overlapping jurisdictions tasked 
with a similar public purpose (Ewetan, 2012; Wheare, 1963).  With many of these 
governmental relationships occurring within similar or overlapping jurisdictional 
boundaries, any one individual or other economic entity may be subject to the authority 
of several tiers of government (Hyman, 2008, p. 690).  
Due to the intertwined relationships occurring between these overlapping 
jurisdictions, fiscal federalism theory addresses which public sector functions are best 
centralized and which are best placed in decentralized levels of government (Oates, 
1999).  Given the vast number of public goods and services provided combined with 
varying geographical  and socioeconomic levels of consumption demand, no specific 
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level of government could possibly provide the perfect solution to optimally distributing 
public benefit.  Oates provided a possible solution to this issue by highlighting each form 
of government, centralized and decentralized, to provide a comparative framework to 
determine the proper methodology of allocation between the two forms of governmental 
hierarchy.   
Oates's Decentralization Theorem 
The understanding of the hierarchical governance structure between political 
entities within a federal environment is critical, as is the discussion of which format of 
governance, centralized, decentralized, or a combination of the two, is most beneficial.  
"Whether certain public goods and services should be provided on a centralized or 
decentralized jurisdictional level is a question of political relevance and has occupied 
politicians and economists for decades" (Hillesheim, 2012, p. 29).  As state and local 
governments increasingly struggle with balancing budgets and meeting constituent 
increasing demands for public goods and services, citizens, economists, and politicians 
alike have begun to question the current alignment of fiscal functions between different 
levels of government.  "While some of these pressures are primarily political in nature, it 
seems they also stem, in great measure, from the fact that the existing structure of the 
public sector has failed to perform its economic functions properly" (Oates, 1972, p. 5).   
Oates supported the establishment of the optimal governmental structure by 
stating that “within the framework of modern welfare economics, the effectiveness of an 
economic system is measured by the degree to which the system provides an equitable 
distribution of income and an efficient allocation of resources” (Oates, 1972).  Oates 
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questioned which “form of government promises the greatest success in resolving the 
allocation, distribution, and stabilization problems” (Oates, 1972, p. 3).  The debate 
requires an understanding of the key elements of each form of government.  By 
definition, a purely centralized form of government is considered unitary and one which 
assumes the full responsibility for providing the three functions of the public sector as 
described by Musgrave—allocation, distribution, and stabilization.  In contrast, a purely 
decentralized form of government begins with a central government entity that, in the 
extreme sense, has no economic responsibility (Oates, 1972).  Rather, smaller local 
governmental entities provide nearly all of the economic functions of the public sector.  
This theoretical comparison focuses on which organizational framework of the public 
sector, centralized, decentralized or some other form, best supports resources being 
allocated efficiently, income being equitably distributed, and high levels of employment 
and stability of prices being maintained.   
Strengths of a purely centralized form of government. 
Under the purely centralized form of government, policy decisions on the 
allocation of public goods and services are made at a national level, where the three 
economic functions of allocation, distribution, and stabilization are aggregated, and the 
centralized provision of goods and services theoretically results in the uniformity of the 
quality and quantity of public goods across the national spectrum (Oates, 1972).  This 
national preference for collective benefits is significant as national public goods are 
consumed by all members of the nation regardless of where they are located.  In regards 
to certain pure public goods such as national defense, social security, income 
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redistribution, and economic stability, a centralized form of government provides a level 
of public good provision efficiency that would be difficult to obtain through a collection 
of local government entities.  Hillesheim stated that "centralization always dominates 
decentralization in the case of identical regional preferences" (p. 31).  The strengths of a 
centralized form of government may be further elucidated through Oates' discussion of 
how this form develops efficiencies in each of the economic functions of allocation, 
distribution, and stabilization.  
In addressing the allocation of certain classes of public goods and services, Oates 
suggested that a centralized form of government is more likely to be successful in 
providing appropriate levels of output than a decentralized form of government.  "It is the 
responsibility of the public sector...to either institute incentives for private production 
or...to provide directly appropriate levels of output of those goods and services not 
forthcoming in efficient quantities through the operation of free markets" (Oates, 1972, p. 
8).  While some of these goods and services might be allocated to meet demand in 
selected areas of a national economy, other goods and services of a pure public good, 
such as a senior age retirement program, may be of a nature where they bestow certain 
benefits on everyone in the nation.   
In considering the distribution function of a public entity, Oates (1972) discussed 
the dilemma of a theoretically decentralized form of government desiring a more 
egalitarian distribution of income than the current market distribution by the 
incorporation of a negative income tax (p. 14).  Such a tax would require a transfer of 
income from those who are wealthy to those who are poor based solely on the 
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individual's level of income before taxes or transfers.  The difficulty of implementing 
such a tax structure in a decentralized environment is the high degree of individual 
mobility within in a national economy.  Such a tax policy would "create strong incentives 
for the wealthy to move out to neighboring municipalities and for the poor to migrate into 
the community" (Oates, 1972, p. 7).  Accordingly, a more egalitarian distribution of 
income may occur, but it would be more the result of a fall in per capita income due to an 
outflow of wealthy individuals and a corresponding influx of the poor (p. 7).   
This degree of individual mobility, however, is much less across national borders, 
allowing for tax policies at a centralized, concentric level of government to find better 
success at implementing redistributive programs.  Accordingly, Oates (1972) concluded 
that a centralized government would be "more effective in achieving the redistributional 
objectives of the society than is a governmental organization at the opposite end of the 
spectrum" (p. 8).   
Oates further suggested that in order to maximize the stability function of high 
levels of employment with stable prices, a centralized form of government is in a stronger 
position to exercise control over the size of the monetary system.  Absent this centralized 
authority, local governments would operate under their own respective fiscal spending 
policies and could, theoretically, increase funding by simply printing more money rather 
than tax their communities, an action which could lead to higher inflation.  In addition, 
local economies are highly open with many individuals typically purchasing goods and 
services from a number of other communities.   
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Oates (1972) stated that this highly mobile dynamic implies that leakages from a 
marginal dollar of private purchases in other jurisdictions could potentially be large, 
resulting in a potential nullification of local policy actions.  An example would be a 
reduction of tax on consumption expenditures implemented as a measure to expand the 
local economy.  Much of the expansionary effect of the tax could be lost as new 
discretionary income resulting from the tax cut could be spent in other jurisdictions.  A 
centralized government would, therefore, be in a better position to implement monetary 
and fiscal policy.  Oates contended that interjurisdictional shifts in economic activities 
have external impacts on neighboring communities as "cyclical movements in aggregate 
economic activity are largely national in scope…and can be best treated by counter-
cyclical policies operating on a nationwide scale" (Oates, 1972, p. 6). 
Strengths of a purely decentralized form of government. 
A fiscally decentralized form of government is one where sub-national 
governmental entities are given the responsibility over the provision and financing of 
public goods and services (Bjedov and Madies, 2010, p. 32).  While Oates recognized the 
strengths of a centralized form of government, he also recognized that "a basic 
shortcoming of a unitary form of government is its probable insensitivity to varying 
preferences among the residents of the different communities" (Oates, 1972, p. 11).   
While a centralized form of government creates a uniformity in public goods and 
services, the consumption demand for these goods may not be uniform as some 
individuals may desire an expanded or high-quality level of consumption, while others 
may consume less of a certain good or service with the anticipation that the lower level of 
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output would result in a simultaneous lower tax assessment.  Essentially, if a public good 
is consumed in equal amounts by everyone regardless of location, a centralized form of 
government suffices.  However, if the benefit of public goods is limited to individuals in 
a specific subset of the population, the provision of goods by a purely centralized form of 
government will be inherently inefficient.  A decentralized form of government is a 
partial solution as the level of efficiency is increased when the variety of output of certain 
public goods and services closely reflects the tastes and preferences of the individuals 
who make up society (Jimenez, 2009; Oates, 1972).   
Oates further suggested that a decentralized form of government provides certain 
welfare gains due to the high level of consumer mobility.  Oates relied upon previous 
research by Charles Tiebot description of how centralized and decentralized forms of 
government adapt to consumer preferences.  Tiebot (1956) stated a centralized form of 
government attempts to adjust to the pattern of consumer preferences whereas a 
centralized form of government various entities have their revenue and expenditure 
patterns fixed (p. 418).  Accordingly, when in an environment consisting of a number of 
adjacent jurisdictions offering varying consumption levels of public goods and services, 
the consumer has the opportunity to "vote with their feet" by selecting to locate in that 
jurisdiction which best represents his tastes.  This ability to choose, to relocate, and to 
select a fiscal package of public goods and services might approximate a market solution 
to the inefficiencies Oates found prevalent in a centralized form of government. 
Finally, Oates suggested that decentralization is advantageous as it provides for a 
more efficient level of public output because expenditure decisions are driven by true 
48 
 
costs of a good or service.  If a community is required to finance its own public programs 
through taxation, individuals will have an increased tendency to weigh the related 
taxation costs against the benefits to be obtained.  Whereas, if the same program were to 
be funded by a centralized government, individuals would be required to pay for only a 
small part of the program benefits, thus having an incentive to vote for and expand public 
programs to the maximum possible.  
The optimal form of government: Fiscal federalism. 
Both forms of government, purely centralized and purely decentralized, have 
comparative advantages and disadvantages in the economic functions of allocating, 
distributing, and stabilizing public resources.  Oates suggested that a decentralized form 
of government dominates centralized in the absence of interjurisdictional spillovers, and 
that absent economies of scale associated with centralized benefits and goods provision, a 
decentralized form of government is welfare enhancing (Oates, 1972; Oates, 2008, p. 
314).  In his summary, Oates (1972) pointed out that a centralized form of government is 
best suited for resolving distribution and stabilization problems, but fails when the 
provision of public goods is uniform in an environment of differing consumption 
demands across jurisdictions.  At the same time, a decentralized form of government 
meets consumer consumption demands on a local level, but fails at providing a consistent 
allocation of pure public goods when jurisdictions compete for public benefits.   
To resolve this dilemma, Oates proposed "a form of government that combines 
the advantages of these two polar forms and avoids the most serious shortcomings of 
each; a federal form of government meets this need" (Oates, 1972, p. 14).  Under this 
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federal format, both a centralized and a decentralized level of government operate in 
unison with each entity having responsibility for the provision of public goods and 
services within its respective geographical location.  The central government is 
responsible for stabilizing the economy, for distributing income fairly, and for providing 
those public goods and services that significantly impact the benefit of all members of 
jurisdiction, while the local decentralized government entities provide goods and services 
that are of primary interest to the constituency of their respective jurisdictions (Oates, 
1972, p. 14).   
This cooperative, yet autonomous, method of meeting the allocation, distribution, 
and stabilization requirements of the public sector make the federalism form the optimal 
form of government.  This hybrid form of public sector cooperation prompted Oates 
(1972) to propose his Decentralization Theorem:  
For a public good–the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets 
of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output 
of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central or for the respective 
local government–it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for 
local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their 
respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified 
and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions. (p. 35) 
Other Contributing Theories on Governmental Structure 
Regardless of Oates’ findings, there is continued debate on the optimal 
government structure.  Boettke et al. (2011) described a theoretical debate between two 
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philosophical camps—the consolidationists who suggest that a centralized, autonomous 
public sector entity is the optimal level of public good and service provision, versus the 
polycentrists who suggest that a decentralized governance system structured around 
multiple, lower-level governmental jurisdictions is more appropriate for this purpose (p. 
210).  Ostrom and Parks (1999) suggested a hybrid governance structure by concluding 
that: 
Neither a single layer of small production bureaus nor a single large bureau 
appears to have as high a performance potential as a complex mixed system with 
many smaller agencies producing some services and some intermediate and large 
agencies producing others.  (p. 292) 
Oates (1972) theory has a tendency to discount the presence of interjurisdictional 
spillovers and the fact that central policies are considered inherently uniform across the 
country.  In contrast, Greco (2003) and Banzhaf and Chupp (2012) argued that 
discounting these factors is unrealistic as decentralized governments respond better to 
local preferences, yet fail to recognize the costs of negative interjurisdictional spillovers 
to adjacent communities—such as air pollution and traffic—while centralized 
governments may internalize those spillovers yet are more likely to ignore local needs.  
Fiscal Imbalance Theory 
Under fiscal federalism theory, the role of government includes the power to 
allocate taxation and expenditure responsibilities within a multi-hierarchical format of 
government.  Within this hierarchy, Oates specifically outlined the theoretical central 
government being best suited to stabilize the economy, to distribute income fairly, and to 
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provide for public benefits and services that significantly benefit the population as a 
whole.  Simultaneously, political subdivisions of the central government are required to 
finance traditionally assigned local government functions with revenue sources based on 
each subdivision's fiscal capacity and level of demand for public services.   
A distinct problem arises as differing jurisdictions, by nature of their respective 
demographical factors, have differing levels of ability to raise economic resources.  If 
among the state's political subdivisions there exist significant disparities between fiscal 
capacities, the resulting variances in revenue generation potential may cause fiscal 
inequalities to occur between and within these sublevel jurisdictions.  Buchanan (1950) 
theorized that these variance differentials are neither unique nor the sole catalyst to 
increasing fiscal disparities between jurisdictions, and that the progressive increase in 
fiscal inequalities may also be attributed to three historical trends: (a) the continual 
industrialization, specialization, and integration of the economy on a national scale, (b) 
the involvement of government in the financial activity of the marketplace has increased, 
and (c) the increase in governmental activity in the operations of lower-level public 
sector entities due to higher demands for social service provision (p. 584).   
Vertical Versus Horizontal Fiscal Imbalances 
The forms of fiscal imbalance which exist in an economy vary depending on the 
relational comparison being made between two independent public entities in a federal 
system.  A vertical fiscal imbalance exists when the revenues of two differing 
hierarchical tiers of government are not sufficient to fund each member's expenditure 
requirements (Breton, 1996; Dahlby, 2005; Walter, 2004).  A vertical fiscal imbalance 
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requires a restructuring of the division of revenue and expenditure responsibilities 
between the two levels of government such that the actual revenue-expenditure 
asymmetry approaches the optimal form (Sharma, 2011, p. 104).  Many times a vertical 
fiscal imbalance is resolved by a transfer of funds from the over-endowed central 
government to the under-endowed sublevel government.  A horizontal fiscal imbalance 
occurs between two jurisdictions sharing a similar tier on the federal government 
hierarchy (Dahlby, 2005; Walter, 2004).  A horizontal fiscal imbalance occurs when 
differences exist in the ability of each jurisdiction to either raise a comparable level of tax 
revenues, or when two differing jurisdictions experience different cost levels of providing 
public benefits and services.  A horizontal fiscal imbalance is typically corrected by 
allocating an equalization payment from the more affluent entity to the needier entity. 
Buchanan and Fiscal Imbalance Theory 
Buchanan described the early years of United States history where most economic 
activity was limited to local markets.  Public goods and services were provided by local 
political entities whose geographical boundaries corresponded to these local markets.  
Buchanan suggested that the rapid developments in transportation and communication led 
to an emphasis on specialization of industrial processes.  As the economy became more 
productive, fiscal inequalities increased in the personal income and wealth individuals - 
leading to expanding individual differences and a closer concentration of higher income 
recipients in the more favored areas (Buchanan, 1950, p. 584).   
This geographical relocation of individuals and related wealth created fiscal 
disparities between jurisdictions.  In affluent localities, the level of fiscal capacity could 
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be greater as could the demand for certain public goods and services.  Simply put, those 
individuals with more discretionary income could be more receptive to paying a higher 
level of tax burden for an increased level of governmental services.  In contrast, the less 
affluent localities had a reduced level of fiscal capacity making it difficult for the 
governmental entity to fund and pay for a similar level of governmental services.  
Buchanan felt that the disparities and the discrepancies between fiscal capacity and public 
good demand were further accentuated by the historical shift of government services 
from a protective role, where the provision of public benefits is based on an individual's 
ability to pay, to a social services role where governmental services "were provided 
equally to all citizens, or based upon some basis of personal need" (Buchanan, 1950, p. 
586).   
To mitigate the fiscal inequities occurring between jurisdictions, Buchanan 
proposed the concept of an intergovernmental transfer system which would allow fiscally 
unequal political subdivisions to provide an equal level of services at an equal level of 
taxation.  Buchanan based this premise on Pigou's central tenant of equity in that 
"different persons should be treated similarly unless they are dissimilar in some relevant 
aspect" (Pigou, 1929, p. 9).  Under this "equal treatment for equals" concept, individuals 
living in jurisdictions of lower fiscal capacity have a greater degree of fiscal pressure 
originating from either a greater tax burden or a lower level of public services provision 
than do individuals living in areas of greater fiscal capacity.   
Tiebot (1956) hypothesized that individuals, having differing tastes, preferences, 
and capacity to pay taxes, will move from one community to another until they locate in a 
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jurisdiction that best maximizes their personal utility.  This may result in a higher level of 
expenditures without an accompanying improvement in the receiving jurisdiction’s tax 
base (Jimenez, 2009; Marcelli & Musso, 2001).  Tiebot’s theory reflected the migration 
risk that may occur when the level of fiscal pressure exceeds the level of personal utility.  
Faced with this pressure, individuals may migrate to other jurisdictions where the level of 
fiscal pressure is less.  Peterson (1981) modified Tiebot’s argument by highlighting the 
motivation for local governments to compete for mobile capital in order to promote their 
own economic development agendas.  Jimenez (2012) stated that this form of 
competition impacts expenditure policies of local governments as municipalities are 
forced into offering high benefit-cost ratios in order to attract capital (p. 82).   
To counteract this latter form of migration risk, an intergovernmental transfer 
system would provide an economic incentive for human and non-human resources to be 
retained in areas of greater fiscal pressure (Buchanan, 1950).  Essentially, when a high 
degree of fiscal disparity exists between sublevel jurisdictions, the central government 
could mitigate fiscal inequities by transferring funds from one jurisdiction to another.  
Buchanan found this concept fulfilling as the central government subsidy would balance 
the fiscal equation thereby sufficing the concept that citizens would be considered equals; 
however he also found it ironic that the central government must, through the 
intergovernmental fund transfers, violate a true equity precept by economically favoring 
individuals residing in the fiscally weaker jurisdictions.  Even with this contradiction, 
Buchanan rationalized this irony by stating that "neither the tax burdens nor the standards 
of public service need be equal...only that the residua be substantially the same" 
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(Buchanan, 1950, p. 591).  Following this form of logic, the policy objective of an 
intergovernmental transfer program, therefore, is to ensure equal fiscal treatment 
regardless of the domicile of the individual. 
To illustrate a simplistic model representation of the mechanics of an 
intergovernmental transfer system, suppose that within a hypothetical Federal 
Government W, there are two state jurisdictions, S and K, each with a population of 
1,000 citizens and with other interjurisdictional factors such as levels of employment 
being similar as well.  State S has an agriculturally-based economy, with an average 
annual per capita income of $32,000.  State K has a substantially developed high-tech 
industry sector affording its citizens an average annual per capita income of $53,000.  
Federal Government W has a progressive state tax structure generating a higher 
incremental level of tax per marginal dollar of income earned which contributes to per 
capita state tax burdens for states S and K are $650 and $1,250, respectively.  Table 1 
reflects a slightly higher effective tax burden rate in State K compared to State S due to 




Table 1  











State S 1,000 $32,000 $650 2.03% $650,000
State K 1,000 $53,000 $1,250 2.36% $1,250,000
Total taxes generated: $1,900,000
 
 
Even with similar population bases, State S possesses a theoretical fiscal capacity 
measured at $650,000 while State K enjoys a fiscal capacity measured at $1,250,000 - a 
figure nearly double that of State S due to the higher level of per capita income.  Except 
for the slight difference in the effective tax burden rate, equals are treated equally.  This 
comparison, however, reflects only the jurisdictional tax capacity of each community.  If 
the level of fiscal capacity is considered alone, the overall fiscal structure is considered 
equitable.  However, if both sides of the fiscal equation are included, fiscal capacity and 
the demand for public benefits and services, a significant inequity in the treatment of 
equals becomes apparent. 
Now suppose that Federal Government W provides an expenditure level of 
publicly provided services, using the combined $1,900,000 tax revenue received from 
both sublevel jurisdictions, such that each jurisdiction receives an equal amount of public 
benefit expenditure - equals being equal.  Table 2 reflects the distribution of public 




Table 2  







State S 1,000 $950 $950,000
State K 1,000 $950 $950,000
Total public benefits received: $1,900,000
 
 
 The public benefit distribution is expended equally, with no consideration 
given to the fiscal capacity of either jurisdiction.  Here in lies the inequity of the Federal 
Government W's fiscal structure.  Table 3 reflects the calculation of taxes paid versus 
benefits received for each state jurisdiction. 
Table 3 
Surplus (Deficit) Position of States S and K 
Federal Government W
State S
Revenue paid to Federal Government W $650,000
less: benefits received from Federal Government W (950,000)
Surplus (deficit) fiscal imbalance ($300,000)
State K
Revenue paid to Federal Government W $1,250,000
less: benefits received from Federal Government W (950,000)
Surplus (deficit) fiscal imbalance $300,000
 
 
State S generated and submitted $650,000 in tax revenue to Federal Government 
W while receiving in return $950,000 in federal benefit expenditure, thereby incurring a 
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fiscal deficit imbalance in the residuum amount of ($300,000).  Conversely, State K 
generated and submitted to Federal Government W while receiving in return $1,250,000 
in federal benefit expenditure, thereby enjoying a fiscal surplus imbalance in the 
residuum amount of $300,000.  The resulting equal and offsetting interjurisdictional 
fiscal residuum reflect the level of fiscal disparity occurring between the two states.  If, 
under Buchanan's theory of an intergovernmental transfer system, a transfer were made 
using the remaining $300,000 in surplus fiscal imbalance from State K to State S to 
subsidize its deficit fiscal imbalance, the resulting residuum are effectively eliminated.  
This intergovernmental transfer enables equals to be equals, as a comparison of the two 
states shows materially similar effective tax burden rates and jurisdictional spending 
received levels.  The irony cannot be missed, as Buchanan noted in his model, that 
residents of State K are effectively paying for public services provided in State S.    
For consideration and application to other potential studies, Buchanan provided 
alternative methodologies to the intergovernmental transfer system to bring about fiscal 
equilibrium between sublevel public entities.  Rather than the utilization of a 
intergovernmental transfer, a geographically determined personal income tax program 
could be implemented assigning varying tax rates to individual sublevel jurisdictions so 
as to mitigate disparities in interjurisdictional fiscal capacities; this methodological use of 
vary tax rates among equals would closely achieve the equity goal (Buchanan, 1950, p. 
595).  The political benefits of a discriminatory central government personal income tax 
is that it would allow for an interjurisdictional transfer effect to occur without requiring 
the need for an increase in overall central government tax rates.  Buchanan noted that the 
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difficulty in implementing such a plan would be significant constitutional barriers 
existing in the United States where the courts have "held repeatedly that the uniformity of 
taxation required was geographical in nature" (Buchanan, 1950, p. 596). 
Transition From Theory to Application of Research Variables 
State governments have experienced unprecedented erosion in revenues as a result 
of the economic recession.  According to the National League of Cities (NLC) ‘Fiscal 
Conditions in 2012’ report, state and local government finance officers report of their 
continuing struggle with the economic impacts of depressed housing markets, slow 
consumer spending, and high levels of unemployment (Pagano, Hoene, & MacFarland, 
2012).  Between 2007 and 2009, average real family income fell by 17 percent, by far the 
largest overall drop since the great depression (Saez, 2012).  These economic impacts 
have a direct effect on public sector revenues as property, sales, income, and excise tax 
collections make up nearly 80 percent of general government revenues (National 
Association of State Budget Officers, 2011).  Historic levels of foreclosures and declines 
in assessed valuations of real property have had a suppressing effect on real property tax 
revenues.   
Any relief from this effect is not expected in the near future as collections of 
property taxes lag behind improvements in housing prices by 3 years (Lutz, 2008, p. 
66).  Simultaneously, the loss of personal income caused by high levels of 
unemployment have created downward pressures on consumer spending, which in turn 
erodes sales and other forms of consumption-related state tax revenue.  Impairments in 
these forms of state tax revenue put financial support for unemployment, medical 
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assistance, food stamps, and other social welfare programs at extreme risk (Jimenez, 
2009; Chernick & Rechovsky, 2003).   
State governmental spending has not fared any better as the drastic reduction in 
nearly every form of tax revenue leave states with no other option than to make offsetting 
cuts in expenditures.  These offsetting expenditure reductions are required as all states, 
with the exception of Vermont, operate under some form of legislative or constitutional 
rule requiring a balanced budget.  By mid-year 2010, 38 states still forecasted lower 
levels of spending in fiscal year 2011 compared to 2008, with fiscal year 2010 general 
fund expenditures down 7.3 percent from 2009 (National Association of State Budget 
Officers, 2011).   
The loss of revenues was not the only factor impacting public spending.  High 
levels of unemployment have a cause and effect relationship with an increased need for a 
number of public welfare services.  The reduction in personal household income has a 
direct effect on the need for unemployment claim payments and job training programs.  
Unemployed individuals may lose health insurance benefits, causing an increased 
financial stress on hospitals and local health clinics.  Public safety costs increase as well 
as "crime rates increase during economic downturns, increasing the need for police 
services" (Congressional Budget Office, 2010).  In some cases, individuals losing their 
employment shift from using personal vehicles to public transportation putting a higher 




Political subdivisions within a federal structure each have their own intrinsic 
socioeconomic characteristics which respond differently to economic fluctuations.  Due 
to each jurisdiction’s having different levels of fiscal capacity combined with varying 
demand pressures from each jurisdiction’s constituency, changes in economic variables 
will have different effects depending on the nature and composition of each jurisdictions 
economy.   
Fiscal Imbalance Ratio 
In the United States, each state generates, collects, and remits federal income, 
excise, estate, and gift taxes to the United States Treasury via the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS).  These funds are pooled and reallocated back to each state based on the 
demand level for various goods and services.  In practice, it is rare that a state’s 
expenditure demand requirement for goods and services will equal exactly the amount of 
tax and fee revenue generated.  Accordingly, some state jurisdictions will receive more in 
public goods and services expenditures than the amount of tax revenue generated; other 
jurisdictions will generate more in tax and fee revenue than they receive in public goods 
and services.   
For the purpose of this study, a fiscal imbalance represents the differential 
mismatch between the governmental revenues generated by a jurisdiction and the level of 
expenditures required to meet the jurisdiction’s constituent demand for public goods and 
services.  The imbalance is presented in ratio form with the numerator reflecting a 
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measure of federal spending received and the denominator reflecting the amount of 
federal revenues generated and paid to the U.S. government.   
Fluctuations in the economic factors within each state may impact the state’s 
fiscal imbalance ratio differently than other jurisdictions.  In terms of fiscal capacity, one 
state may have a higher level of commercial retail development which generates a 
comparably higher level of revenue growth than other states during prosperous periods of 
time, yet the same state may experience a higher level of revenue erosion during 
economic recessions as sales tax revenues are highly sensitive to shifts in economic 
conditions.  In terms of demand levels for public goods and services, one state may have 
an agriculturally oriented economic base which experiences seasonal fluctuations and a 
higher sensitivity to negative economic conditions; both of these scenarios may result in a 
higher demand level for public safety net services, such as low income housing or 
unemployment payments, than other state jurisdictions.  Each state has its own mix and 
economic composition of socioeconomic factors which may respond differently to 
fluctuations in the economic environment than its neighboring jurisdictions.   
Of interest to this study was the observation measurement of examine how 
fluctuations in unemployment percentage rate by state, the percentage of the population 
over age 65 by state, the level of per capita income by state, the percent of state 
population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial 
Activity by state, and per capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the 
United States are related to fluctuations in the dependent variable, the net change in 




One of the most widely recognized indicators of an economic recession is higher 
unemployment rates.  Figure 2 shows that from 2004 through 2007 the national 
unemployment rate had been hovering at an average of 5.0 percent.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Unemployment during recessionary periods.   
Source: Bureau of Labor & Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor (2012).  BLS spotlight 
on statistics: The recession of 2007-2009.  Retrieved from 
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012 /recession/pdf/ recession_bls_spotlight.pdf.  
Permission per Title 17 U.S.C., Section 105. 
 
According to the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, national unemployment reached 
its peak at 10.0 percent in October of 2009 - the highest rate in nearly 30 years (Bureau of 
Labor and Statistics, 2012, p. 2).  Most notable in Figure 2 is the increased level in the 
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long-term unemployment share rate, representing those who have been unemployed for 
27 weeks or longer.   
While the current fiscal recession was initiated by a severe contraction in the 
housing market, the high levels of unemployment lingering through the last few years 
have been an impediment to the economy experiencing a healthy economic rebound 
(Diamond, 2013, p. 31).  With the economic remnants of the economic recession still 
remaining several years after its inception, a critical question lingers as well regarding 
why unemployment has not significantly abated.  Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012a) 
suggested that the weak recovery in unemployment stems from high levels of market 
uncertainty regarding federal economic policy which causes reluctance in households and 
businesses to spend, invest, and hire (p. 39).  Diamond (2013) studied the concepts of 
cyclical versus structural unemployment to interpret how shifts in the Beveridge Curve 
observed during the recession may signal new levels of long-term unemployment in the 
United States.  Frazis and Ilg (2009) analyzed labor status flows to determine how 
changes in unemployment rates and employment-population ratios during the current 
recession differs those of previous recessions.   
The Beveridge Curve is a graphical representation of the ratio of job openings to 
unemployment rate and is considered an appropriate methodology of measuring how well 
the labor market is functioning (Diamond, 2013).  Typically, the relationship between job 
openings and unemployment is reciprocal with lower openings and higher levels of 
unemployment expected during periods of economic recession.  By observing shifts in 
the Beveridge Curve during and after the recent recession, Diamond observed two 
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distinct periods when job opening rates appeared to increase with immaterial changes in 
the unemployment rate.  Stating that shifts along the Beveridge curve signify cyclical 
changes in unemployment, Diamond (2013) questioned if the erratic pattern of movement 
observed during and after the recession may signify that the fluctuations may be 
structural in nature, and that higher levels of long-term unemployment may now be the 
“new normal” in the United States economy (p. 33).  Through the combined analysis of 
previous literature and unemployment data gathered from the recessionary period, 
Diamond suggested that recent erratic movements may simply reflect that the pool of 
long-term unemployed workers has simply increased, that recruiting and hiring practices 
were remaining stagnant, that federally extended provision of unemployment benefits has 
resulted in an increased amount of time unemployed workers will remain out of the 
workforce, and that inadequate aggregate labor demand is a contributing factor to 
unemployment rates remaining at high levels.  
Frazis and Ilg (2009) took a similar approach to Diamond’s by analyzing shifts in 
unemployment rates and employment-population ratios.  Using data from the Bureau of 
Labor and Statistics (BLS), Frazis and Ilg calculated that during the period from March 
2007 to December 2009, the percentage change in the jobless rate rose 2.8% while the 
employment-population ratio decreased by 2.3%.  Of interest to Frazis and Ilg were the 
levels of employment flows into and out of the workforce.  By categorizing workers into 
the three labor force states of employment (E), unemployment (UE), and not in the labor 
force (N), the authors measured and compared the velocity at which workers moved 
between the three categories during the recent recessionary period and previous 
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recessions.  The author’s comparison found that while labor flows out of employment 
were similar in all recessionary periods, labor flows back into the employment state 
during the recent recession were lagging behind similar flows of past recessions.  
Interestingly, the observation of a slowness to reenter the workforce by unemployed 
individuals regardless of job availability mirrors the results found by Diamond.   
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012b) also observed the sluggishness of output 
growth and high levels of unemployment.  Rather than looking at quantitative ratios of 
economic fluctuations, Baker et al. were interested in measuring economic policy 
uncertainty and its effect on economic performance.  The authors used a previously 
developed index of economic policy uncertainty (Baker et al., 2012a) consisting of the 
combined measures of press coverage of policy related uncertainty, the number of tax 
code revisions expiring in the future, and observed disagreements among economic 
forecasters as a proxy for uncertainty.   
By plotting the levels of economic uncertainty over time, the authors found that 
the level of economic uncertainty has been higher during the recent recession and that 
short-term movements in economic uncertainty are similar to measurements of policy 
related uncertainty more during recent years than previous periods.  Baker et al. (2012b) 
concluded by confirming their view of policy uncertainty having a profound impact due 
to policy uncertainty being at historically high levels the last four years, that policy-
related concerns represent a larger share of overall economic uncertainty, and that the 




Percent of Population Over Age 65 
In 2011, the oldest members of the "Baby Boom" generation turned 65.  As has 
been observed since post-World War II, this cohort of aging individuals will affect many 
of the social service, medical, and economic structures of the U.S. as they move through 
the maturation phase of their life cycle.  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that, according to the 
U.S. Census Bureau, the number of people in the United States over age 65 is expected to 
grow from 35 million in 2000 to 89 million in 2050 which will representing 20.3% of the 
total U.S. population (Wiener & Tilly, 2013):   
 
 
Figure 3.  Projected U.S. population 60+ 1900-2050. 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Retrieved online at 
http://www.aoa.acl.gov/Aging_Statistics/future_growth/future_growth.aspx.  Permission 


































Figure 4.  Percent of population 65+ 1900-2050. 
Note: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Projections for 2010 through 
2050 are from: Table 12.  Projections of the Population by Age and Sex for the United 
States: 2010 to 2050 (NP2008-T12), Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau; Release 
Date: August 14, 2008.  Retrieved online at http://www.aoa.acl.gov/Aging_Statistics/ 
future_growth/future_growth.aspx.  Permission per Title 17 U.S.C., Section 105. 
 
This rapid growth of the older age component of the economy will dramatically 
impact health care costs as the demand for Medicare and nursing homes, as well as for 
the treatment of dementia, heart disease, and osteoporosis—rather than acute illnesses 
(Schneider & Guralnik,1990; Wiener & Tilly, 2002).  Those over age 65 also tend to be 
bigger recipients of government spending for education, pensions and health care.   
These demographical dynamics are economically important as public 
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official government projections for Medicare and Social Security expenditures for long-
term care expenditures. 
  
Table 4  
Percent of GDP for Federal Healthcare Programs 
Program 2000 2050 
Percent 
change 
Medicare 2.2 6 173 
Social security 4.2 6.5 55 
Medicaid long-term care 0.4 0.7 95 
Total 6.8 13.2 94 
Source: Board of Trustees (2001).  The 2001 Annual report of trustees of the Federal 
Old-Age and Survivor’s Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust funds.  Baltimore, MD: 
Social Security Administration. 
 
The projected rise in the national Dependency Ratio, the ratio of economically 
inactive compared to economically active, as social program costs increase dramatically 
will challenge policy makers to fund an increase in expenditure demand from a 
demographic segment of the population which contributes a smaller proportional amount 
to federal tax revenues (Wiener & Tilly, 2002).    
The social program costs for the aging is not the only issue concerning decision 
makers regarding the percent of population over age 65.  The American public is a very 
mobile public.  Tiebot (1956) theorized that individuals are fully mobile, and are fully 
informed of the wide variations in levels and mixes of local expenditure and tax burdens 
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that exist between neighboring jurisdictions.  Accordingly, many senior citizens will 
select a community in which to reside depending how a jurisdiction best matches the 
individual's tastes and preferences for public benefits and services.  Individuals seeking 
community attributes of lower tax rates, cheaper housing, better traffic routing, a slower 
pace of life, and the ability to leave the deteriorating core of central cities (Hyman, 2008, 
p. 696).  With the proliferation of the automobile, individuals may live in one community 
while at the same time demanding services from an adjacent community.  While Tiebot's 
model explained individual motivations to relocate to different communities, the model 
ignores the interjurisdictional externality costs or benefits that occur when individuals in 
one community may pay for or consume public services that were decided on in an 
adjacent community.   
One of the guiding precepts to Buchanan's (1950) fiscal imbalance theory is the 
recognition that different jurisdictions have varying levels of the fiscal capacity needed to 
provide a standard package of public goods and services.  “The proportion of the 
population age 65 and over varies by state…this proportion is partly affected by the state 
fertility and mortality levels and partly by the number of older and younger people who 
migrate to and from the state” (Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics, 
2012, p. 3).  In addition, various socioeconomic factors within a jurisdiction cause 
fluctuations in the demand for public services based on each jurisdiction's demographic 
mix.  Theoretically, a more aged jurisdiction with a less developed economic based may 
suffer more economically than an affluent jurisdiction that may be insulated from the 
negative impacts of a recession.   
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Per Capita Income 
The elements that determine per capita income across communities varies 
geographically because neither economic development nor labor force factors are 
homogenous across political jurisdictions.  Local government revenues vary on a per 
capita basis due to different levels of fiscal capacity factors occurring between 
jurisdictions.  Krueger's seminal work on per capita income differences between 
countries began with the acknowledgement that "the days when a single factor—capital, 
skills, entrepreneurship—was believed to be the key to economic development...have 
long since passed" (Krueger, 1968, p. 641).  Krueger felt that little research had been 
performed to quantify the degree to which other explanatory variables, such as capital or 
trade skill levels, may cause differentials in per capita income.  If one could determine 
that most of the differential is the result of uneven factor endowments then resource 
accumulation would be the basis for economic development analysis; if resource 
disparities have little observed impact on per capita income differentials, then research 
should be focused on models that study resource inputs to resource outputs (Krueger, 
1968, p. 641).   
In an effort to craft a methodology of determining material factor roles causing 
per capita income disparities, Krueger (1968) suggested that three human capital 
variables determine at least half of the per capita income variances between regions: (a) 
years of education—representing the best measure of investment in an individual, (b) age 
distribution—a factor which impacts population growth and productivity, and (c) urban-
rural distribution of the population—spatial distribution being a factor in determining 
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income per individual (p. 647).  While Krueger’s study appears to address human capital 
alone as a significant component of per capita income differential analysis, absent is a 
clear reference to the impacts productivity and factor price may contribute to the 
equation. 
Counter to Krueger’s position, Kahn (2009) suggested that differences in per 
capita income across jurisdictions are not a result of the availability of capital and labor; 
differences in per capita income are the result of varying levels of efficiency at which 
production factors are used (p. 11).  Kahn (2009) describes the elements of growth 
accounting - the classical economics approach to explaining differences in income per 
person by dissecting gross domestic product (GDP) into capital per worker, human 
capital per worker, and total factor productivity (TFP).  TFP represents the both the 
efficiency in which the inputs of labor and capital are used, and the level of residual 
output remaining after accounting for the physical and human capital  (Kahn, 2009, p. 
17).  According to Kahn, this dissection process leads the reader to conclude that 
differences in per capita income across jurisdictions is attributable to differences in the 
amount of physical capital available, or the level of technical training received by each 
worker (p. 15).   
To other researchers, this conclusion is misleading as illustrated through recent 
research by both Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) which 
supports the theory that between 50 to 70 percent of the observed differences in per 
capita income comes from differences in TFP.  Essentially, less affluent jurisdictions are 
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poorer, not due to less capital and skill levels per worker, but because these jurisdictions 
use these factors less efficiently than others. 
The Percent of State Population Below the Federal Poverty Level 
The United States has one of the highest rates of poverty in the Western world 
(Iceland, 2006).  The irony is that the United States is also the wealthiest nation in the 
world in terms of GDP per capita with all other countries GDP measurements falling 
“within a tight range of 12 percentage points in their GDP per capita, from 69 to 81 
percent of the U.S. level” (Smeeding, 2006, p. 70).  One of the fundamental reasons the 
U.S. has one of the highest poverty rates while at the same time being the richest nation 
lies in the fact that the nature and causes of poverty in the United States is greatly 
misunderstood, and that the U.S. has a much more unequal distribution of income that 
other industrialized nations (Jantti, 2009; Rank, 2006).   
There are many reasons why poverty is an important issue in the study of fiscal 
imbalance.  Studies on the adverse effects of poverty on the developmental growth, and 
the physical and mental stability of youth have shown that children raised in poverty are 
more likely to worse off in self-esteem, school achievement, and in anti-social behavior 
(Smeeding, 2006).  Individuals suffering in these areas might find it difficult to find 
living wage employment in their adult years, thereby placing greater demand strain on the 
provision of social support programs.  In addition, much of the economic growth in the 
United States was fueled by a vibrant middle class.  “As the demand for new technology 
soared, so did technological innovation, productivity, and wages and benefits…increasing 
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the number of people who can purchase goods and services; that in turn, stimulates 
economic growth and raises the average standard of living” (Iceland, 2006, p. 3).   
Nijhawan and Dubas (2006) researched the relationship between poverty and 
income inequality by studying economic data from across the 50 U.S. states.  The study 
confirmed an inverse relationship between income inequality and income growth finding 
that income inequality may actually cause income growth thereby reducing poverty in the 
future.  Other research has shown that spatially-related income inequality is important 
when considering how different jurisdictions respond to economic growth in mitigating 
poverty (Bourguignon, 2004; Joshi & Gebremedhin, 2012; Ravillion, 1997).   
With a highly and increasingly unequal distribution of income fueling an even 
greater disparity in both relative and absolute poverty, the long-term spatial effect of 
poverty on the relative measure of interjurisdictional fiscal imbalances between states is 
significant as poverty reduces produces a two-fold adverse impact on a jurisdiction’s 
fiscal imbalance ratio.  First, lower levels of per capita income in one state, in relation to 
other states, comparatively reduces the poorer jurisdiction’s tax generating capacity.  At 
the same time, a higher percentage of individuals living in poverty in one state create a 
higher demand level for unemployment benefits, medical care subsidies, and other social 
safety net services compared to other more affluent states.  Accordingly, the 
measurement of the level of individuals living below the federal poverty level may have 
an important relationship to the level of fluctuations in aggregate fiscal imbalances during 
periods of economic instability.   
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The Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity 
One conceptual component of fiscal imbalance theory is the understanding of 
fiscal differentials existing between jurisdictional elements of a federal system.  These 
fiscal differentials evolve when either the tax generation capacity or the level of demand 
for public goods and services between jurisdictions lack equivalency in measurement 
(Buchanan, 1950).  With certain jurisdictions being economically weaker than others, an 
obvious objective of for decision makers might focus on the need for encouraging 
equivalency and expanding economic growth within poorer jurisdictions.   
Solow (1956) developed an economic growth model that included a list of 
economic factors which contribute to economic development—a list which included the 
concept of entrepreneurship as a key component to observed economic growth.  
Holcombe (1998) suggested that the inclusion of entrepreneurial activity into economic 
growth models illuminates the concept that “the engine of economic growth is 
entrepreneurship, not technology advance or investment in human capital” (p. 60).  
Wong, Ho, and Autio (2005), studying the effect of entrepreneurship at the country level, 
found that only high-level entrepreneurship impacts economic growth, and that firms 
experiencing rapid levels of growth are more significant than new or start-up firms.  Acs 
and Armington (2006) concluded that the understanding of the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth is better situated at the sub-national or state level 
as local public entities are more homogenous, and there is superior mobility of human 
and non-human factors between states than at the federal level (p. 141).   
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There are numerous indices used to measure the impacts of entrepreneurial 
activity on economic growth.  The Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA) index 
defines the impact of governmental market interference on a national free market 
economies and how taxation, spending, and regulation effect entrepreneurship (Ashby, 
Bueno, & McMahon, 2011; Powell & Weber, 2013).  The Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor Consortium (GEM) is a wide ranging indices measurement of entrepreneurial 
activity across a number of countries (Hafer, 2013; Wong et al., 2005).  The Kauffman 
Index for Entrepreneurial Activity (KIEA), a superior measure of state entrepreneurial 
activity, explains state-level entrepreneurial activity as a component of economic growth 
(Hafer, 2013; Hall & Sobel, 2008; Powell & Weber, 2013).   
The KIEA index, using state-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey (CPS), measures the percentage of the adult, non-business-owning 
population which start a new business each year.  In addition to measuring the 
comprehensive level of business start-up activity, the KIEA index calculates separate 
estimates for specific demographic groups, for each of the 50 U.S. states, and for certain 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  “The KIEA index provides the only national 
measure of business creation by specific demographic groups” (Fairlie, 2014).  An 
analysis of state-level fiscal imbalance fluctuations should include an index gauging any 
potential relationship between new business activity and the fiscal capacity expansion of 
a jurisdiction.  Due to the availability of state-level indices for all years, and the 
robustness and depth of its index components, the KIEA index will be used as a measure 
of entrepreneurial activity occurring within the 48 contiguous U.S. states for this study.   
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Per Capita GSP by Statei as a Percentage of Per Capita GDP in the United States - 
GDPUS.   
GSP is a measurement of a state's economic output calculated as the combination 
of all value-added activities from all industries in the state.  GSP is the state-level 
derivative of a nation’s GDP, with GDP representing the market value of goods and 
services produced by labor and property capital within the United States, regardless of 
nationality.  One of the key issues connected to interjurisdictional fiscal imbalance 
analysis is whether the overall GSP disparity levels contract or expand during cyclical 
economic periods of time.   
The velocity at which fiscal imbalances levels diverge or converge can be 
categorized into two different types of divergence models: (a) sigma convergence, or σ-
convergence, is when the overall variation of income or other economic factors across a 
jurisdictional population decreases—most frequently measured by fluctuations in the 
standard deviation or coefficient of variation of a given economic variable such as GSP, 
and (b) beta convergence, or β-convergence, when the convergence velocities vary within 
a population of states depending on the level of fiscal affluence of each individual entity, 
thereby allowing poorer states economies to potentially grow at a faster rate than a richer 
state (Wodon & Yitshaki, 2001).   
Paas and Schlitte (2006) in a study of GDP convergence factors impacting 
regional income disparities in the European Union (EU-25) determined that beta and 
sigma convergence are mutually exclusive, that the speed of convergence occurs 
differently between regional and nation levels, and that tests for spatial autocorrelation 
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between regions determined that convergence velocities within a state jurisdiction are 
affected by contiguous jurisdictions (p. 19).  Garrett et al. (2005) used GSP as a 
measurement variable to determine the existence of spatial correlations in regional fiscal 
disparities and income growth between the 50 U.S. states.  The researchers found positive 
spatial correlation in income growth across contiguous states.  However the strength of 
the spatial correlation varied between geographic regions.   
Garret et al. (2005) concluded that spatial correlations between states are 
complex, and that further research is warranted to understand how various economic 
factors impact growth dynamics, and that state decision makers should pay close 
attention to the fiscal policies of neighboring states, as state-level policies can have 
significant influence over growth in adjacent states (p. 17).  For these reasons, GSP is 
chosen as an independent variable in this study due to its relevance as an empirically 
accepted measure of economic growth, and as a valid economic measure of economic 
output at the state level. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This literature review develops the ground work for the study and includes a 
review of the theoretical and thematic concepts which frame the how public entities 
allocate and distribute public goods and services in a manner which stabilizes an 
economy, how the responsibility for the delivery of various forms of public goods and 
services are assigned to different hierarchical levels within multi-tiered governmental 
structure, and how a central form of government might mitigate economic deficiencies 
that occur between its sublevel political jurisdictions.  The variables of unemployment 
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percentage rate by state, the percentage of the population over age 65 by state, the level 
of per capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty 
level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and per capita GSP by 
state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United are highlighted to illustrate how 
socioeconomic factors play an important part in fiscal imbalance dynamics that exist 
between state jurisdictions.   
The literature review exposes certain gaps in the literature regarding alternative 
methodologies that could be used to mitigate fiscal imbalances that occur as these 
socioeconomic factors fluctuate during economic cycles.  The present study sought to 
provide greater detail of the causes of fiscal imbalance fluctuations so that decision 
makers may address fiscal disparities at their economic roots rather than simply funding 
disparities after the fact. 
Chapter 3 outlines the design and research methodologies used to observe and 
measure fluctuations in the independent variables and how any fluctuations might impact 
the levels of fiscal imbalances occurring within the 48 contiguous U.S. states.  Chapter 4 
highlights the results of the proposed research, while chapter 5 provides a summarizing 
discussion of the findings of the research questions and data, a recommendation for future 
study and organizational practice, in addition to research implications for social change.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
Introduction 
The goal of this quantitative study was to examine the potential relationships 
between fluctuations in key socioeconomic factors and changes in aggregate fiscal 
imbalance levels in the United States during the years of 2000 through 2010.  The 
information in Chapter 3 includes the research problem, the research design and rationale, 
the research questions and related hypotheses, the sample data, study methodology, and 
the selected study approach.  The discussion also includes sections addressing data 
collection and the data analysis plan, threats to validity, and ethical considerations of the 
research.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the rationale for using a quantitative 
longitudinal design addressing the research problem, an explanation of the procedures 
used to support or reject the null hypotheses, and a discussion of the potential for social 
change.   
Research Design and Rationale 
Research design, the overall plan of structure of a study, consists of clearly stated 
research questions and the related plans for compiling, processing, and interpreting data 
to answer the questions (Singleton & Straits, 2010).  Singleton and Straits (2010) 
described a quantitative study as one that analyzes values or categories of numbers to 
observe if differences between categories can be expressed numerically.  The data-
analysis techniques of a quantitative study depend on whether the intent of the study is 
descriptive, explanatory, or a hybrid of the two methods.  The objective of a researcher 
using a descriptive study is to describe some phenomenon by focusing on relatively few 
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dimensions of a specific entity and measuring the dimension systematically and precisely, 
usually with detailed numeric data (Singleton & Straits, 2010, p. 108).  The objective of a 
researcher using an explanatory study is to investigate possible relationships between two 
or more variables and to attempt to explain these relationships in terms of cause and 
effect (Singleton & Straits, 2010, p. 267).  These formalized procedural methodologies of 
study research assist in guiding researchers in quantitative research analysis (Aczel & 
Sounderpandian, 2009; Creswell, 2009).   
Within the realm of study methodologies are those models used to observe and 
measure changes that occur throughout a process or phenomenon, and in which the 
function of time are an important element of the research design.  According to Salkind 
(2000), there are two basic developmental research methods that are used to describe 
changes or differences in behavior within a framework of age, stage, or other 
measurement of time: (a) cross-sectional method and (b) longitudinal method (p. 200).  
The cross-sectional method is used to examine several elements of a study design at one 
specific point in time, whereas the longitudinal method assesses changes in a certain 
behavior of a variable at more than one measured point, or wave, in time.  Of the two 
methods, the longitudinal method reveals extensive detail on the development or trend of 
a process over an extended period of time, whereas the cross-sectional method provides 
no indication of as to the direction of change that a group might take (Salkind, 2000, p. 
202; Yan & Lou, 2008).   
Rather than attempting to influence or manipulate the identified explanatory 
variables or events in any way, the purpose for choosing a quantitative, longitudinal 
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design methodology for this study was to develop informed responses to the research 
questions by observing, analyzing, and interpreting measurements of a multiyear 
economic phenomenon.  Essentially a fact-finding exercise, the purpose of using a 
longitudinal research design in this study was to examine how fluctuations in of 
unemployment percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the 
level of per capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal 
poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per 
capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States may be related 
to corresponding changes in aggregate fiscal imbalance levels during the 11-year period 
of 2000 to 2010.  Additionally, the purpose of this quantitative model was to use statistics 
to compare the annual level of statistical variance in fiscal imbalance ratios of each state 
to the annual changes in the various socioeconomic factors to determine if possible 
relationships exist between all of the explanatory variables, and if so, which changes in 
economic factors have a higher relational strength to observed changes in levels of fiscal 
imbalance.   
The choice of a longitudinal design is consistent with contemporary research 
designs used to advance knowledge in the discipline of governmental fiscal policy and 
economic performance.  Of particular interest to this study, within the realm of 
longitudinal design study formats, was the use of time-series-cross-section (TSCS) 
modeling in the prototypical empirical analysis of comparative fiscal politics and public 
sector economic performance.  TSCS data are the most commonly used data in any 
comparison of political units, and any study that compares political units such as regions, 
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states, or counties within a single public entity (Beck & Katz, 2011, p. 332).  Beck (2001) 
stated that “TSCS data are characterized by repeated observations (often annual) on the 
same fixed non-sampled political units (usually states or countries)”   (p. 271).  TSCS 
data analysis incorporates a three-dimensional data analysis structure using multiple units 
and multiple variables, over multiple periods of time.  Figure 5 shows the three-
dimensional structure of this study consisting of the analysis of multiple economic 
variables, with multiple states, measured over multiple periods of time: 
 
 
Figure 5.  Three-dimensional structure of a TSCS plan design for 48 U.S. states.   
Note: Adapted from Wlezian, C. (1999).  Presidential polls as a time series: The case of 
1996.  Public Opinion Quarterly, 63(2), 163-177.  Permission for use licensed through 




A common TSCS design structure in comparative econometric studies of the U.S. 
states is where an economic performance measure or policy objective is regressed against 
a number of economic variables (Beck, 2001; Fiorina, 1994; Fording, 1997; 
Hollingsworth, Hanneman, Hage, & Ragin, 1996; Smith, 1997).  In a comparison of 
panel data and TSCS data as two subsets of a longitudinal design, there are inherent 
differences between the two processes.  Panel data is repeated cross-section data where 
the units of measurement are sampled, yet only observed a few times—whereas TSCS 
units are fixed with no sampling scheme for the units and any reapplication of the study 
model must retain the units fixed and complete (Beck, 2001, p. 113; Freedman & Peter, 
1984).  In the use of panel data, all inferences of interest are on the elements of the 
population that were sampled rather than being conditioned on the selected sample (Beck, 
2001, p. 113).  In the use of TSCS data, “all inferences of interest are conditional on the 
observed units” with any replication of a previous model being focused on the draw of a 
new data sample from the same fixed unit of observation (Beck, 2001, p. 113). 
Following these TSCS modeling concepts, I examined the potential relationships 
between fluctuations in multiple socioeconomic factor variables and changes in aggregate 
fiscal imbalance levels, using 48, fixed, nonsampled, observational units (states), over 
multiple periods of time (the 11-year period of 2000 through 2010) using a quantitative, 
longitudinal, time-series-cross-section research design, for a total of 3,696 observations.   
Research Methodology 
In this study, I employed a quantitative descriptive research methodology—a 
methodology that gives the researcher the ability to objectively observe and test the 
85 
 
relationship between fluctuations in key economic factors and corresponding fluctuations 
in aggregate fiscal imbalance levels in the target population of the 48 contiguous U.S. 
states over an 11-year period.   
Target Population 
Econometric studies of an entire population of political entities allow for cross-
population generalizability of the research findings about one group, population, or 
setting to other groups, populations, or settings (Schutt, 2012, p. 21).  Accordingly, the 
procedural sequence of this econometric study began with an examination of a fiscal 
phenomenon occurring geographically within the target population of the 48 contiguous 
U.S. state jurisdictions.  The significance of using the 48 state jurisdictions followed the 
theory that spatial interdependence exists between contiguously-located jurisdictions—
contiguous being defined as those states either “touching or connected throughout in an 
unbroken sequence” (Merriam-Webster Online, 2014).  Coughlin et al. (2006) stated that 
“units of observation, such as states or countries, are typically defined by politically 
established boundaries rather than economic boundaries…technology spillovers, 
migration, trade flows, commuting patterns and public policy can link economies 
together despite their political separation” (p.3).   
In this study, I excluded the two noncontiguous U.S. states, Alaska and Hawaii, 
based on two previous research studies that found that, due to these two states having 
very unique economies and their being located great distances from the closest U.S. state, 
estimating similar spatial relationships as assumed for the remaining 48 contiguous states 
may be unreasonably different than those of other states (Barrios, Diamond, Imbens, & 
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Kolesar, 2012, p. 580; Coughlin, et al., 2006, p. 6).  Recent research using spatial 
econometric techniques to investigate fluctuation dynamics in economic data within an 
entire interrelated and contiguous population of political jurisdictions has become more 
prevalent (Abreu, de Groot, & Florax, 2004; Garrett, Wagoner, & Wheelock, 2007).  
Abreu et al. (2004) distinguished between spatial models of absolute and relative location 
that are based on the classification of spatial dependence— “when the observations at one 
location depend on the values of observations at other locations” (p. 2).  For example, the 
growth rate of one state-level jurisdiction surrounded by states with high levels of growth 
may benefit from positive spillovers resulting from consumers who earn higher wages in 
the higher growth jurisdictions, yet live and spend funds in the adjacent jurisdiction.   
Garret et al. (2005) found that when a positive spatial correlation existed in 
income growth analysis across all 48 contiguous U.S. states as a whole, and when spatial 
correlation is assumed to impact all elements of a population in an equal manner, "a 
given state's income growth is directly related to the income growth of its neighbors" (p. 
1).  Cliff and Ord (1981) used a model of correlation to investigate the determinants of 
state-level annual income growth in the complete population of all 48 contiguous U.S. 
states using data from 1977 to 2002.  Anselin (1988) proposed that spatial correlation in 
longitudinal models depends upon the use of all contiguous 48 states under observation.  
Margrini (2004) argued that geographical elements within regional or country income 
growth studies are not interchangeable and that regional income studies should be based 
on different empirical methods than other forms of study, especially when the 
geographical elements are contiguous in nature.  Finally, Rey and Montouri (1999) 
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studied income and growth rates using global spatial autocorrelation statistics across all 
50 U.S. states resulting in the determination that measures of income of one state are 
correlated with those of adjacent states.   
Econometric models using the contiguous geographic location of all jurisdictional 
elements within a geographical population are valid as the statistical analysis of the 
interwoven economic relationships between adjacent states could be weakened or 
impaired should any jurisdictional elements be excluded from the econometric analysis 
(Anselin, 1988; Coughlin et al., 2006; Rey & Jankas, 2005).  Conceptually formulated on 
the modeling framework of these previous studies, I extended previous research by 
gathering and analyzing sample economic data from the 48 contiguous U.S. states for the 
years 2000 through 2010, as fiscal imbalance levels are a highly intertwined relational 
factor between one state and its contiguous state-level peer jurisdictions, and the measure 
of fiscal imbalance within any one state jurisdiction is highly sensitive to economic 
dynamics within all other contiguous states in the study population.   
Sample and Sampling Procedure 
In order to examine state-level fiscal imbalances and their relationship with 
various socioeconomic factors, I relied on sample data obtained from federal agencies—
the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, the U.S. Department of Commerce—and the Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation’s KIEA statistic, the Kauffman Index on Entrepreneurial Activity, compiled 
from sample data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey.  All 
of these entities provided detailed documentation and data on a comprehensive variety of 
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national and state-level fiscal factors.  The datasets from these agencies provided the 
necessary elements to construct the sample data for years 2000 to 2010 required for this 
study.  The 11-year period used in this research study represented a sample range of dates 
covering a number of cyclical fluctuations in economic growth, including two periods of 
recession and subsequent recovery, as established by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER).  Sample data were in finalized form, with any figures stated in 
currency adjusted for inflation and presented in real chained 2009 dollars based on the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers 
(C-CPI-U, US).  The sample size was composed of seven variables, for each of the 48 
contiguous U.S. states, for 11 consecutive years, for a total of 3,696 observations.  
Permission for access to the data information on federal agency websites was not 
required under Title 17 U.S.C., Section 105. 
Phasing of Research Methodology 
The research methodology incorporated an analysis process structured in two 
phases.  The initial phase of the research methodology, addressing Research Question 1, 
replicated the econometric modeling structure developed by Connaughton and Madsen 
(2012) who used a longitudinal modeling design structure to observe impacts of the 2007 
to 2009 recessionary period of time on job loss and employment levels within the all 
inclusive population of 50 U.S. states.  Connaughton and Madsen measured the net 
change in state-level employment during both the initial 2000 to 2007 prerecession 
expansionary and the 2007 to 2009 recessionary period of time, with linear comparisons 
being made between the selected time periods and the encompassing 2000 to 2009 
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decade.  In Connaughton and Madsen’s study, the independent variable, the net 
percentage change in jobs, was regressed against various economic factors to observe if 
relationships existed that explained the observed fluctuations in the state employment 
levels during the three periods of time.   
I expanded and modified Connaughton and Madsen’s (2012) model by replacing 
the dependent variable, the percentage change in jobs growth by state, with the 
percentage change in fiscal imbalance ratios by state for years 2000, 2007, 2009, and 
2010.  The independent variables were replaced with those year 2000 economic factors of 
unemployment percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the 
level of per capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal 
poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per 
capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States--variables that 
were better aligned with a study of the aggregate fiscal imbalances dynamic.  In addition, 
the 11-year time period of observation in this model was segregated into relative and 
specific periods of cyclical change: (a) the 2000 to 2007 prerecession expansionary 
subperiod, (b) the 2007 to 2009 recession subperiod, (c) the 2007 to 2010 postrecession 
recovery subperiod, and (d) the comprehensive period of time encompassing the entire 
2000 to 2010 range of years.   
Multiple regression analyses were performed employing all variables to determine 
if relationships exist that might explain how changes in economic factors are related to 
changes in fiscal imbalance disparities within and between the 48 contiguous U.S. state 
jurisdictions during different stages of the economic cycle. 
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In the second phase of the research methodology analysis, addressing Research 
Question 2, I focused on determining if potential relationships between the set of 
independent variables and the single dependent variable were either strengthened or 
weakened over time, and which independent variables best related to a state’s fiscal 
imbalance throughout the proposed 11-year period.  The determination of either a 
strengthening or weakening in the potential relationships was made by observing annual 
fluctuations in the R
2 
measures from one year to the next.  R
2 
measures the degree of 
relationship between the set of independent variables and the dependent variable.  This 
measurement described, more specifically, what percentage of variation in fiscal 
imbalance from one state to another was explained by the set of independent variables 
(Pallant, 2010).   
During a similarly structured econometric study, Borcherding and Deacon (1972) 
assessed the determinants of variation within the economic variables of state government 
tax capacity, per capita incomes, and governmental spending by measuring the 
coefficient of variation, also known as the coefficient of dispersion, within of cross-
sectional economic data at the state level (p. 894).  In a later econometric study of 
regional income inequality in Brazil, Azzoni (2001) used economic factor measurements 
to analyze cyclical oscillations in income inequality over a 47-year period for potential 
relationships to changes national economic growth rates (p. 133).  Similar to these 
studies, the purpose of Research Question 2 was to observe how the statistical variation 
in aggregate fiscal imbalance levels fluctuates annually, and to determine which 
economic factor variables had the greater relational strength to these fluctuations. 
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The datasets necessary to construct the variables for both phases of the study were 
obtained from those federal agencies responsible for compiling and reporting economic 
data.  All quantitative variables were derived from federally provided secondary data—
data collected by other federal entities for purposes other than this specific study.  Access 
to the datasets was gained through the use of publicly-available internet download sites.  
Per Title 17 U.S.C., Section 105, information posted on these web sites is in the public 
domain and may be used or reproduced without specific permission (See disclaimer at: 
http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfm?faq_id=147#sthash.vnG9Sfx7.dpuf). 
Definition of Research Variables 
The research models included the dependent variable, the net change in fiscal 
imbalance ratio (Y1), and the following independent variables: (a) the unemployment 
percentage rate by statei (X1), (b) the percentage of the population over age 65 by statei 
(X2), (c) the level of per capita income by statei (X3), (d) the percent of statei population 
below the federal poverty level (X4), (e) the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity 
by statei (X5), and (f) per capita GSP by statei as a percentage of per capita GDP in the 
United States - GDPUS.  The operational definitions of these variables are as follows: 
1. Net change in fiscal imbalance ratio: Dependent variable (Y1) – a fiscal 
imbalance ratio represents the quotient of total federal expenditure support 
received by a state divided by the total federal tax revenues generated by a 
state jurisdiction’s fiscal capacity and subsequently collected by the 
Department of the Treasury.  In this study, states were classified as being in a 
fiscal surplus position when their fiscal imbalance ratios are less than 1.00—
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representing a lesser amount of federal expenditure support being received by 
the state than was generated in federal tax revenue.  Conversely, states were 
classified as being in a fiscal deficit position when the fiscal imbalance ratio is 
greater than 1.00—representing a greater amount of federal expenditure 
support being received from the federal government than was generated in 

























Figure 6.  Components of a fiscal imbalance ratio. 
 
 
2. Unemployment percentage rate by statei: Independent variable (X1) – 
represents each state’s respective unemployment level. 
3. Percentage of statei population age 65+: Independent variable (X2) – 
represents the percentage of state population over the age of 65.   
4. Per capita income by statei: Independent variable (X3) – represents the dollar 
amount of per capita income per state. 
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5. Percent of population below the poverty level by statei: Independent variable 
(X4) – represents the percent of the state population level below the federal 
poverty level. 
6. Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity index by statei: Independent 
Variable (X5) – represents the index of entrepreneurial activity for the base 
year 2002. 
7. Per capita GSP by statei as a percentage of per capita GDPUS: Independent 
Variable (X6) – represents an index of GSP per state divided by GDPUS. 
Theoretical Basis for Lagging of Independent Variables 
Many regression models are intrinsically static and include variable comparisons 
that are instantaneous in nature, meaning they are derived from the same time period 
(Studenmund, 2000, p. 177).  This instantaneous time concept is illustrated in the 
following multiple variable regression line equation where the subscript t is similar for 
each variable representing an instantaneous time reference: 
Yt = α + β1X1t + β2X2t + ... +βkXkt + εt                                  (1) 
Y is the observed score of the dependent variable, α represents the y-intercept, β 
equals the regression coefficients, X is the observed score on the independent variable, 
and ε is the error or residual term.  However, the implication of instantaneous 
relationships is not always applicable in many econometric scenarios as these forms of 
study may require an analysis which allows for a period of time to occur between a 
change in the predictor variables and the responsive change in the dependent variable.  
Economic equations may include one or more lagged independent variables as illustrated 
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in the following equation where the subscript t-1 reflects that the measurement of 
variable X1 occurs during the time period preceding period t:  
Yt = α + β1X1(t-1) + β2X2t + ... +βkXkt + εt                                        (2) 
The use of lagged variables has been prevalent in many academic fields of study.  
Singh, Singh, and Shinde (2011) incorporated lagged variables during their studying the 
effects of irrigation infrastructure construction on reservoir inflow projections.  El-Din 
and Smith (2002) used lagged variables to establish a neural network model of projecting 
sewage effluent inflows into wastewater treatment facilities following heavy rainfall 
events.  Beck and Katz (2011) proposed the use of lagged variables to measure the time 
between a political administration's date of election and any resulting impact the new 
administration may have its promise to decrease unemployment (p. 335).  In all of these 
studies, dynamic regression analysis observed changes in the value of a dependent 
variable based on previous values of one or more independent variables. 
In this analysis of potential relationships occurring between the dependent and 
independent variables, I used a time series observation of all variables.  The six predictor 
variables in this study represented changes in economic factors which may not have 
prompted a measurable change in the dependent variable until a future period of time.  
Due to this delayed impact, the regression models used were constructed using a one-year 
lagged basis (t-1) for the independent variables as the underlying economic impact of 
changes in these factors on fiscal imbalances levels may be delayed by one year.   
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Procedure for Data Collection 
The sequential procedure for sample data collection began with receiving 
approval from Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to ensure the study 
complies with the university’s ethical standards and federal regulations (IRB #10-09-14-
0092133).  The specific sample data for the study were obtained from publicly available 
database sources made available by the federal and state government agencies 
responsible for compiling and archiving historical economic data.  When appropriate, 
these agencies report economic data with adjustments made for seasonal variations, or in 
terms of constant dollars referenced to a given year.  Accordingly, sample data adjusted 
for seasonal variances remained intact; however, sample data stated in terms of constant 
dollars to a specific year were recalibrated back to the original raw data format so that 
accurate measurements of change could be calculated. 
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists when there is a high correlation between two or more 
predictor variables in a regression model.  Perfect multicollinearity exists when at least 
one predictor is a perfect linear combination with other predictors—a relationship making 
it impossible to obtain unique quantifications of the regression coefficients as there would 
be an infinite number of coefficient combinations that could work equally as well (Field, 
2013, p. 324).  I tested for multicollinearity by utilizing the variance inflaton factor (VIF) 
indicators in SPSS, and the related tolerance statistic, to observe whether a predictor had 
a strong linear relationship with the other predictors.  VIF measured the impact of 
collinearity amoung the variables.  Unfortunately, there is no formal VIF measure that 
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determines the absolute presence of multicollinearity.  In general, my testing for 
multicollinearity performed within the following paramters: 
1.  If VIF values wee greater than 10, then there was concern for 
multicollinearity (Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990; Myers, 1990).  
2. If the average of VIF values were greater than 1 then the regression might be 
biased (Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990). 
3. If the tolerance statistic was below 0.2, the measure would indicate a potential 
problem (Menard, 1995). 
In addition, I performed a Durbin-Watson calculation to test for serial correlation 
between errors.  Using a 4-point scale, the Durbin-Watson tests whether adjacent 
residuals are correlated (Durbin & Watson, 1951; Field, 2013).  A value of 2 indicates the 
residuals are uncorrelated, a value greater than 2 indicates a negative correlation, and a 
value of less than 2 indicates a positive correlation. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Descriptive Data Analysis 
The compiled explanatory variable data were input into IBM SPSS Statistics 
version 21.0 for Windows.  Descriptive statistics analyses were performed to the 
compiled data to detail the demographics within the population and the research variables 
with percentages and frequencies being computed for all categorical data.  Means and 
standard deviations were calculated for continuous data of interest pertaining to the net 
change in fiscal imbalance ratio, the unemployment percentage rate by statei, the 
percentage of the population over age 65 by statei, the level of per capita income by statei, 
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the percent of statei population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for 
Entrepreneurial Activity by statei, and the per capita GSP by statei as a percentage of per 
capita in the United States - GDPUS (Howell, 2010).   
Preanalysis Data Screening 
The compiled data were reviewed for accuracy, missing data, and the presence of 
any data outliers.  Descriptive statistics and frequency distributions were constructed to 
ascertain that calculated results were within a prescribed range of values and that the data 
is not distorted by extreme cases (Howell, 2010).  The existence of outliers was 
determined by the analysis of standardized values for each variable measurement.  
Outliers serve as possible indicators of potential problems within the data, and provide 
researchers with opportunity to closely examine the processes used to discover any 
possible shortcomings (Field, 2013).  Any measurement value falling above a z-score of 
3.29, or falling below a z-score of -3.29, were be classified as an outlier (Field, 2013; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  Any occurrence classified as an outlier was investigated to 
determine possible significance of the statistical anomaly. 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1: Quantitative - Is there a relationship between fluctuations 
in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate fiscal imbalance 
ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment percentage rate by 
state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by state, 
the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for 
Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of per 
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capita GDP in the United States, during the four measurement time periods of: (a) the 
2000 to 2007 pre-recession expansion, (b) the 2007 to 2009 economic recession, (c) the 
2009 to 2010 post-recession recovery, and (d) the entire 2000 to 2010 11-year period?  
H101: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage rate 
by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2007 expansionary period of 
time.  
H1A1: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage rate 
by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2007 expansionary period of 
time.  
H102: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage rate 
99 
 
by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2007 to 2009 recessionary period of time.  
H1A2: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage rate 
by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2007 to 2009 recessionary period of time.  
H103: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage rate 
by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2009 to 2010 recovery period of time.  
H1A3: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage rate 
by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
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state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2009 to 2010 recovery period of time.  
H104: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage rate 
by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2010 encompassing period of 
time.  
H1A4: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage rate 
by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2010 encompassing period of 
time. 
 To address Research Question 1 and the subsequent four hypotheses, four 
multiple linear regression analyses were conducted.  The purpose of these analyses was to 
examine the impact of a state’s fiscal condition, as represented and measured by the 
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independent variables in the year 2000 on subsequent fluctuations in fiscal imbalance 
between the years of interest.  Multiple linear regressions are an appropriate analytical 
methodology to use when the objective of the research is to assess the level of 
relationship among a set of dichotomous independent predictor variables on an 
interval/ratio dependent variable.  The following multiple regression equation was used: 
y = b0 +b1x1 + b2x2 +… e 
 y = the percent change in fiscal imbalance, b0 = constant (which includes the error term), 
b1 = first regression coefficient, b2 = second regression coefficient, and so on, while each 
x = one of the independent variables, and e = the residual error (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2012).   
 In each of the four regression analyses, the independent variables were economic 
factor measurements taken from the year 2000 for each state.  These economic factors 
included the percentage of unemployment, the percentage of the population over 65 years 
of age, the level of per capita income for the state, the percentage of population below the 
federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity, and the per capita 
GSP as a percentage of national GDP.  While the independent variables remained 
identically constant in regressions one through four, the dependent variable was slightly 
different for each regression.  The dependent variable measured the change in fiscal 
imbalance for the period under observation, and was calculated as the percent of change 
in state-level fiscal imbalance ratios from one date to the next.  For Hypothesis 1, the 
dependent variable measurements were the changes in the percentage of fiscal imbalance 
from 2000 to 2007.  For Hypothesis 2, the dependent variable measurements were the 
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changes in the percentage of fiscal imbalance from 2007 to 2009.  For Hypothesis 3, the 
dependent variable measurements were the percentage change from 2009 to 2010, and 
Hypothesis 4 examined the percentage change in fiscal imbalances from 2000 to 2010.  
Thusly, Research Question 1 examined how well the economic measurements taken at 
year 2000 influence changes in fiscal imbalance in the subsequent years. 
 Multiple regression—the forced entry method—was be used (Studenmund & 
Cassidy, 1987).  The multiple regression forced entry method forced all independent 
predictor variables simultaneously into the model (Studenmund & Cassidy, 1987).  
Variables were then evaluated based on what each contributed to the prediction of the 
dependent variable that is different from the predictability provided by the other 
predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).  The F test was used to assess whether the set of 
independent variables collectively predicted the dependent variable.  R
2
 - the multiple 
correlation coefficient of determination - was reported and used to determine how much 
each state’s change in fiscal imbalance could be accounted for by the specified set of 
independent variables (Statistic Solutions, 2013).  The t-test was be used to determine the 
significance of each predictor and beta coefficients were used to determine the extent of 
prediction for each independent variable.  For significant predictors, for every one unit 
increase in the predictor, the dependent variable increased or decreased by the number of 
unstandardized beta coefficients (Statistic Solutions, 2013). 
 Prior to the regression analysis, the assumptions of normality, homoscedasticity, 
and absence of multicollinearity were assessed.  Normality is the assumption that there is 
a normal distribution of error about the regression line.  Homoscedasticity assumes that 
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scores are equally distributed about the regression line from one end to another.  Both 
normality and homoscedasticity were assessed by visual examination of residual scatter 
plots (Stevens, 2009).  The absence of multicollinearity assumes that independent 
variables are not too related and will be assessed using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF).  
VIF values over 10 will suggest the presence of multicollinearity (Statistic Solutions, 
2013; Stevens, 2009). 
Research Question 2 
How does the relationship between fiscal imbalance, and the independent 
variables of unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, 
the level of per capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal 
poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per 
capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States fluctuate 
throughout the years 2000-2010? 
H20: The relationship between fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables of 
unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per 
capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States does not fluctuate throughout the 
years 2000-2010. 
H2A: The relationship between fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables of 
unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per 
capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
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Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States fluctuates throughout the years 2000-
2010. 
 To examine Research Question 2, eleven multiple linear regressions were 
conducted.  The ultimate goal of these analyses extended a step further.  The purpose of 
the analysis of Research Question 2 was to discover whether the relationship between the 
set of independent variables and the single dependent variable either strengthened or 
weakened over time, and to possibly determine which independent variables best related 
to a state’s fiscal imbalance throughout the proposed 11-year period. 
 To examine this effect, the annual data for each state’s fiscal imbalance were 
collected and used as the outcome or dependent variable.  The annual data for each state’s 
unemployment percentage rate, the percent of the population of age 65+, the level of per 
capita income, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP as a 
percentage of per capita GDP in the United States were collected and used as the 
predictor or independent variables.  This annual data were used once for each year from 
2000 to 2010, thereby creating a model for each respective year which examined the 
relationship between the set of independent variables and the dependent variable for all 
48 contiguous U.S. states.  Thus, eleven total regression analyses were conducted. 
 Next, the R
2
 for each of the eleven multiple regression analysis was gathered.  The 
R
2 
measured the degree of relationship between the set of independent variables and the 
dependent variable.  This measurement described, more specifically, what percentage of 
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variation in fiscal imbalance from one state to another was explained by the set of 
independent variables (Pallant, 2010).  If the R
2
 increased for each subsequent year, the 
relationship was viewed as strengthening over time.  However, if the R
2
 decreased for 
each subsequent year, the relationship was viewed as weakening over time.  R
2
 values 
were plotted against time to provide a visual representation of the effect of time on the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables.   
 Next, significance levels and standardized beta coefficients for each independent 
variable were examined for each year.  Examination of p values provided insight into 
which of the independent variables most strongly influenced fiscal imbalance for each 
year.  At times, certain variables might have been significant predictors in one year’s 
analysis, yet may no longer have had a significant level of predictive ability in following 
years.  To measure for strength variations within the independent variables, significant 
predictors were assessed for the strength of their correlation for each year.  If a set of 
predictors were significantly related to the dependent variable for several years, 
examination of the standardized beta coefficient (β) allowed a description of how the 
strength of these relationships fluctuated from one year to the next.  Research Question 2 
examined the fashion in which relationships between yearly state-wise demographics and 
fiscal imbalance changed throughout time. 
 Prior to any of the regression analysis, the assumptions of multiple regressions 
were assessed.  Both normality and homoscedasticity were assessed by visual 
examination of residual scatter plots (Stevens, 2009).  The absence of multicollinearity 
was assessed using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF).  VIF values over 10 will suggest the 
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presence of multicollinearity (Stevens, 2009).  Using the VIF measure in this fashion, no 
relationships indicated a violation of multicollinearity. 
Threats to Validity 
Validity is a critical aspect necessary to validate the findings or “goodness of fit” 
of a quantitative study.  Moskal, Leydens, and Pavelich (2002) stated that validity 
represents “the degree to which the evidence supports that the interpretations are correct 
and the manner in which the interpretations are used is appropriate” (p. 351).  There are 
several forms of validity: (a) those which may question the accuracy of the study data, or 
(b) those that may question the manner in which statistical analysis is used to adequately 
describe the outcome of a study.   
Validity refers to the ability of the researcher to establish sufficient controls over 
experimental procedures, treatments, and research design to afford a level of confidence 
that relational or causal inferences between the dependent and independent variable data 
in an experiment are valid.  In this study, the explanatory variables under observation 
were considered economically relational within the public sector industry.  However, to 
ensure that a sufficiently high degree of internal relationship existed between the various 
factors, Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient test was performed on the dependent and 
independent variables to seek a measure of internal consistency between the factors being 
observed.  According to Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel and Li (2005), Cronbach’s Alpha 
coefficient test utilizes the formula α = 
    
          
  Symbol N represents the number of 
items under observation,    represents the average covariance between the items, and   
represents the average variance.  Mathematically, if the average covariance is relatively 
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low, the alpha will be low; if the average correlation is high, the corresponding alpha will 
be higher as well.  A higher alpha score allowed for a greater the level of confidence 
being placed in the internal consistency of the data. 
Ethical Considerations 
The data selected, compiled, and analyzed for this study were extracted from 
publicly available economic and financial data compiled and presented by a number of 
governmental agencies.  All selected data for each state jurisdiction were collected and 
compiled with no reference or disclosure of the names of any individuals for 
confidentiality purposes.  All data and other economic information were encrypted and 
stored on a private, password-protected computer.  In addition, a duplicate copy of the 
data was stored on an external backup hard drive, as well as a DVD kept in a securely 
locked safe at on offsite location.  There were no human subjects involved with this 
study.  I received approval by Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to 
conduct research through IRB #10-09-14-0092133. 
Implications for Social Change 
This research promotes positive social change through an increased awareness of 
how fluctuations in economic factors affecting fiscal imbalances between and within 
state-level jurisdictions within the United States.  Public sector officials are tasked not 
only with promoting the economic well-being of their constituency, but also with 
minimizing fiscal disparities between economic regions within the country so that the 
allocation of tax burden and the distribution of public goods and services are equitable.  
This is particularly important to those state jurisdictions which experience a higher rate of 
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fiscal disparity during times of economic stress.  With a enhanced understanding of the 
impacts that certain economic factors have on the economic quality of life of individuals, 
state lawmakers, administration officials, planners, and financial executives might work 
together to develop a comprehensive plan to create a positive environment within the 
country. 
Summary and Transition 
Chapter 3 sets out the research methodology to be used in the study to determine 
the relationships between key economic factors and the levels of aggregate fiscal 
imbalance in the United States.  The methods of inquiry included the use of several 
multiple regression processes at various points in time to determine how fiscal imbalance 
levels fluctuated during periods of cyclical economic volatility, and how the relationship 
between these economic factors either strengthened or weakened over time.  By studying 
the results of these analyses, decision makers might gain an understanding of the 
interplay between fluctuations in key economic variables and corresponding fluctuations 
in fiscal imbalances within and between states.  Chapter 4 includes the presentation and 
statistical analysis of the data, while chapter 5 indentifies the significant findings, the 






Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 was structured to provide a review of the study’s purpose, the research 
questions and hypotheses, the data collection and preparation process, and the results of 
the appropriate analyses performed to test the null hypotheses.  Chapter 4 includes a 
section on the descriptive statistical analyses and the regression analyses corresponding 
to this study.  At the end of the chapter, a summary of key findings is provided. 
The analysis and presentation of sample data were structured around the study’s 
research questions and the associated statistical hypotheses.  The purpose of this study 
was to observe and measure for possible relationships between state-level fiscal 
imbalance levels and certain key economic factors relative to each individual state’s 
economic environment.  Prior to the examination of the of the research questions, 
economic and demographic data pertaining to both state-level fiscal imbalance levels and 
the related independent variables were presented to provide the appropriate context and 
background information.  A quantitative longitudinal design, employing a TSCS 
econometric model, was used to examine relationships and patterns through a statistical 
analysis of the sample data.  Two research questions and five hypotheses outlined the 
focus and direction of the study and were answered in this chapter.   
Review of Research Questions 
The first research question pertained to the existence of possible relationships 
between the dependent variable, fluctuations in state-level fiscal imbalance ratios, and the 
year 2000 independent variables of the unemployment percentage rate by state, the 
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percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by state, the percent 
of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for 
Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of per 
capita GDP in the United.  The four related hypotheses addressed the observation of 
possible relationships occurring during four relative and specific periods of cyclical 
economic change: (a) the 2000 to 2007 prerecession expansion subperiod, (b) the 2007 to 
2009 recession subperiod, (c) the 2007 to 2010 postrecession recovery subperiod, and (d) 
the comprehensive period of time encompassing the entire 2000 to 2010 range of years. 
The focus of the second research question was to determine if potential 
relationships between the set of independent variables and the single dependent variable 
were either strengthened or weakened over time, and which independent variables best 
related to a state’s fiscal imbalance throughout the proposed 11-year period.  To address 
the related hypothesis of the existence of a relational strengthening or weakening over 
time, a determination of either a strengthening, a weakening, or no change in the potential 
relationships was made by observing annual fluctuations in the R
2 
measure from one year 
to the next.  R
2 
measured the degree of relationship between the set of independent 
variables and the dependent variable.   
The information in Chapter 4 includes the specific data collection procedures, a 
report of descriptive statistics that characterized the sample data, and a report of the 
statistical analysis findings and results.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
answers to the research questions.   
The procedure for the statistical analysis is organized in the following sections:  
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1. Data collection and preparation. 
a. Fiscal years applicable to the study. 
b. Variable naming conventions. 
c. Source of archival data. 
2. Research Question 1. 
a. Data screening and descriptive statistics for Research Question 1. 
b. Description of procedure for Research Question 1 analytics. 
c. Summary of Research Question 1 regressions. 
3. Research Question 2. 
a. Data screening and descriptive statistics for Research Question 2. 
b. Description of procedure for Research Question 2 analytics. 
c. Summary of Research Question 2 regressions. 
d. Additional statistical information. 
4. Summary. 
Data Collection and Preparation 
Fiscal Years Applicable to Study 
The data used to investigate the research questions and related hypotheses were 
obtained from publicly available information for the years 1999 through 2010.  
Accordingly, the results of this study may not be inferred to be relevant to an earlier or 
later period of time.  Due to a 2010 budgetary cost reduction action taken by the U.S. 
Congress, the federal government no longer publishes the Consolidated Federal Funds 
Report (CFFR) — a document that previously provided the required data to accurately 
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calculate state-level fiscal imbalance ratios.  Should data become available for years 
subsequent to 2010 in the future, an expanded examination of the post-2007 recession 
fluctuations in the study variables could be possible.  
Archived data for the independent variables were collected for fiscal years 1999 
through 2009 as the independent variables are lagged by a period of one year from the 
dependent variable.  Archived data used to construct the dependent variable, the fiscal 
imbalance ratios by state and by year, were collected for the years 2000 through 2010.  
For presentation purposes, the lagged 1999 to 2009 independent variables were assigned 
column headings illustrated by the use of a fiscal year factor of t + 1.  For example, the 
1999 data for unemployment ratios by state were presented under the column headings of 
fiscal year 2000 to better coordinate the visual and computational comparisons of the 
lagged independent variables to the fiscal year 2000 data of the dependent variable.   
Variable Naming Conventions 
In the interest of specificity and the improvement of presenting statistical data, 





Variable Naming Conventions 
Naming convention In-text reference
FIB Fiscal imbalance ratio
UERate Unemployment percentage rate by state i
%StatePop65+ Percent of statei population age 65+
PerCapInc Per capita income by statei
PPOV Percent of statei population below the federal poverty level
KIEA Kauffman Index for Entreprenurial Activity by state i
%GSP Per capita GSP by statei divided by per capita GDPUS  
 
Sources of Archival Data 
The archived data for the study variables were obtained as follows: 
1.  Fiscal imbalance ratio (FIB):  The quotient representing each state’s fiscal 
imbalance ratio was calculated by dividing the total federal spending by state 
by the total federal revenues collected by state for each of the 48 contiguous 
state jurisdictions.  The data required for the quotient numerator, Federal 
Spending by State, were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau Consolidated 
Federal Funds Report (CFFR) for each year of the study (Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/govs/pubs/topic.html#federal_ programs on October 
10, 2014).  The data required for the quotient denominator, Federal Revenues 
Collected by State, were obtained from the Internal Revenue Service Data 
Book for each year (Retrieved from http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-
IRS-Data-Book on October 10, 2014).  Both datasets were available via 
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internet download, with all datasets residing in the public domain under Title 
17 U.S.C, Section 105.  The data presented in Appendix A represent the 
calculations of 2000 to 2010 fiscal imbalance ratios for all states using the 
applicable dataset information. 
2. Unemployment percentage rate by state (UERate): The data pertaining to the 
unemployment percentage rate by state were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor and Statistics website (Retrieved from 
http://www.bls.gov/lau /#tables for 2000-2010 and 
http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/ laus_nr.htm#1999 for 1999 on October 
10, 2014).  The data were available via internet download, with all datasets 
residing in the public domain under Title 17 U.S.C, Section 105.  The data 
presented in Appendix B represent the collected data by state. 
3. Percent of state population over age 65 (%StatePop65+):  The data pertaining 
to the percent of a state population over age 65 were obtained from the U.S. 
Census Bureau, Population Division website (Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/popest/ data/intercensal/ state/ST-EST00INT-02.html 
on October 10, 2014).  The data were available via internet download, with all 
datasets residing in the public domain under Title 17 U.S.C, Section 105.  The 
data presented in Appendix C represent the collected data by state. 
4. Per capita income by state (PerCapInc):  The data pertaining to the per capita 
income levels by state were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 




70&step=1&isuri=1 on October 10, 2014).  The data were available via 
internet download, with all datasets residing in the public domain under Title 
17 U.S.C, Section 105.  The data presented in Appendix D represent the 
collected data by state. 
5. Percent of state population below the federal poverty level (PPov): The data 
pertaining to the percent of state population below the federal poverty level 
were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce 
website (Retrieved at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr12-01.pdf 
for 2000-2010 and http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-19.pdf for 
1999 on October 10, 2014).  The data were available via internet download, 
with all datasets residing in the public domain under Title 17 U.S.C, Section 
105.  The data presented in Appendix E represent the collected data by state. 
6. Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity (KIEA): The data pertaining to 
the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity were obtained from Ewing 
Marion Kauffman Foundation website (Retrieved from 
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/ 
kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and% 20covers/kiea/state9613.xlsx on 
October 10, 2014).  The data were available via internet download, with 
written permission being obtained for the presentation and use of the data in 




7. Per capita GSP by state as a percentage of the U.S. GDP (GSP %):  The data 
pertaining to the GSP by state, in addition to the U.S. GDP, for each year were 
obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis website (Retrieved at 
http://bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=1#reqid=70&step=1&isuri=
1 on October 10, 2014).  The data were available via internet download, with 
all datasets residing in the public domain under Title 17 U.S.C, Section 105.  
The GSP by state as a percentage of U.S. GDP was calculated by dividing 
each state GSP factor by the applicable U.S. GDP factor for each year of the 
study.  The data presented in Appendix F represent the collected data by state. 
Research Question 1 
Research Question 1: Quantitative - Is there a relationship between fluctuations in 
the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate fiscal imbalance 
ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment percentage rate by 
state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by state, 
the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for 
Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of per 
capita GDP in the United States, during the four measurement time periods of: (a) the 
2000 to 2007 prerecession expansion, (b) the 2007 to 2009 economic recession, (c) the 
2009-2010 postrecession recovery, and (d) the entire 2000 to 2010 11-year period?  
H101: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
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percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2007 
expansionary period of time.  
H1A1: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2007 
expansionary period of time.  
H102: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2007 to 2009 recessionary 
period of time.  
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H1A2: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2007 to 2009 recessionary 
period of time.  
H103: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2009 to 2010 recovery 
period of time.  
H1A3: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
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a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2009-2010 recovery 
period of time.  
H104: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2010 
encompassing period of time.  
H1A4: There is a statistically significant predictive relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the 2000 to 2010 
encompassing period of time. 
Data Screening and Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 1 
Prior to analyses, data were screened for accuracy, missing data, and outliers or 
extreme cases.  Descriptive statistics and frequency distributions were conducted to 
determine that responses were within the possible range of values and that the data were 
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not distorted by outliers.  The presence of outliers was tested by the examination of 
standardized values, with observed values which fell above 3.29 and values that fell 
below -3.29 being designated as outliers.  Using these criteria, data for Mississippi 
showed that the fiscal imbalance difference for 2000 to 2007 for this state were outside of 
the acceptable range of values.  Further analysis was conducted to verify and confirm the 
accuracy of original data, and to triangulate the original source data to other federal 
government datasets available in the public domain.  I found, through this additional 
analysis, that the State of Mississippi began receiving significant federal procurement 
contracts for shipbuilding in 2001 which increased the level of federal spending received 
from 2001 going forward.  This increase in procurement spending by the federal 
government through the years 2000 to 2007 accounted for the unusual variance for year 
2000.  Accordingly, I made the determination to retain the measurement in the dataset for 
further analysis.  Table 6 presents the descriptive statistical information for the Research 





Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 1 
Min Max M SD Statistic SE Statistic SE
FIB 2000-2007 -0.324 0.936 0.197 0.209 0.601 0.343 2.684 0.674
FIB 2007-2009 0.047 0.959 0.466 0.205 0.287 0.343 -0.277 0.674
FIB 2009-2010 -0.306 0.457 0.056 0.145 0.436 0.343 0.617 0.674
FIB 2000-2010 -0.063 1.574 0.720 0.380 0.216 0.343 -0.541 0.674
UERate 0.025 0.066 0.040 0.010 0.357 0.343 -0.483 0.674
%StatePop65+ 0.087 0.181 0.127 0.016 0.435 0.343 1.839 0.674
PerCapInc $25,589.36 $48,684.20 $33,929.30 $5,014.81 0.642 0.343 0.500 0.674
PPov 0.065 0.199 0.120 0.032 0.745 0.343 0.046 0.674
KIEA 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.413 0.343 -0.414 0.674
%GSP 0.674 1.463 0.949 0.164 0.795 0.343 0.880 0.674
SK Rku
Note.  N = 48.  SK = skewness; Rku = kurtosis. 
 
Description of Procedure for Research Question 1 Analytics 
To address Research Question 1, four multiple linear regression analyses were 
conducted—one regression analysis for each of the four time periods under observation.  
The purpose of the analysis of Research Question 1 was to examine the impact of a 
state’s economic conditions in the year 2000 on fluctuations in fiscal imbalance levels 
between the years of interest.  In each analysis, the independent variables were measures 
taken from the year 2000 for each state.  These included the percentage of 
unemployment, the percentage of the population over 65 years of age, the level of per 
capita income for the state, the percentage of population below the federal poverty level, 
the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity, and the per capita GSP, and were 
identical in regressions one through four.  The dependent variable for each regression was 
the measure of change in fiscal imbalance as observed from one date to the next.  Thus, a 
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separate regression was performed to examine each of the four time periods in question: 
(a) the 2000 to 2007 prerecession expansion, (b) the 2007 to 2009 economic recession, 
(c) the 2009 to 2010 postrecession recovery, and (d) the entire 2000 to 2010 eleven year 
period.   
Analytics for Hypothesis 1. 
The purpose of the first multiple linear regression model was to examine the 
effect of the independent variables on the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios between the years of 2000 to 2007.  Prior to analysis, the 
assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The assumption of 
normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots which resulted in 
the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of homoscedasticity 
was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the data did not deviate 
greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of multicollinearity was assessed, 
and met, through examination of variance inflation factors (VIFs), where any VIF greater 
than 10 was considered to possess high levels of multicollinearity, thereby violating the 
assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.189 to 4.942, all tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and 
the average VIF score was 2.741.  These measurements provided confirmation that 
collinearity was not a problem in this model (Bowerman & O'Connell, 1990; Menard, 
1995; Myers, 1990).  Table 7 presents the relative coefficients and collinearity statistics 











(Constant) .760 .480 1.584 .121 -.209 1.728
UER -.293 4.318 -.068 .946 -9.013 8.426 .476 2.099
%StatePop65+ -2.123 1.911 -1.111 .273 -5.983 1.736 .836 1.197
PerCapInc 2.240E-05 .000 1.761 .086 .000 .000 .202 4.942
PPov .513 1.668 .307 .760 -2.856 3.882 .296 3.380
KIEA -28.937 33.485 -.864 .393 -96.561 38.687 .841 1.189
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The results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
economic conditions in the year 2000 on the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios between the years of 2000 to 2007 did not indicate a significant 
model, F (6, 41) = 2.041, p = .082, R
2 
= .230.  As such, no further inferences could be 
made.  Utilizing α = 0.05 level of significance, there existed no evidence to conclude that 
at least one of the predictors is useful for predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  
Accordingly, with the p-value of .082 >.05, the null hypothesis was not rejected.  As 
such, no further inferences could be made.  Results of the first linear regression are 











SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.480 0.230 0.117 0.197 2.075 0.474 47 2.041 0.082  
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2000 to 2007; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
 Analytics for Hypothesis 2. 
The purpose of the second multiple linear regression model was to examine the 
effect of the independent variables on the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios between the years of 2007 to 2009.  Prior to analysis, the 
assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The assumption of 
normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots which resulted in 
the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of homoscedasticity 
was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the data did not deviate 
greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of multicollinearity was assessed, 
and met, through examination of variance inflation factors (VIFs), where any VIF greater 
than 10 was considered to possess high levels of multicollinearity, thereby violating the 
assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.189 to 4.942, all tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and 
the average VIF score was 2.741.  These measurements provided confirmation that 
collinearity was not a problem in this model.  Table 9 presents the relative coefficients 











(Constant) 1.187 .485 2.447 .019 .207 2.166
UER 3.637 4.365 .833 .409 -5.177 12.452 .476 2.099
%StatePop65+ -3.503 1.932 -1.813 .077 -7.405 .399 .836 1.197
PerCapInc 1.109E-05 .000 .862 .393 .000 .000 .202 4.942
PPov -.546 1.686 -.324 .748 -3.951 2.860 .296 3.380
KIEA -13.253 33.850 -.392 .697 -81.614 55.108 .841 1.189





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




The results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
economic conditions in the year 2000 on the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios between the years of 2007 to 2009 did not indicate a significant 
model, F (6, 41) = 1.475, p = .211, R
2 
= .178.  As such, no further inferences could be 
made.  Utilizing α = 0.05 level of significance, there existed no evidence to conclude that 
at least one of the predictors is useful for predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  
Accordingly, given that the p-value of .211 >.05, the null hypothesis was not rejected.  
As such, no further inferences could be made.  Results of the second linear regression are 











SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig.
1 0.421 0.178 0.057 0.199 2.022 1.972 47 1.475 0.211  
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2007 to 2009; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
 Analytics for Hypothesis 3. 
The purpose of the third multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the percentage change in state-level aggregate fiscal 
imbalance ratios between the years of 2009 to 2010.  Prior to analysis, the assumptions of 
the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The assumption of normality was assessed, 
and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots which resulted in the data not deviating 
greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of homoscedasticity was assessed, and 
subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the data did not deviate greatly from a 
rectangular distribution.  The absence of multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through 
examination of variance inflation factors (VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was 
considered to possess high levels of multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  
VIFs ranged from 1.189 to 4.942, all tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average 
VIF score was 2.741.  These measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was 
not a problem in this model.  Table 11 presents the relative coefficients and collinearity 











(Constant) -.081 .341 -.237 .814 -.770 .609
UER 3.463 3.073 1.127 .266 -2.744 9.669 .476 2.099
%StatePop65+ .196 1.360 .144 .886 -2.551 2.943 .836 1.197
PerCapInc -1.923E-06 .000 -.212 .833 .000 .000 .202 4.942
PPov .736 1.187 .620 .539 -1.662 3.134 .296 3.380
KIEA .711 23.834 .030 .976 -47.422 48.845 .841 1.189





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




The results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
economic conditions in the year 2000 on the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios between the years of 2009 to 2010 did not indicate a significant 
model, F (6, 41) = 1.583, p = .177, R
2 
= .188.  As such, no further inferences could be 
made.  Utilizing α = 0.05 level of significance, there existed no evidence to conclude that 
at least one of the predictors is useful for predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  
Accordingly, with the p-value of .177 >.05, the null hypothesis was not rejected.  As 
such, no further inferences could be made.  Results of the third linear regression are 











SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig.
1 0.434 0.188 0.069 0.140 2.298 0.990 47 1.583 0.177  
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2009 to 2010; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
  
 Analytics for Hypothesis 4. 
  
The purpose of the fourth multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the percentage change in state-level aggregate fiscal 
imbalance ratios between the years of 2000 to 2010.  Prior to analysis, the assumptions of 
the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The assumption of normality was assessed, 
and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots which resulted in the data not deviating 
greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of homoscedasticity was assessed, and 
subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the data did not deviate greatly from a 
rectangular distribution.  The absence of multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through 
examination of variance inflation factors (VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was 
considered to possess high levels of multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  
VIFs ranged from 1.189 to 4.942, all tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average 
VIF score was 2.741.  These measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was 
not a problem in this.  Table 13 presents the relative coefficients and collinearity statistics 











(Constant) 1.865 .829 2.251 .030 .192 3.539
UER 6.807 7.460 .912 .367 -8.259 21.872 .476 2.099
%StatePop65+ -5.430 3.302 -1.645 .108 -12.099 1.238 .836 1.197
PerCapInc 3.156E-05 .000 1.436 .159 .000 .000 .202 4.942
PPov .703 2.882 .244 .808 -5.117 6.523 .296 3.380
KIEA -41.478 57.854 -.717 .477 -158.316 75.359 .841 1.189














The results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
economic conditions in the year 2000 on the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios between the years of 2000 to 2010 indicated a significant model, F 
(6, 41) = 2.970, p = .017, R
2 
= .303.  The R
2
 value of .303 suggested that approximately 
30.3% of fluctuations in the 2000-2010 fiscal imbalances were due to the six independent 
variables.  Examination of the individual predictors suggested a significant relationship 
per capita GSP by state divided by per capita GDPUS and the percentage change in state-
level aggregate fiscal imbalance between the years of 2000 to 2010 only (t = -3.235, p = 
.002).  The beta value (B = -1.865) for this relationship indicates that for every unit of 
increase in the ratio of per capita GSP by state divided by per capita GDPUS there was a 
decrease of 1.865 units in the fiscal imbalance from 2000 to 2010.  Using α = 0.05 level 
of significance, there existed sufficient evidence to conclude that at least one of the 
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predictors is useful for predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, given that 
the p-value of .017 < .05, the null hypothesis was rejected.  Results of the fourth linear 
regression are presented in Table 14. 
 
Table 14 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig.
1 0.550 0.303 0.201 0.340 2.025 6.796 47 2.970 0.017
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2000 to 2010; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Summary of Research Question 1 Regressions 
The purpose of the Research Question 1 analysis was to examine and identify the 
possible relationships and impacts of a state’s fiscal condition, as represented and 
measured by the six independent variables in the year 2000, on subsequent fluctuations in 
fiscal imbalance variables during the four measurement time periods of: (a) the 2000 to 
2007 prerecession expansion, (b) the 2007 to 2009 economic recession, (c) the 2009 to 
2010 postrecession recovery, and (d) the entire 2000 to 2010 11-year period.  The 
summary results of the four linear regressions and the findings for rejecting or not 
rejecting the four null hypotheses were as follows: 
1. The focus of the first null hypothesis (H101) was on a possible relationship 
between impacts of a state’s fiscal condition, as represented and measured by 
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the six independent variables in the year 2000, on subsequent fluctuations in 
fiscal imbalance variable between the years of 2000 to 2007.  The hypothesis 
was addressed using a forced entry multiple linear regression model that 
concluded that the overall regression was not significant, F (6, 41) = 2.041, p 
= .082, R
2 
= .230.  Utilizing α = 0.05 level of significance, there existed no 
evidence to conclude that at least one of the predictors is useful for predicting 
a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, with the p-value of .082 >.05, the 
null hypothesis H101was not rejected. 
2. The focus of second null hypothesis (H102) was on a possible relationship 
between impacts of a state’s fiscal condition, as represented and measured by 
the six independent variables in the year 2000, on subsequent fluctuations in 
fiscal imbalance variable between the years of 2007 to 2009.  The hypothesis 
was addressed using a forced entry multiple linear regression model that 
concluded that the overall regression was not significant, F (6, 41) = 1.475, p 
= .211, R
2 
= .178.  Utilizing α = 0.05 level of significance, there existed no 
evidence to conclude that at least one of the predictors is useful for predicting 
a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, given that the p-value of .211 
>.05, the null hypothesis H102 was not rejected. 
3. The focus of third null hypothesis (H103) was on a possible relationship 
between impacts of a state’s fiscal condition, as represented and measured by 
the six independent variables in the year 2000, on subsequent fluctuations in 
fiscal imbalance variable between the years of 2009 to 2010.  The hypothesis 
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was addressed using a forced entry multiple linear regression model that 
concluded that the overall regression was not significant, F (6, 41) = 1.583, p 
= .177, R
2 
= .188.  Utilizing α = 0.05 level of significance, there existed no 
evidence to conclude that at least one of the predictors is useful for predicting 
a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, with the p-value of .177 >.05, the 
null hypothesis H103 was not rejected. 
4. The focus of the fourth null hypothesis (H104) was on a possible relationship 
between impacts of a state’s fiscal condition, as represented and measured by 
the six independent variables in the year 2000, on subsequent fluctuations in 
fiscal imbalance variable between the years of 2009 to 2010, F (6, 41) = 
2.970, p = .017, R
2 
= .303.  The R
2
 value of .303 suggested that approximately 
30.3% of fluctuations in the 2000 to 2010 fiscal imbalances were due to the 
six independent variables.  Examination of the individual predictors suggested 
a significant relationship per capita GSP by state divided by per capita GDP in 
the United States and the percentage change in state-level aggregate fiscal 
imbalance between the years of 2000 to 2010 only (t = -3.235, p = .002).  The 
beta value (B = -1.865) for this relationship indicated that for every unit of 
increase in the ratio of per capita GSP by state divided by per capita GDP in 
the United States there was a decrease of 1.865 units in the fiscal imbalance 
from 2000 to 2010.  Using α = 0.05 level of significance, there existed 
sufficient evidence to conclude that at least one of the predictors is useful for 
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predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, given that the p-value 
of .017 < .05, the null hypothesis H104 was rejected. 
Research Question 2 
How does the relationship between fiscal imbalance, and the independent 
variables of unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, 
the level of per capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal 
poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per 
capita GSP by state as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States fluctuate 
throughout the years 2000 to 2010? 
H20: The relationship between fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables of 
unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per 
capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States does not fluctuate throughout the 
years 2000 to 2010. 
H2A: The relationship between fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables of 
unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per 
capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 




Data Screening and Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset for Research Question 2 consists of the measures of both dependent 
and independent variables for each of the individual years occurring within the eleven 
year period of 2000 to 2010.  In contrast to the dependent variable measurements used in 
Research Question 1 which measured the net change in fiscal imbalance levels during 
four given multi-year periods of time, the dependent variable measurements used for 
Research Question 2 are the actual measurements of state-level fiscal imbalance for each 
individual year under observation.  Accordingly, Table 15 presents the descriptive 
statistical information for the dataset specific to Research Question 2. 
 
Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics for Research Question 2 
Min Max M SD Statistic Std. Error Statistic
Std. 
Error
FIB .31 4.31 1.3001 .62795 1.296 .106 1.925 .212
UERate .02 .14 .0512 .01770 1.629 .106 3.689 .212
%StatePop65+ .09 .18 .1278 .01553 -.066 .106 .864 .212
PerCapInc $25,589.36 $57,722.55 $37,225.63 $5,725.55 .744 .106 .495 .212
PPov .05 .22 .1265 .03130 .495 .106 -.221 .212
KIEA .00 .01 .0030 .00092 .654 .106 .868 .212




 Note.  N = 528.  SK = skewness; Rku = kurtosis. 
 
Description of Procedure for Research Question 2 Analytics 
To examine Research Question 2, eleven multiple linear regressions were 
conducted.  My analysis of Research Question 2 aimed to discover whether the 
relationship between the set of independent variables and the single dependent variable 
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was either strengthened or weakened over time, and which independent variables best 
related to a state’s fiscal imbalance throughout the proposed years. 
In order to assess this effect, each state’s ratio of fiscal imbalance was used as a 
dependent variable, while the data for each state’s unemployment percentage rate, the 
percent of the population of age 65+, the level of per capita income, the percent of state 
population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial 
Activity by state, and the per capita GSP as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United 
States were used as independent variables.  Data for each year from 2000 to 2010 were 
used to create eleven individual multiple linear regression models, one model for each 
year, with my examining the relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables for each state. 
Regression model 1: Year 2000. 
The purpose of the first multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of the 
independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2000.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.189 to 4.942, all 
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tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 2.741.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  










(Constant) 1.239 .752 1.647 .107 -.280 2.759
UERate 2.342 6.774 .346 .731 -11.338 16.021 .476 2.099
%StatePop65+ 2.717 2.998 .906 .370 -3.338 8.772 .836 1.197
PerCapInc -3.052E-05 .000 -1.529 .134 .000 .000 .202 4.942
PPov 4.676 2.617 1.787 .081 -.609 9.961 .296 3.380
KIEA 62.300 52.532 1.186 .242 -43.790 168.389 .841 1.189





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2000 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
10.664, p < .000, R
2 
= .609.  The R
2
 value of .609 suggested that approximately 60.9% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2000 was due to the six independent variables.  However, 
examination of the individual predictors showed no significant relationships, and as such, 












SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig.
1 0.781 0.609 0.552 0.309 1.699 10.002 47 10.664 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2000; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Regression 2: Year 2001. 
The purpose of the second multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2001.  Prior 
to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.173 to 5.691, all 
tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 2.911.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  
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(Constant) 1.563 .920 1.699 .097 -.295 3.421
UERate -4.646 8.476 -.548 .587 -21.763 12.471 .504 1.983
%StatePop65+ 1.895 3.365 .563 .576 -4.900 8.691 .852 1.173
PerCapInc -1.415E-05 .000 -.633 .530 .000 .000 .176 5.691
PPov 5.852 2.870 2.039 .048 .055 11.648 .310 3.221
KIEA 55.746 62.156 .897 .375 -69.782 181.273 .806 1.240





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 
Note.  Dependent variable: FIB 2001; F (6, 41) = 9.094, p = .000, R
2
 = .571. 
 
Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2001 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
9.094, p < .000, R
2 
= .571.  The R
2
 value of .571 suggested that approximately 57.1% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2001 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
individual predictors showed only a significant relationship between the percentage of 
state population below the poverty level and the fiscal imbalance for the year 2001 (t = 
2.039, p = .048).  The beta value (B = 5.852) for this relationship indicated that for every 
unit of increase in the percentage of state population below the poverty level there was a 
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change of 5.852 units in the fiscal imbalance for 2001.  Results of the second linear 
regression are presented in Table 19. 
 
Table 19 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.756 0.571 0.508 0.353 1.951 11.927 47 9.094 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2001; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Regression 3: Year 2002. 
The purpose of the third multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2002.  Prior 
to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.138 to 6.550, all 
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tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 3.088.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  










(Constant) 2.879 .942 3.055 .004 .976 4.782
UERate -20.034 7.865 -2.547 .015 -35.917 -4.150 .631 1.584
%StatePop65+ -.730 3.835 -.190 .850 -8.475 7.015 .721 1.386
PerCapInc -7.535E-07 .000 -.030 .976 .000 .000 .153 6.550
PPov 8.409 3.059 2.749 .009 2.231 14.588 .334 2.998
KIEA -57.780 67.322 -.858 .396 -193.739 78.179 .879 1.138





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2002 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
10.232, p < .000, R
2 
= .600.  The R
2
 value of .600 suggested that approximately 60.0% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2002 was due to the six independent variables.  Examination of the 
individual predictors showed significant relationships between the fiscal imbalance for 
the year 2002 and the unemployment percentage rate (t = -2.547, p = .015), the 
percentage of state population below the poverty level (t = 2.749, p = .009), and the per 
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capita GSP for state divided by per capita GDP for the US (t = -2.283, p = .028).  For the 
relationship with the unemployment percentage rate, the beta value (B = -20.034) 
indicates that for every unit of increase the unemployment percentage rate there was a 
change of -20.034 units in fiscal imbalance for 2002.  Similarly, the beta values for the 
percentage of state population below the poverty level (B = 8.409) and the per capita GSP 
for state divided by per capita GDP for the US (B = -1.593) indicated that for one unit of 
change in each of these variables there are changes of 8.409 units and -1.593 units, 
respectively, in the fiscal imbalance for 2002.  Results of the third linear regression are 
presented in Table 21. 
 
Table 21 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.774 0.600 0.541 0.365 2.119 13.679 47 10.232 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2002; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 





Regression 4: Year 2003. 
The purpose of the fourth multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2003.  Prior 
to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.297 to 7.622, all 
tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 3.401.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  












(Constant) 1.725 1.248 1.382 .174 -.796 4.245
UERate -21.130 7.676 -2.753 .009 -36.633 -5.628 .691 1.448
%StatePop65+ .524 4.511 .116 .908 -8.587 9.634 .685 1.459
PerCapInc 2.178E-05 .000 .686 .497 .000 .000 .131 7.622
PPov 11.726 3.552 3.301 .002 4.553 18.899 .301 3.321
KIEA -15.273 90.842 -.168 .867 -198.733 168.187 .771 1.297





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2003 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
8.828, p < .000, R
2 
= .564.  The R
2
 value of .564 suggested that approximately 56.4% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2003 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
individual predictors showed significant relationships between the fiscal imbalance for 
the year 2003 and the unemployment percentage rate (t = -2.753, p = .009) and the 
percentage of state population below the poverty level (t = 3.301, p = .002).  For the 
relationship with the unemployment percentage rate, the beta value (B = -21.130) 
indicates that for every unit of increase the unemployment percentage rate there was a 
change of -21.130 units in fiscal imbalance for 2003.  Similarly, the beta value for the 
percentage of state population below the poverty level (B = 11.726) indicated that for one 
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unit of change in this variable there was a change of 11.726 units in the fiscal imbalance 
for 2003.  Results of the fourth linear regression are presented in Table 23. 
 
Table 23 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.751 0.564 0.500 0.412 1.835 15.929 47 8.828 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2003; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
 
Regression 5: Year 2004. 
The purpose of the fifth multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of the 
independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2004.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
145 
 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.184 to 6.958, all 
tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 3.172.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  










(Constant) 1.574 1.229 1.281 .207 -.908 4.056
UERate -20.731 7.555 -2.744 .009 -35.988 -5.474 .684 1.462
%StatePop65+ 1.907 4.524 .422 .676 -7.229 11.043 .775 1.291
PerCapInc 2.389E-05 .000 .745 .461 .000 .000 .144 6.958
PPov 9.438 3.410 2.768 .008 2.551 16.324 .318 3.141
KIEA 119.698 68.310 1.752 .087 -18.257 257.652 .845 1.184





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2004 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
9.134, p < .000, R
2 
= .572.  The R
2
 value of .572 suggested that approximately 57.2% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2004 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
individual predictors showed significant relationships between the fiscal imbalance for 
the year 2004 and the unemployment percentage rate (t = -2.744, p = .009) and the 
percentage of state population below the poverty level (t = 2.768, p = .008).  For the 
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relationship with the unemployment percentage rate, the beta value (B = -20.731) 
indicated that for every unit of increase the unemployment percentage rate there was a 
change of -20.731 units in fiscal imbalance for 2004.  Similarly, the beta value for the 
percentage of state population below the poverty level (B = 9.438) indicated that for one 
unit of change in this variable there was a change of 9.438 units in the fiscal imbalance 
for 2004.  Results of the fifth linear regression are presented in Table 25. 
 
Table 25 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.765 0.572 0.509 0.429 1.740 17.692 47 9.134 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2004; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Regression 6: Year 2005. 
The purpose of the sixth multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2005.  Prior 
to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
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data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.349 to 6.819, all 
tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 3.303.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  










(Constant) 1.982 1.484 1.336 .189 -1.015 4.978
UERate -19.721 9.463 -2.084 .043 -38.831 -.611 .631 1.584
%StatePop65+ 3.573 5.335 .670 .507 -7.202 14.348 .742 1.349
PerCapInc 7.782E-06 .000 .226 .822 .000 .000 .147 6.819
PPov 9.294 3.890 2.389 .022 1.439 17.149 .311 3.219
KIEA -10.565 95.564 -.111 .913 -203.560 182.430 .653 1.531





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2005 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
6.513, p < .000, R
2 
= .488.  The R
2
 value of .488 suggested that approximately 48.8% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2005 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
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individual predictors showed significant relationships between the fiscal imbalance for 
the year 2005 and the unemployment percentage rate (t = -2.084, p = .043) and the 
percentage of state population below the poverty level (t = 2.389, p = .022).  For the 
relationship with the unemployment percentage rate, the beta value (B = -19.721) 
indicated that for every unit of increase the unemployment percentage rate there was a 
change of -19.721 units in fiscal imbalance for 2005.  Similarly, the beta value for the 
percentage of state population below the poverty level (B = 9.294) indicated that for one 
unit of change in this variable there was a change of 9.294 units in the fiscal imbalance 
for 2005.  Results of the sixth linear regression are presented in Table 27. 
 
Table 27 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.699 0.488 0.413 0.485 1.950 18.862 47 6.513 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2005; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Regression 7: Year 2006. 
The purpose of the seventh multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2006.  Prior 
to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
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assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.230 to 6.861, all 
tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 3.377.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  










(Constant) -.425 1.612 -.264 .793 -3.680 2.829
UERate 11.939 7.263 1.644 .108 -2.730 26.608 .559 1.788
%StatePop65+ 6.312 6.094 1.036 .306 -5.995 18.619 .759 1.317
PerCapInc 2.049E-05 .000 .535 .596 .000 .000 .146 6.861
PPov 6.781 4.671 1.452 .154 -2.653 16.215 .296 3.384
KIEA 122.360 88.638 1.380 .175 -56.648 301.368 .813 1.230





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 






Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2006 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
6.359, p = .004, R
2 
= .482.  The R
2
 value of .482 suggested that approximately 48.2% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2006 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
individual predictors revealed no significant relationships, and as such no further 










SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.694 0.482 0.406 0.548 1.988 23.736 47 6.359 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2006; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Regression 8: Year 2007. 
The purpose of the eighth multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2007.  Prior 
to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
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homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.098 to 7.877, all 
tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 2.933.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  










(Constant) 1.586 1.140 1.391 .172 -.716 3.888
UERate -11.312 7.624 -1.484 .146 -26.709 4.085 .694 1.441
%StatePop65+ 3.325 4.354 .764 .449 -5.467 12.118 .911 1.098
PerCapInc 2.545E-05 .000 .862 .393 .000 .000 .127 7.877
PPov 6.055 3.461 1.749 .088 -.935 13.045 .336 2.973
KIEA 45.856 77.178 .594 .556 -110.007 201.720 .784 1.275





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2007 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
6.942, p < .000, R
2 
= .504.  The R
2
 value of .504 suggested that approximately 50.4% of 
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fiscal imbalance in 2007 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
individual predictors showed significant relationships between the fiscal imbalance for 
the year 2007 and the per capita GSP for state divided by per capita GDP for the US (t = -
2.570, p = .014).  For the relationship with per capita GSP for state divided by per capita 
GDP for the US, the beta value (B = -2.337) indicated that for every unit of increase the 
unemployment percentage rate there was a change of -2.337 units in fiscal imbalance for 
2007.  Results of the eighth linear regression are presented in Table 31. 
 
Table 31 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.710 0.504 0.431 0.420 1.990 14.606 47 6.942 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2007; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Regression 9: Year 2008. 
The purpose of the ninth multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2008.  Prior 
to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
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homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.178 to 6.868, all 
tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 3.121.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  










(Constant) 2.182 1.048 2.083 .044 .066 4.298
UERate -16.472 6.016 -2.738 .009 -28.623 -4.322 .849 1.178
%StatePop65+ .980 4.174 .235 .815 -7.449 9.410 .771 1.296
PerCapInc 3.678E-05 .000 1.559 .127 .000 .000 .146 6.868
PPov 6.923 2.779 2.492 .017 1.311 12.535 .411 2.433
KIEA -92.058 66.443 -1.386 .173 -226.242 42.126 .843 1.186





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2008 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
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8.499, p < .000, R
2 
= .554.  The R
2
 value of .554 suggested that approximately 55.4% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2008 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
individual predictors showed significant relationships between the fiscal imbalance for 
the year 2008 and the unemployment percentage rate (t = -2.738, p = .009), the percent of 
population below the federal poverty level (t = 2.492, p = .017), and per capita GSP for 
state divided by per capita GDP for the US (t = -3.309, p = .002).  For the relationship 
with the unemployment percentage rate, the beta value (B = -16.472) indicated that for 
every unit of increase the unemployment percentage rate there was a change of -16.472 
units in fiscal imbalance for 2008.  For the relationship with the percent of population 
below the federal poverty level, the beta value (B = 6.923) indicated that for every unit of 
increase the unemployment percentage rate there was a change of 6.923 units in fiscal 
imbalance for 2008.  Similarly, the beta value for per capita GSP for state divided by per 
capita GDP for the US (B = -2.539) indicated that for one unit of change in this variable 
there was a change of -2.539 units in the fiscal imbalance for 2008.  Results of the ninth 
linear regression are presented in Table 33. 
 
Table 33 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.745 0.554 0.489 0.372 2.408 12.703 47 8.499 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2008; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 




Regression 10: Year 2009. 
The purpose of the tenth multiple linear regression was to examine the effect of 
the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 2009.  Prior 
to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  Prior to 
analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.122 to 7.041, all 
tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 3.225.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  












(Constant) 2.218 1.413 1.570 .124 -.635 5.071
UERate -13.663 5.752 -2.376 .022 -25.278 -2.047 .891 1.122
%StatePop65+ 2.138 6.000 .356 .723 -9.980 14.255 .752 1.330
PerCapInc 3.240E-05 .000 .920 .363 .000 .000 .142 7.041
PPov 7.176 4.273 1.679 .101 -1.454 15.807 .396 2.526
KIEA 68.330 84.190 .812 .422 -101.695 238.355 .761 1.314





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2009 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
5.684, p < .000, R
2 
= .454.  The R
2
 value of .454 suggested that approximately 45.4% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2009 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
individual predictors showed significant relationships between the fiscal imbalance for 
the year 2009 and the unemployment percentage rate (t = -2.376, p = .022) and per capita 
GSP for state divided by per capita GDP for the US (t = -2.322, p = .025).  For the 
relationship with the unemployment percentage rate, the beta value (B = -13.663) 
indicated that for every unit of increase the unemployment percentage rate there was a 
change of -13.663 units in fiscal imbalance for 2009.  Similarly, the beta value for per 
capita GSP for state divided by per capita GDP for the US (B = -2.579) indicated that for 
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one unit of change in this variable there was a change of -2.579 units in the fiscal 
imbalance for 2009.  Results of the tenth linear regression are presented in Table 35. 
 
Table 35 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.674 0.454 0.374 0.531 2.079 21.176 47 5.684 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2009; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Regression 11: Year 2010. 
The purpose of the eleventh and final multiple linear regression was to examine 
the effect of the independent variables on the state-level fiscal imbalance during the year 
2010.  Prior to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  
Prior to analysis, the assumptions of the multiple linear regressions were assessed.  The 
assumption of normality was assessed, and subsequently met, using a normal P-P plots 
which resulted in the data not deviating greatly from the normal line.  The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was assessed, and subsequently met, using a residuals scatterplot; the 
data did not deviate greatly from a rectangular distribution.  The absence of 
multicollinearity was assessed, and met, through examination of variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), where any VIF greater than 10 was considered to possess high levels of 
multicollinearity, thereby violating the assumption.  VIFs ranged from 1.055 to 5.502, all 
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tolerance statistics were above 0.1, and the average VIF score was 2.665.  These 
measurements provided confirmation that collinearity was not a problem in this model.  










(Constant) 3.220 1.829 1.761 .086 -.474 6.913
UERate -8.697 4.449 -1.955 .057 -17.681 .287 .871 1.148
%StatePop65+ 1.535 6.363 .241 .811 -11.315 14.386 .848 1.179
PerCapInc 1.197E-05 .000 .325 .746 .000 .000 .182 5.502
PPov 6.512 4.819 1.351 .184 -3.221 16.245 .358 2.792
KIEA -76.648 108.287 -.708 .483 -295.337 142.041 .948 1.055





95.0% CI for B Collinearity statistics
 




Results of the multiple linear regression to determine the impact of state 
conditions on fiscal imbalance for the year 2010 indicated a significant model, F (6, 41) = 
4.798, p < .000, R
2 
= .413.  The R
2
 value of .413 suggested that approximately 41.3% of 
fiscal imbalance in 2010 was due to the six independent variables.  Examining the 
individual predictors showed significant relationships between the fiscal imbalance for 
the year 2010 and per capita GSP for state divided by per capita GDP for the US (t = -
2.098, p = .042).  The beta value for per capita GSP for state divided by per capita GDP 
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for the US (B = -2.127) indicated that for one unit of change in this variable there was a 
change of -2.127 units in the fiscal imbalance for 2010.  Results of the eleventh, and 
final, linear regression are presented in Table 37. 
 
Table 37 






SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS df F Sig
1 0.642 0.413 0.327 0.596 2.173 7.000 47 4.798 0.000
 
Note.  (a) Dependent Variable: FIB 2010; (b) Predictors: (Enter method), %GSP, 
%StatePop65+, UER, KIEA, PPov, PerCapInc. 
 
Summary of Research Question 2 Regressions 
The purpose of Research Question 2, and its related hypothesis, was to analyze 
the relationships between the outcome and predictor variables to determine if these 
relationships have fluctuated over the eleven-year period under observation.  Multiple 
linear regressions were run for each of the eleven individual years.  For each year's 
multiple linear regression, tables containing the relative coefficient summaries and linear 
regression results have been provided to illustrate the statistical relationship between 
state-level fiscal imbalance and the six independent variables. 
Table 38 contains a summary of the year-to-year data obtained from each of the 












SE  of 
estimate
Durbin-
Watson SS F Sig.
2000 0.781 0.609 0.552 0.309 1.699 10.002 10.664 0.000
2001 0.756 0.571 0.508 0.353 1.951 11.927 9.094 0.000
2002 0.774 0.600 0.541 0.365 2.119 13.679 10.232 0.000
2003 0.751 0.564 0.500 0.412 1.835 15.929 8.828 0.000
2004 0.765 0.572 0.509 0.429 1.740 17.692 9.134 0.000
2005 0.699 0.488 0.413 0.485 1.950 18.862 6.513 0.000
2006 0.694 0.482 0.406 0.548 1.988 23.736 6.359 0.000
2007 0.710 0.504 0.431 0.420 1.990 14.606 6.942 0.000
2008 0.745 0.554 0.489 0.372 2.408 12.703 8.499 0.000
2009 0.674 0.454 0.374 0.531 2.079 21.176 5.684 0.000
2010 0.642 0.413 0.327 0.596 2.173 7.000 4.798 0.000  
 
  
Table 38 includes the measurement of R
2
, or the coefficient of determination, 
representing the degree of relationship between the set of independent variables and the 
dependent variable for each of the eleven years under observation.  My comparison of 
these values measures, more specifically, how the percentage of variation in fiscal 
imbalance from one state to another was explained by the set of independent variables 
(Pallant, 2010).  If the R
2
 measurement increased for each subsequent year, the 
relationship was viewed as strengthening over time.  However, if the R
2
 measurement 
decreased for each subsequent year, the relationship was viewed as weakening over time.   
In Figure 7, R
2
 values were plotted against time to provide a comparative 
representation of the effect of time on the relationship between the independent and 




2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
R2 0.609 0.571 0.600 0.564 0.572 0.488 0.482 0.504 0.554 0.454 0.413















Annual Comparison of R2 Values
 
Figure 7.  Annual measures of R
2




 values measured in each of the eleven multiple regressions fluctuated over 
time, with annual values decreasing from 2002 to 2010 with a linear trend slope of y = -
0.0163x + 0.6262.  The negative slope of the linear trend line reflects the long-term 
weakening of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  The 
Research Question 2 null hypothesis (H20) states that the relationship between fiscal 
imbalance levels and the six independent variables does not fluctuate throughout the 
years 2000 to 2010.  However, the resulting analysis illustrated in both Table 38 and 
Figure 7 reflects fluctuations in the value of R
2 
during the eleven-year time period.  
Accordingly, the null hypothesis H20 was rejected. 
 The second step in the supporting analysis of Research Question 2 was an 
examination of the fashion in which relationships between yearly state-wise 
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demographics and fiscal imbalance change throughout time.  Significance levels and 
unstandardized beta coefficients for each independent variable were examined for each 
year.  Examination of p-values provided insight into which of the independent variables 
most strongly influenced fiscal imbalance for each year.  At times, certain variables may 
be significant predictors in one year’s analysis, and may no longer have a significant 
level of predictive ability in following years.  In this way, significant relationships may 
be examined as they fluctuated throughout time.  In addition, significant predictors will 
be assessed for the strength of their correlation for each year.  If a set of predictors were 
significantly related to the dependent variable for several years, examination of the 
unstandardized beta coefficient (B) allowed a description of how the strength of these 
relationships fluctuate from one year to the next.  Table 39 includes the significance 
levels, or p-values, of the independent variables over time. 
 
Table 39 
Summary of Predictor Variable p-values 2000 to 2010 
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
UERate .731 .587 .015 .009 .009 .043 .108 .146 .009 .022 .057
%StatePop65+ .370 .576 .850 .908 .676 .507 .306 .449 .815 .723 .811
PerCapInc .134 .530 .976 .497 .461 .822 .596 .393 .127 .363 .746
PPov .081 .048 .009 .002 .008 .022 .154 .088 .017 .101 .184
KIEA .242 .375 .396 .867 .087 .913 .175 .556 .173 .422 .483
%GSP .453 .135 .028 .061 .052 .110 .127 .014 .002 .025 .042  
 
Only three of the predictor variables have significance levels which fluctuate at or 
below p < .05 level of significance, as highlighted by the shading of these values in Table 
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39, at various times during the eleven year period: (a) the unemployment rate (UERate), 
(b) the percent of state population below the federal poverty level (PPov), and (c) the 
percent of state GSP divided by the GDP in the United States (%GSP).  None of the p-
values related to the remaining three independent variables, the percent of state 
population of age 65+ (%StatePop65+), the level of per capita income (PerCapInc), and 
the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity (KIEA), fell below the criteria α = 0.05 
level of significance, therefore there existed insufficient evidence to conclude that at least 
one of these three remaining independent variables was useful for predicting a change in 
fiscal imbalance.  Table 40 includes the annual p-values and B-coefficient values for each 
of the three independent variables having a demonstrated predictive relationship with 
state fiscal imbalance levels. 
 
Table 40 
Summary of p-values and B-coefficients for Significant Predictors 
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
UER
ate
p -value .015 .009 .009 .043 .009 .022
B-coefficient -20.034 -21.130 -20.731 -19.721 -16.472 -13.663
PPov p -value
.048 .009 .002 .008 .022 .017
B-coefficient 5.852 8.409 11.726 9.438 9.294 6.923
%GSPp -value .028 .014 .002 .025 .042
B-coefficient -1.593 -2.337 -2.539 -2.579 -2.127  
 
In Table 40, the annual B-coefficient measurements represent the level of relationship 
between the predictor variables and fiscal imbalance levels in the following manner: 
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1.  The independent variable representing the unemployment rate (UERate) had 
the highest significant predictive relationship with fiscal imbalance levels 
during the years 2002 to 2005, and again in the years 2008 to 2009.  The B-
coefficient measures ranged from B = -21.130 in 2003 to B = -13.663 in 2009. 
2. The independent variable representing the percent of population under the 
federal population level (PPov) had a significant predictive relationship with 
fiscal imbalance levels during the years 2001 to 2005, and again in 2008.  The 
B-coefficient measures ranged from B = 11.726 in 2003 to B = 5.852 in 2001. 
3. The independent variable representing the ratio of state GSP to GDP in the 
United states in 2002, and again in the years 2007 to 2010.  The B-coefficient 
measures ranged from B = -2.579 in 2009 to B = -1.593 in 2002. 
Additional Statistical Information 
Figure 8 is a graphical presentation of the p-value levels of these three 
independent variables as they related to fluctuations in state level fiscal imbalance.  I was 
interested in observing how the p-values of these three predictors fluctuated over the 
eleven-year period, and how the variation in significance levels values may converge or 
diverge over time.  Interestingly, the plotted values on Figure 8 fluctuated with near-
convergence in the measure of statistical dispersion between the three variables possibly 
occurring in both 2002 and 2008—the initial dates of the two most recent economic 
recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2014).   
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The initial date of the two economic recessions is illustrated in Figure 8 by the 
inclusion of the two vertical lines at each of the years.  In both cases, the slope of each 
predictor variable's plotted line of the p-value was negative prior to the 2002 economic 
recession, turning positive after the start of the subsequent recovery period, turning 
negative again prior to the 2008 economic recession, and finally turning positive as the 
recovery period of the 2008 economic recession commenced.  This same convergence 
phenomenon appears in Table 40 where years 2002 and 2008 are the only years in which 
all three of the predictor variables meet significance at p < .05. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
UERate .731 .587 .015 .009 .009 .043 .108 .146 .009 .022 .057
PPov .081 .048 .009 .002 .008 .022 .154 .088 .017 .101 .184

















2000-2010 p-value levels: UERate, PPov, and %GSP
Start of recession
 




This convergence/divergence dynamic potentially illustrated the potential cyclical 
nature of the three independent variables on the dependent variable.  However, the 
analysis of the factors attributing to the conversion of these variables at the time point 
when an economic recession commences is beyond the scope of this study.  Future 
research might highlight the interactions between economic factors and fiscal imbalance 
levels as they pertain to their relationship with cyclical economic downturns. 
Summary 
The research was designed to examine the extent to which the relationship 
between fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables of unemployment percentage 
rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by state, 
the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index for 
Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of per 
capita GDP in the United States does not fluctuate throughout the years 2000 to 2010. 
The initial step of the analysis indicated the first three of the four individual null 
hypotheses pertaining to Research Questions 1 (H101, H102, and H103) were not rejected 
as the independent variables did not have a significant relationship with fluctuations in 
fiscal imbalance levels during the three periods of time: (a) 2000 to 2007, (b) 2007 to 
2009, and (c) 2009 to 2010.  However, the analysis indicated that the independent 
variables did have a significant relationship with fluctuations in fiscal imbalance levels 
during the encompassing 2000 to 2010 period of time.  Accordingly, the null hypothesis 
H104 was rejected. 
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The second step of the analysis, pertaining to Research Question 2 indicated that 
the strength of the relationship between the predictor variables and the outcome variable, 
measured on an annual basis, both strengthened and weakened during at various time 
points during 2000 to 2010.  The measurement of R
2
, or the coefficient of determination, 
represented the degree of relationship between the set of independent variables and the 
dependent variable.  This measurement described, more specifically, the percentage of 
variation in fiscal imbalance from one state to another was explained by the set of 
independent.  If the R
2
 measurement increased for each subsequent year, the relationship 
was viewed as strengthening over time.  However, if the R
2
 measurement decreased for 
each subsequent year, the relationship was viewed as weakening over time.  The results 
of the analysis illustrated that the measurement of R
2
 varied over the eleven year period, 
with both strengthening and weakening fluctuations observed on a cyclical basis.  
Accordingly, the null hypothesis H20 was rejected.   
Finally, an analysis was made to determine which of the predictor variables and 
which independent variables best related to a state’s fiscal imbalance throughout the 
proposed years.  An analysis of each of the six predictor variable p-values and 
corresponding beta-coefficient measurements, I determined that only three of the 
independent variables had significance levels which fluctuate below p < .05 level of 
significance at various times during the eleven year period: (a) the unemployment rate 
(UERate), (b) the percent of state population below the federal poverty level (PPov), and 
(c) the percent of state GSP divided by the GDP in the United States (%GSP).   
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Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter of the study on cyclical economic impacts on 
aggregated fiscal imbalance levels in the United States.  The chapter contains the 
summary and conclusion, as well as recommendations for future research.  Chapter 5 will 
also include further comments on the findings of the study, with recommendations for 
action, and perspectives on positive social change. 
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Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative research was to provide a deeper understanding 
of the impact of cyclical changes in the economic environment on aggregated fiscal 
imbalance levels across the 48 contiguous U.S. states.  This study was conducted to 
achieve the following objectives: (a) the initial phase of this study was to measure, 
describe, regress, and analyze how the independent variables of the unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States may be related to state-level fiscal 
imbalances across the United States prior to, during, and immediately following the 2007 
to 2009 economic recession, and (b) the second phase of the analysis was to measure, 
describe, regress, and analyze how the relationship between unemployment percentage 
rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita income by 
state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the Kauffman Index 
for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as a percentage of 
per capita GDP in the United States and state-level fiscal imbalances is either 
strengthened or weakened over time and, accordingly, which economic factors best relate 
to a state’s fiscal imbalance throughout the proposed 11-year period. 
In the first phase of the statistical results, the analysis resulted in the 
determination that the predictor variables did not have a statistically significant 
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relationship with fluctuations in fiscal imbalance levels during the following three 
consecutive periods of time: (a) 2000 to 2007, (b) 2007 to 2009, and (c) 2009 to 2010.  
However, statistical testing resulted in the determination that the annual measures of all 
predictor variables did have a statistically significant relationship with the annual 
measurements of fiscal imbalance levels over the comprehensive 11-year period under 
observation.   
In the second phase of analysis, I observed that the strength of the relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables both strengthened and weakened, as 
demonstrated by the fluctuations in the R
2
 values, on a year-to-year basis.  In addition, 
three of the predictor variables, the unemployment rate, the percent of population below 
the federal poverty level, and the ratio of GSP to GDP in the United States, were found to 
have an individually significant relationship with fiscal imbalance levels at various points 
between 2000 and 2010. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The 2008 economic recession has been the most severe recession since World 
War Two as evidenced by a doubling of the unemployment rate, numerous quarters of 
negative GDP growth during 2008 and 2009, and over 8 million jobs lost (Connaughton 
& Madsen, 2012, p. 177).  While this information is critical to national level decision 
makers, the implication for state-level public entities is varied as evidence of regional 
differences in economic performance during national business cycles suggests that the 
correlation between economic characteristics and economic sustainability vary across 
regions (Garrett, Wagner, & Wheelcock, 2005, p. 1).   
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Due to the variety of economic factors between states, in both number and 
complexity, researchers investigating recessionary economic impacts have employed 
several types of explanatory variables identified as having an influence on state-level 
economic performance (Connaughton & Madsen, 2012, p. 178).  Berryman and 
Kaserman (1993) studied employment level fluctuations in the manufacturing sector to 
explain state economic growth from 1929 to 1987.  Furthermore, Levernier, Partridge, 
and Rickman (1990) studied economic, demographic, and labor variables with regional 
dummy variables to measure economic impacts by region.  Moreover, Connaughton and 
Madsen (2012) observed percent change in jobs by state, state-level productivity, the 
percent of state population with a 4-year college degree, and other factors with dummy 
variables included to observe regional effects on unemployment during the 2008 to 2009 
economic recession (p. 182).   
One economic phenomenon that received no mention in these previous studies 
was the impact of cyclical economic fluctuations on state-level fiscal imbalances.  
Buchanan (1950) called attention to fiscal imbalances between subordinate units in a 
federal polity by suggesting that fiscal systems in each subunit government is limited by 
its geographical boundaries, thereby restricting its taxing authority to withdraw resources 
for the financing of public services only from those within its boundaries (p. 584).  
Buchanan (1950) further stated that if “subordinate units are required independently to 
finance certain traditionally assigned functions, fiscal inequalities among those units will 
be present…there will be differences in the number of public services performed…and in 
the burden of taxes levied” (p. 584).  This theoretical gap in the literature piqued my 
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interest as the concept of fluctuating fiscal inequalities between states is an important 
factor in economic development policies aimed at providing a similar level of public 
goods and services for a similar public cost across regions.  Accordingly, the 
development of the research questions in this study was to measure how fiscal imbalance 
levels fluctuate during a cyclical economic period of time and to observe which economic 
variables may be related to these fiscal imbalance fluctuations.   
To study cyclical economic impacts on fiscal imbalance levels, I developed two 
sets of research questions and five sets of hypotheses—four hypotheses addressing 
Research Question 1 and one hypothesis addressing Research Question 2.  Existing 
datasets from four federal government agencies and one private entity were obtained, 
organized, and categorized by state government for the analysis.  The findings and 
interpretations for each research question are discussed in the following sections. 
 Research Question 1 
In Research Question 1, I queried the following: Is there a relationship between 
fluctuations in the dependent variable, the percentage change in state-level aggregate 
fiscal imbalance ratios, and the year 2000 independent variables of unemployment 
percentage rate by state, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of per capita 
income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, the 
Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state as 
a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States, during the four measurement time 
periods of: (a) the 2000 to 2007 prerecession expansion, (b) the 2007 to 2009 economic 
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recession, (c) the 2009-2010 postrecession recovery, and (d) the entire 2000 to 2010 11-
year period? 
The line of inquiry and the structural format of Research Question 1 replicated the 
model developed by Connaughton and Madsen (2012) who studied state-level impacts of 
the 2008 economic recession on job losses and unemployment levels.  While 
conceptually formulated around Connaughton and Madsen’s model, this study replaced 
job loss as the outcome variable with fiscal imbalance fluctuations, while simultaneously 
adopting predictor variables that might be related to shifts in the components used in 
calculating a state’s fiscal imbalance level.  In addition, I expanded the period of time 
under observation to include the 2009 to 2010 recovery period.  This additional time 
observation adds to the body of literature by analyzing not only the negative economic 
impacts of the 2008 recession, but also the subsequent recovery period. 
In Research Question 1, one hypothesis was assigned to each of the four time 
measurement periods.  The purpose of this assignment was to separately measure the 
level of relationship between the independent and dependent variables during different 
stages of a cyclical economic cycle.  Each hypothesis was constructed to address the 
potential existence of a significant predictive relationship between state-level economic 
factors and the percent fluctuation in state-level fiscal imbalance levels during its 
assigned period of time.   
The data used in Hypothesis 1did not support the existence of a significant 
predictive relationship between the dependent variable fluctuations in fiscal imbalance 
levels from 2000 to 2007 and the fiscal year 2000 independent variable economic factors.  
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The results of the multiple linear regression model concluded that the overall regression 
was not significant (F (6, 41) = 2.041, p = .082, R
2 
= .230).  Using α = 0.05 level of 
significance, there existed no evidence to conclude that at least one of the predictors is 
useful for predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, with the p-value of .082 
>.05, the null hypothesis H101was not rejected. 
The data used in Hypothesis 2 did not support the existence of a significant 
predictive relationship between the dependent variable fluctuations in fiscal imbalance 
levels between 2007 and 2009 and the fiscal year 2000 independent variable economic 
factors.  The results of multiple linear regression model that concluded that the overall 
regression was not significant (F (6, 41) = 1.475, p = .211, R
2 
= .178).  Using α = 0.05 
level of significance, there existed no evidence to conclude that at least one of the 
predictors is useful for predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, given that 
the p-value of .211 >.05, the null hypothesis H102 was not rejected. 
The data used in Hypothesis 3 did not support the existence of a significant 
predictive relationship between the dependent variable fluctuations in fiscal imbalance 
levels during 2009 to 2010 and the fiscal year 2000 independent variable economic 
factors.  The results of multiple linear regression model that concluded that the overall 
regression was not significant (F (6, 41) = 1.583, p = .177, R
2 
= .188).  Using α = 0.05 
level of significance, there existed no evidence to conclude that at least one of the 
predictors is useful for predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, with the p-
value of .177 >.05, the null hypothesis H103 was not rejected. 
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Finally, the data used in Hypothesis 4 did support the existence of a significant 
predictive relationship between the dependent variable fluctuations in fiscal imbalance 
levels from 2000 to 2010 and the fiscal year 2000 independent variable economic factors.  
Based on the results of the multiple linear regression model, I concluded that there was a 
significant predictive relationship between the six independent variables in the year 2000 
and subsequent fluctuations in fiscal imbalance variable between the years of 2009 and 
2010 (F (6, 41) = 2.970, p = .017, R
2 
= .303).  Using α = 0.05 level of significance, there 
existed sufficient evidence to conclude that at least one of the predictors was useful for 
predicting a change in fiscal imbalance.  Accordingly, given that the p-value of .017 < 
.05, the null hypothesis H104 was rejected. 
The implication of these results suggested that, while the independent variables 
had a significant predictive relationship with fiscal imbalance levels over the entire 11-
year period of 2000 to 2010, the fluctuations in fiscal imbalances occurring during the 
various stages of the economic cycle were not significantly aligned enough to the 
predictor variables existing in 2000 to allow any inferences of relationship during the 
three subperiods of time.   
At the time of developing Research Question 1, I also considered that the strength 
of relationship between the outcome and predictor variables might fluctuate on an annual 
basis rather than during multiyear periods of time.  In addition, I considered that the 
predictor variables might each have their own levels of relational significance with fiscal 
imbalance levels that could possible strengthen and weaken at different annual time 
points independent of the other independent variables.   
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Accordingly, I again expanded previous research by adding Research Question 2 
to study how the strength of relationship between fiscal imbalance levels and the 
individual independent variables may strengthen or weaken over time, and which 
independent variable may be significant predictors in one year’s analysis and may no 
longer have a significant level of predictive ability in following years.  In this way, 
significant relationships were examined as they fluctuate on a year to year basis. 
Research Question 2 
 In Research Question 2, I asked the following:  How does the relationship 
strength between the dependent variable, fiscal imbalance, and the independent variables 
of unemployment percentage rate, the percent of state population of age 65+, the level of 
per capita income by state, the percent of state population below the federal poverty level, 
the Kauffman Index for Entrepreneurial Activity by state, and the per capita GSP by state 
as a percentage of per capita GDP in the United States fluctuate throughout the years 
2000 to 2010? 
The analysis of Research Question 2 included the analysis, on a year by year 
basis, of the statistical relationships between state-level fiscal imbalances and each 
respective state’s economic conditions.  I used the R
2
 measure during each year as the 
measure of strength between all variables.  Thus, I plotted the R
2
 values graphically to 
observe and measure possible fluctuations in relationship strength evidence by 
corresponding fluctuations in R
2
 values year to year.  As shown in Figure 7, the R
2
 values 
did vary year to year, thus possibly proving that the relational strength fluctuated during 
the 2000 to 2010 period of time.  In addition, the analysis of the significance levels of 
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each predictor variable reflected that different variables have greater levels of statistical 
significance in one year, with a lesser degree of significance in subsequent years. 
The implication of the analysis of Research Question 2 may highlight that 
different economic factors may have different levels of sensitivity to cyclical changes in 
the economic environment—sensitivities that create a different level of responsive 
volatility to economic swings than do other economic factors.  For example, the varied 
and volatile plot lines of p-values in Figure 8, the appearance and disappearance of 
significance levels of the three independent variables, the unemployment rate, the percent 
of population under the federal poverty level, and the ration of individual GSP over GDP 
in the United States as reflected in Table 40 may be interpreted that different economic 
factors respond to cyclic economic subperiods of time.  One possible implication is that 
the results of the two research questions are related.  In Research Question 1, there was 
no significant relationship measured during the three subperiods of time, yet there was a 
significant relationship over the 11-year period of time.  In Research Question 2, the 
predictor variables phased-in and -out of significance during shorter periods of time, all 
the while there was a measureable level of relational strength during the entire 11-year 
period.  Further research might illuminate possible relationships between these models. 
Limitations of the Study 
The scope of this study was limited to an analysis of potential relationships 
between fluctuations in various economic factors and simultaneous fluctuations in state-
level fiscal imbalances, across the 48 contiguous U.S. states, during the years 2000 to 
2010.  While the population of 48 U.S. states is finite due to the contiguity requirement of 
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economic factors in one state impacting economic factors in adjacent or other contiguous 
states, the period of time over which relationships are observed and measured could be 
expanded outside of the 11-year period used in this study.  In addition, the model used for 
this study could be applied to other contiguous hierarchical public entity units such as an 
analysis of economic factor and fiscal imbalance relationships on a state/county level.   
Finally, this study was somewhat limited in scope by the unavailability of federal 
data for years subsequent to 2010.  Improved data availability of the economic datasets 
used in this study could enhance the ability of analyzing fiscal imbalance fluctuations is 
into future years as the federal government refines and sophisticates its data collection 
and archiving processes to make available to the public the critical economic data needed 
to accurately measure federal spending on the state level. 
Recommendations for Future Study 
The purpose of Research Question 1 was to measure, describe, regress, and 
analyze how fluctuations in state-level fiscal imbalances across the United States may be 
related to year 2000 economic factors prior to, during, and immediately following the 
2007 to 2009 economic recession.  The model for the analysis was a replication of the 
econometric model used by Connaughton and Madsen (2012) the purpose of which was a 
regression of a fixed set of predictor variables from a base year against fluctuations in a 
dependent variable, GDP, during subsequent periods of time.  Rather than holding the 
predictor variables fixed at the year 2000 base measurements, I would recommend a 
similar study be performed that would compare and regress fluctuations in the predictor 
variables during the same time intervals as fluctuations in fiscal imbalance levels.  The 
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purpose of this analysis would be to observe possible relationships in the fluctuations of 
all variables during similar time intervals and if any resulting fluctuations might result in 
a higher level of significant relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables than was observed in this study. 
Further research is encouraged in the area of determining if other economic or 
demographic factors may have significant relationships on fiscal imbalance level 
fluctuations, and how these fluctuations combined with the predicator variables in this 
study may act as precursors to an upcoming economic recession event.  Figure 7 in this 
study represented a graphical illustration of convergence of significance levels in three of 
the predictor variables, the unemployment rate, the percent of population below the 
federal poverty level, and state-level GSP as a percentage of GDP in the United States, 
precisely at the time when an economic recession commenced.  Possible further research 
could expand the time period under observation to include several past economic 
recession events while simultaneously focusing on these same three variables to observe 
if a similar conversionary phenomenon exists. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
This focus of this study centered on fiscal imbalance variances that exist between 
the 48 contiguous U.S. states.  Each individual state government has its own demographic 
and socioeconomic mix of factors which generate differing levels of both jurisdictional 
tax revenue production and constituent demand for public goods and services.  As 
demonstrated in this study, the measured levels of jurisdictional fiscal imbalance across 
the 48 contiguous U.S. states was consistent, yet ever-changing, over the 2000 to 2010 
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period of time.  The sheer number of possible economic factors that impact jurisdictional 
fiscal capacities and expenditure demand levels make the development of a measurement 
methodology of regional disparity difficult.  Previous researchers have attempted various 
econometric models to study relationships between various economic variables in an 
effort to assess the various dimensions of fiscal imbalances (Connaughton & Madsen, 
2009; Crain & Lee, 1999; Moon, 2003).  Buchanan (1950) acknowledged the variances in 
governance structure and economic composition of individual sublevel entities and 
subsequently proposed a methodology of correcting fiscal imbalances by taking surplus 
fiscal balance from wealthier states to subsidizing poorer state economies.  While 
Buchanan's methodology may artificially mitigate a certain level of fiscal imbalance, the 
subsidization is a postfacto treatment of an adverse economic symptom.  The 
subsidization does nothing to observe, understand, or treat the basal causes of fiscal 
imbalance.   
Accordingly, this study was needed to observe and understand how certain 
specific economic variables impacting aggregated fiscal imbalance levels fluctuate within 
the population of U.S. states—fluctuations that may, in turn, cause relative imbalances in 
the quality of life and economic potential in all regions over time.  Based on the findings 
of this study's research questions, in particularly how the unemployment rate, the 
percentage of the population living with an income under the federal poverty level, and 
the level of GSP per GDP in the United States are related to fluctuations in fiscal 
imbalance, public sector decision makers might implement new fiscal policies which 
address job creation, business incubation, and the expansion of economic development 
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into those geographical areas which experience a higher level of fiscal imbalance 
fluctuation than other jurisdictions.  By encouraging an examination of the underlying 
economic causes of fiscal imbalances between and across state jurisdictions, one could 
potentially influence the fiscal imbalance disparities apparent between jurisdictions by 
mitigating the misalignment in the allocation of tax burden and the disbursement of 
critically needed social support services.  Doing so might enhance the quality of life and 
economic stability of all state jurisdictions as a whole.  
Conclusion 
The defining characteristic of public sector economics is the continual struggle 
between the demands placed on governmental entities to provide public goods and 
services and the desires of the constituency and the fiscal capacity of public jurisdictions 
to finance those demands (Joyce & Pattison, 2010).  This opening sentence to Chapter 1 
is both profound and an acceptable summary of the results of this study.  Atkins (2008) 
stated that fiscal inequity between governments is a fact in America with taxation rates 
varying between jurisdictions while local governments provide different mixes of goods 
and services to their citizens (p. 53).  Ladd (2005) described fiscal disparity as a 
comparison of a public entity’s ability to raise revenue against the expenditure burden 
placed upon it (p. 144).   
Does this fiscal disparity represent a negative or positive dynamic of public sector 
economic policy?  Atkins (2008) stated that the tolerable margin of economic diversity 
among local governments is a political and societal decision.( p. 53).  Tiebot (1956) 
suggested that individuals “vote with their feet” and will simply move to a jurisdiction 
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which offers a desirable mix of public goods and services at a price acceptable to the 
individual.  Both Atkins and Tiebot describe an individual willing to accept some degree 
of fiscal disparity that matches the individual’s own level of fiscal tolerance. 
However, as demonstrated in this study, fiscal imbalance levels are not static and 
do, indeed, fluctuate over time.  Cyclical economic impacts on jurisdictional economic 
factors cause fluctuations in both the ability of a jurisdiction and its citizens to raise 
public funds and the demand level for public goods and services.  With economic factors 
differing between jurisdictions, the level of fiscal disparity in one community may vary 
significantly from its jurisdictional peers.  This disparity level may or may not be 
exacerbated by cyclical shocks to an individual jurisdiction’s economic environment.  It 
is this jurisdictional variance which potentially causes varying quality of life levels for 
individuals depending on the fiscal status of the jurisdiction in which they live—a surplus 
or a deficit jurisdiction in terms of fiscal imbalance.   
Public policy makers interested in leveling the economic field in and between 
their sublevel political units have an interest in softening or mitigating wide variations in 
fiscal imbalance swings through cyclical economic periods.  While Buchanan (1956) 
suggested that surplus jurisdictions simply donate their excess fiscal surplus to those less 
fortunate jurisdictions, this subsidization model is only treating the symptom of fiscal 
imbalance fluctuations.  Through the analysis of economic factors which are related to 
cyclical swings in fiscal imbalance disparity, and through the development of sound 
fiscal policies designed to minimize the volatility of those economic factors most 
sensitive to cyclical economic swings, public decision makers may make definitive 
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progress towards narrowing the dispersion of fiscal imbalances in and between sublevel 
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Appendix A: Fiscal Imbalance Ratios 2000 to 2010. 
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 1.5484 1.7436 1.8386 2.0590 2.1119 2.0619 1.9805 1.9831 1.9527 2.7210 2.8396
Arizona 1.1617 1.1657 1.3959 1.6272 1.6563 1.5299 1.4202 1.3530 1.5166 1.9470 2.0338
Arkansas 0.8357 0.8752 0.9325 0.9240 0.9472 0.8490 0.7762 0.8213 0.8470 1.0612 1.0232
California 0.6796 0.7117 0.8885 0.9653 0.9767 0.9106 0.8477 0.8294 0.9429 1.3062 1.2212
Colorado 0.6133 0.6749 0.7201 0.8558 0.8673 0.8253 0.8136 0.7671 0.7878 1.2422 1.2647
Connecticut 0.4838 0.5276 0.6394 0.7380 0.7231 0.6671 0.6069 0.5970 0.7144 0.9531 1.2723
Delaware 0.3344 0.4177 0.4043 0.4829 0.4711 0.4154 0.3398 0.3698 0.3068 0.5947 0.5269
Florida 0.9531 1.0021 1.1091 1.2421 1.2933 1.1643 1.0872 1.0778 1.1156 1.5949 1.6765
Georgia 0.6956 0.8052 0.8509 0.9131 0.9335 0.9059 0.8627 0.9450 1.0738 1.4107 1.5269
Idaho 0.9562 0.9339 1.2151 1.2808 1.3840 1.2291 1.2017 1.2129 1.3054 2.1718 2.2925
Illinois 0.5211 0.5754 0.6302 0.6898 0.7082 0.6778 0.6330 0.6546 0.7464 0.9995 0.9903
Indiana 0.8475 0.9581 1.0059 1.0744 1.1779 1.1217 1.0982 1.1075 1.2216 1.4522 1.3528
Iowa 1.0071 1.1668 1.2929 1.2054 1.3390 1.1851 1.2548 1.1742 1.2156 1.6673 1.6146
Kansas 0.8004 0.9077 1.0738 1.1735 1.2034 1.0901 1.0694 1.0191 1.1331 1.7034 1.5433
Kentucky 1.3657 1.4537 1.6662 1.8530 1.8107 1.8204 1.7322 1.5519 2.0958 2.1452 2.4492
Louisiana 1.6022 1.4474 1.3231 1.5920 1.6201 1.5451 2.5520 1.2779 1.2628 1.3863 1.5396
Maine 1.4092 1.4256 1.7358 1.9188 1.9802 1.9862 1.7426 1.8842 1.7774 2.3325 2.4838
Maryland 1.0891 1.1158 1.1897 1.5070 1.5828 1.4249 1.4733 1.3149 1.4392 2.0716 2.0192
Massachusetts 0.6348 0.6352 0.7862 0.9146 0.8994 0.8673 0.8218 0.8161 0.8863 1.1966 1.1545
Michigan 0.6187 0.7427 0.8431 0.8936 0.9489 0.9458 0.9617 1.0247 1.2449 1.6414 1.6901
Minnesota 0.4162 0.4354 0.4653 0.4763 0.4958 0.4627 0.4428 0.5092 0.4720 0.6754 0.6525
Mississippi 1.8811 2.1692 2.3645 2.4118 2.4955 2.9551 4.3096 2.8169 2.3704 3.4206 3.4552
Missouri 0.8779 0.9325 1.0292 1.1509 1.1932 1.2204 1.1756 1.1440 1.2595 1.5333 1.5260
Montana 1.6100 1.9588 2.2359 2.2908 2.3912 2.1729 1.9629 1.8788 1.8762 2.6414 2.6893
Nebraska 0.7591 0.8210 0.9260 0.7933 0.8195 0.7930 0.8013 0.7344 0.7366 1.0201 0.9371
Nevada 0.7253 0.7825 0.8843 0.8836 0.9605 0.8431 0.7636 0.7887 0.9722 1.3721 1.5349
New Hampshire 0.7305 0.7703 0.9428 0.9977 1.1080 1.0154 0.9739 1.0494 0.9690 1.3552 1.3531
New Jersey 0.4535 0.4900 0.5552 0.6205 0.6067 0.5747 0.5645 0.5257 0.5883 0.7788 0.6809
New Mexico 2.3352 2.5776 2.4457 2.9878 3.2831 3.1021 2.7867 2.6860 2.4187 3.3548 3.6723
New York 0.5766 0.5954 0.7087 0.8186 0.8369 0.7296 0.7115 0.6449 0.7580 1.0079 1.0103
North Carolina 0.9203 0.9494 1.0078 1.0703 1.0232 0.9775 0.8940 0.8677 0.9497 1.3391 1.5767
North Dakota 1.8253 2.0214 2.3683 2.1040 2.1362 2.2564 1.8939 1.8488 1.7647 2.0938 2.0301
Ohio 0.6470 0.7231 0.7600 0.8200 0.8331 0.8043 0.8913 0.9947 0.8159 1.0418 0.9997
Oklahoma 1.0785 1.0738 1.3372 1.2862 1.3049 0.9694 0.9335 1.0464 1.0515 1.5440 1.6443
Oregon 0.8248 0.9273 1.0786 1.2117 1.1584 1.1561 1.0202 1.0757 1.0532 1.5455 1.6072
Pennsylvania 0.8343 0.9079 1.0013 1.1044 1.0804 1.0464 1.0073 1.0426 1.0429 1.2727 1.4327
Rhode Island 0.8327 0.9081 0.9447 0.9276 0.9649 0.8672 0.8435 0.7585 0.8463 1.0557 1.1188
South Carolina 1.3549 1.5096 1.7211 1.8693 1.9568 1.8880 1.0875 1.8077 1.9054 2.6341 2.6829
South Dakota 1.2499 1.4697 1.7672 1.8378 2.0043 1.9460 1.8256 1.7375 1.7594 1.9430 2.2084
Tennessee 0.9142 1.0065 1.0963 1.2085 1.2347 1.1481 1.0676 1.0777 1.1919 1.5562 1.5456
Texas 0.6979 0.6982 0.8429 0.9895 0.9291 0.8777 0.8138 0.7621 0.8911 1.1326 1.1934
Utah 1.0014 1.1700 1.3492 1.4508 1.4264 1.2725 1.1868 1.1390 0.9995 1.4507 1.7404
Vermont 0.9697 1.1045 1.3671 1.4638 1.5045 1.4027 1.4627 1.4658 1.6337 2.1066 2.3079
Virginia 1.2519 1.3870 1.5010 1.7508 1.9278 1.7471 1.6811 1.7762 1.7726 2.6546 2.3481
Washington 0.7085 0.8306 0.9502 1.0349 1.0634 1.0074 0.8492 0.9131 0.8437 1.3699 1.4542
West Virginia 2.3403 2.4611 2.7113 2.9453 2.9050 2.9411 2.6232 2.6169 2.6149 3.1281 3.5848
Wisconsin 0.6771 0.7424 0.8325 0.8853 0.9090 0.8888 0.8291 0.8721 0.8805 1.5858 1.4358
Wyoming 1.3660 1.2106 1.3402 1.5581 1.4973 1.5495 1.3068 1.1334 1.1636 1.6376 1.6216  
Source: Authors calculations.   
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Appendix B: Unemployment Rate by State 2000 to 2010. 
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 0.048 0.041 0.047 0.049 0.055 0.049 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.054 0.104
Arizona 0.044 0.040 0.047 0.048 0.057 0.048 0.047 0.040 0.037 0.070 0.105
Arkansas 0.045 0.042 0.047 0.056 0.060 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.076
California 0.052 0.049 0.054 0.060 0.069 0.060 0.053 0.048 0.056 0.079 0.120
Colorado 0.029 0.027 0.038 0.056 0.062 0.056 0.051 0.043 0.040 0.051 0.083
Connecticut 0.032 0.023 0.031 0.048 0.055 0.048 0.049 0.045 0.047 0.060 0.086
Delaware 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.035 0.035 0.054 0.082
Florida 0.039 0.038 0.047 0.045 0.052 0.045 0.036 0.034 0.043 0.070 0.110
Georgia 0.040 0.035 0.040 0.049 0.047 0.049 0.053 0.047 0.048 0.068 0.103
Idaho 0.052 0.046 0.049 0.044 0.052 0.044 0.035 0.028 0.031 0.054 0.080
Illinois 0.043 0.045 0.054 0.062 0.069 0.062 0.057 0.044 0.053 0.068 0.108
Indiana 0.030 0.029 0.042 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.050 0.046 0.063 0.105
Iowa 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.042 0.037 0.039 0.042 0.063
Kansas 0.030 0.038 0.043 0.055 0.058 0.055 0.051 0.044 0.041 0.047 0.074
Kentucky 0.045 0.042 0.052 0.053 0.064 0.053 0.061 0.058 0.056 0.070 0.106
Louisiana 0.051 0.050 0.054 0.054 0.062 0.054 0.112 0.038 0.037 0.049 0.069
Maine 0.041 0.033 0.037 0.047 0.052 0.047 0.051 0.049 0.049 0.057 0.083
Maryland 0.035 0.036 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.035 0.048 0.077
Massachusetts 0.027 0.027 0.037 0.050 0.059 0.050 0.048 0.048 0.045 0.058 0.086
Michigan 0.038 0.037 0.052 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.067 0.071 0.073 0.089 0.141
Minnesota 0.028 0.031 0.038 0.046 0.050 0.046 0.041 0.041 0.047 0.056 0.079
Mississippi 0.051 0.057 0.056 0.069 0.062 0.069 0.101 0.066 0.062 0.072 0.100
Missouri 0.034 0.033 0.045 0.060 0.057 0.060 0.052 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.096
Montana 0.052 0.048 0.045 0.039 0.043 0.039 0.036 0.032 0.036 0.049 0.064
Nebraska 0.029 0.028 0.031 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.049
Nevada 0.044 0.045 0.053 0.042 0.053 0.042 0.045 0.043 0.049 0.079 0.126
New Hampshire 0.027 0.027 0.034 0.037 0.045 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.041 0.066
New Jersey 0.046 0.037 0.043 0.047 0.058 0.047 0.046 0.046 0.044 0.058 0.095
New Mexico 0.056 0.050 0.049 0.057 0.061 0.057 0.050 0.039 0.035 0.050 0.074
New York 0.052 0.045 0.049 0.055 0.064 0.055 0.051 0.045 0.047 0.057 0.088
North Carolina 0.032 0.037 0.056 0.053 0.065 0.053 0.053 0.049 0.049 0.069 0.108
North Dakota 0.034 0.029 0.028 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.040
Ohio 0.043 0.040 0.044 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.058 0.055 0.058 0.070 0.106
Oklahoma 0.034 0.031 0.037 0.048 0.057 0.048 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.039 0.071
Oregon 0.057 0.051 0.064 0.072 0.082 0.072 0.062 0.054 0.053 0.072 0.111
Pennsylvania 0.044 0.042 0.048 0.054 0.057 0.054 0.049 0.045 0.044 0.056 0.084
Rhode Island 0.041 0.042 0.045 0.051 0.055 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.055 0.085 0.115
South Carolina 0.045 0.036 0.052 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.064 0.056 0.075 0.118
South Dakota 0.029 0.027 0.031 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.032 0.051
Tennessee 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.055 0.059 0.055 0.054 0.051 0.050 0.071 0.108
Texas 0.046 0.044 0.050 0.059 0.067 0.059 0.053 0.048 0.043 0.052 0.080
Utah 0.037 0.034 0.044 0.049 0.056 0.049 0.041 0.028 0.027 0.033 0.082
Vermont 0.030 0.027 0.033 0.035 0.045 0.035 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.068
Virginia 0.028 0.023 0.032 0.037 0.041 0.037 0.035 0.031 0.032 0.042 0.072
Washington 0.047 0.050 0.062 0.060 0.074 0.060 0.055 0.050 0.046 0.058 0.098
West Virginia 0.066 0.055 0.052 0.051 0.059 0.051 0.049 0.047 0.043 0.043 0.083
Wisconsin 0.030 0.034 0.044 0.049 0.056 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.051 0.091






Appendix C: Percent of Population Older Than Age 65 2000 to 2010. 
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 0.1300 0.1305 0.1307 0.1307 0.1311 0.1311 0.1318 0.1324 0.1331 0.1350 0.1364
Arizona 0.1316 0.1301 0.1296 0.1290 0.1292 0.1293 0.1296 0.1294 0.1302 0.1325 0.1356
Arkansas 0.1416 0.1398 0.1392 0.1387 0.1386 0.1382 0.1383 0.1391 0.1400 0.1418 0.1431
California 0.1100 0.1062 0.1059 0.1059 0.1062 0.1064 0.1072 0.1075 0.1089 0.1108 0.1127
Colorado 0.1005 0.0967 0.0961 0.0962 0.0972 0.0984 0.0997 0.1015 0.1030 0.1051 0.1075
Connecticut 0.1428 0.1380 0.1372 0.1364 0.1361 0.1358 0.1356 0.1354 0.1365 0.1389 0.1405
Delaware 0.1302 0.1299 0.1300 0.1303 0.1309 0.1317 0.1326 0.1348 0.1367 0.1400 0.1421
Florida 0.1814 0.1752 0.1732 0.1713 0.1699 0.1684 0.1671 0.1654 0.1662 0.1692 0.1719
Georgia 0.0977 0.0958 0.0955 0.0955 0.0960 0.0961 0.0973 0.0989 0.1000 0.1023 0.1046
Idaho 0.1135 0.1127 0.1128 0.1133 0.1138 0.1143 0.1149 0.1163 0.1172 0.1194 0.1221
Illinois 0.1234 0.1207 0.1202 0.1197 0.1199 0.1200 0.1203 0.1205 0.1215 0.1231 0.1244
Indiana 0.1250 0.1237 0.1234 0.1231 0.1233 0.1234 0.1236 0.1243 0.1254 0.1273 0.1286
Iowa 0.1493 0.1490 0.1486 0.1481 0.1478 0.1474 0.1471 0.1470 0.1474 0.1481 0.1484
Kansas 0.1334 0.1324 0.1316 0.1306 0.1302 0.1301 0.1300 0.1301 0.1302 0.1308 0.1314
Kentucky 0.1245 0.1249 0.1247 0.1244 0.1248 0.1251 0.1262 0.1276 0.1287 0.1307 0.1322
Louisiana 0.1147 0.1158 0.1159 0.1160 0.1163 0.1163 0.1169 0.1199 0.1200 0.1213 0.1223
Maine 0.1399 0.1439 0.1440 0.1440 0.1441 0.1445 0.1451 0.1469 0.1492 0.1528 0.1562
Maryland 0.1154 0.1132 0.1132 0.1130 0.1133 0.1137 0.1142 0.1149 0.1165 0.1193 0.1213
Massachusetts 0.1392 0.1353 0.1340 0.1332 0.1329 0.1327 0.1327 0.1328 0.1337 0.1356 0.1368
Michigan 0.1240 0.1227 0.1227 0.1228 0.1233 0.1240 0.1249 0.1265 0.1291 0.1328 0.1357
Minnesota 0.1226 0.1207 0.1202 0.1201 0.1204 0.1207 0.1211 0.1221 0.1234 0.1256 0.1273
Mississippi 0.1212 0.1208 0.1208 0.1208 0.1213 0.1216 0.1226 0.1233 0.1239 0.1256 0.1271
Missouri 0.1364 0.1349 0.1344 0.1338 0.1337 0.1335 0.1337 0.1343 0.1353 0.1371 0.1387
Montana 0.1328 0.1342 0.1351 0.1358 0.1362 0.1369 0.1377 0.1394 0.1410 0.1437 0.1463
Nebraska 0.1370 0.1356 0.1351 0.1344 0.1334 0.1327 0.1325 0.1327 0.1333 0.1340 0.1347
Nevada 0.1146 0.1098 0.1105 0.1112 0.1124 0.1124 0.1117 0.1112 0.1118 0.1142 0.1174
New Hampshire 0.1204 0.1197 0.1189 0.1187 0.1190 0.1208 0.1214 0.1237 0.1265 0.1302 0.1332
New Jersey 0.1361 0.1322 0.1313 0.1305 0.1300 0.1296 0.1295 0.1298 0.1309 0.1329 0.1340
New Mexico 0.1149 0.1171 0.1187 0.1193 0.1203 0.1210 0.1227 0.1245 0.1260 0.1285 0.1307
New York 0.1335 0.1291 0.1291 0.1292 0.1294 0.1298 0.1304 0.1305 0.1316 0.1332 0.1343
North Carolina 0.1248 0.1203 0.1201 0.1202 0.1210 0.1212 0.1216 0.1230 0.1239 0.1258 0.1277
North Dakota 0.1458 0.1473 0.1475 0.1473 0.1468 0.1463 0.1454 0.1453 0.1451 0.1457 0.1452
Ohio 0.1334 0.1328 0.1326 0.1325 0.1328 0.1329 0.1332 0.1342 0.1357 0.1380 0.1395
Oklahoma 0.1336 0.1322 0.1319 0.1312 0.1312 0.1314 0.1315 0.1322 0.1324 0.1336 0.1344
Oregon 0.1312 0.1280 0.1276 0.1275 0.1280 0.1293 0.1301 0.1312 0.1325 0.1348 0.1373
Pennsylvania 0.1583 0.1561 0.1552 0.1542 0.1534 0.1523 0.1516 0.1513 0.1516 0.1530 0.1537
Rhode Island 0.1158 0.1451 0.1433 0.1415 0.1401 0.1393 0.1388 0.1393 0.1398 0.1419 0.1434
South Carolina 0.1218 0.1211 0.1215 0.1218 0.1226 0.1234 0.1249 0.1274 0.1291 0.1318 0.1344
South Dakota 0.1438 0.1431 0.1427 0.1421 0.1417 0.1412 0.1408 0.1412 0.1415 0.1425 0.1429
Tennessee 0.1242 0.1237 0.1239 0.1238 0.1243 0.1246 0.1255 0.1272 0.1284 0.1308 0.1328
Texas 0.1006 0.0994 0.0988 0.0984 0.0985 0.0987 0.0991 0.0997 0.1002 0.1014 0.1025
Utah 0.0871 0.0852 0.0851 0.0851 0.0854 0.0857 0.0866 0.0875 0.0873 0.0883 0.0894
Vermont 0.1228 0.1274 0.1276 0.1279 0.1285 0.1295 0.1307 0.1331 0.1358 0.1398 0.1429
Virginia 0.1127 0.1119 0.1120 0.1122 0.1128 0.1128 0.1138 0.1147 0.1162 0.1188 0.1207
Washington 0.1142 0.1123 0.1119 0.1119 0.1126 0.1131 0.1140 0.1152 0.1165 0.1185 0.1210
West Virginia 0.1510 0.1533 0.1537 0.1537 0.1541 0.1541 0.1545 0.1554 0.1567 0.1586 0.1596
Wisconsin 0.1317 0.1309 0.1304 0.1301 0.1302 0.1303 0.1305 0.1311 0.1320 0.1340 0.1355
Wyoming 0.1160 0.1171 0.1183 0.1183 0.1196 0.1202 0.1209 0.1211 0.1211 0.1221 0.1225  
203 
 
Appendix D: Per Capita Income 2000 to 2010. 
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama $29,214 $30,025 $30,450 $30,788 $31,279 $32,479 $33,016 $33,592 $33,966 $33,679 $32,930
Arizona $31,055 $32,354 $32,444 $32,481 $32,823 $34,014 $35,456 $37,005 $37,177 $35,749 $33,972
Arkansas $27,151 $27,775 $28,430 $28,556 $29,404 $30,277 $30,604 $31,337 $32,326 $32,357 $31,629
California $38,101 $40,678 $40,612 $40,299 $40,718 $41,807 $42,620 $44,243 $44,739 $43,581 $41,569
Colorado $39,031 $41,728 $42,005 $40,934 $40,599 $41,002 $42,006 $43,180 $43,745 $43,378 $41,515
Connecticut $48,684 $51,446 $52,125 $50,966 $50,551 $52,544 $53,482 $55,887 $57,723 $56,085 $53,712
Delaware $37,305 $39,131 $40,569 $41,195 $40,970 $41,904 $42,002 $42,886 $42,534 $41,463 $40,841
Florida $34,661 $36,050 $36,440 $36,575 $36,848 $38,339 $39,673 $41,145 $41,298 $39,710 $37,340
Georgia $33,698 $34,955 $35,258 $35,192 $35,167 $35,461 $36,094 $36,573 $36,851 $35,738 $34,330
Idaho $29,489 $30,793 $31,062 $31,171 $31,245 $32,592 $32,781 $34,031 $34,249 $32,775 $31,629
Illinois $38,363 $40,151 $40,253 $40,190 $40,058 $40,720 $41,234 $42,720 $43,820 $43,310 $41,544
Indiana $33,011 $34,275 $34,171 $34,062 $34,078 $34,698 $34,431 $35,166 $35,263 $34,944 $33,679
Iowa $32,170 $33,628 $33,826 $34,360 $34,408 $36,299 $36,092 $36,729 $38,188 $39,415 $38,713
Kansas $33,868 $35,068 $35,508 $35,204 $35,510 $35,968 $36,550 $38,234 $39,350 $40,572 $38,737
Kentucky $28,898 $30,403 $30,645 $30,869 $30,839 $31,600 $31,928 $32,593 $32,852 $32,817 $32,290
Louisiana $27,833 $28,713 $29,915 $30,211 $30,378 $30,997 $32,123 $35,264 $37,114 $37,775 $36,378
Maine $31,676 $33,049 $33,711 $34,161 $34,898 $35,693 $35,277 $36,246 $36,810 $36,632 $36,808
Maryland $40,900 $43,074 $43,917 $44,610 $45,330 $47,082 $47,927 $49,308 $50,041 $49,758 $49,238
Massachusetts $43,250 $46,852 $47,432 $46,721 $46,853 $48,082 $48,829 $51,009 $52,099 $51,482 $50,304
Michigan $35,315 $36,593 $36,046 $35,741 $35,903 $36,148 $36,040 $35,977 $36,131 $35,574 $34,168
Minnesota $37,530 $39,410 $39,727 $39,892 $40,626 $41,501 $41,278 $42,070 $43,112 $43,040 $41,202
Mississippi $25,589 $26,290 $27,156 $27,303 $27,694 $28,432 $29,332 $29,772 $30,572 $30,639 $30,249
Missouri $32,817 $34,143 $34,305 $34,535 $35,006 $35,689 $35,766 $36,571 $37,136 $37,359 $36,323
Montana $27,635 $28,763 $29,511 $29,781 $30,732 $31,644 $32,254 $33,440 $34,583 $34,677 $33,651
Nebraska $34,216 $35,315 $35,974 $36,084 $37,523 $37,900 $37,929 $38,251 $39,852 $40,493 $39,428
Nevada $36,940 $38,047 $37,879 $37,539 $38,440 $40,170 $42,220 $42,369 $42,356 $39,910 $36,839
New Hampshire $38,799 $41,792 $41,896 $41,715 $41,667 $43,016 $42,962 $44,281 $44,978 $44,351 $43,788
New Jersey $44,656 $47,737 $48,035 $47,745 $47,560 $48,522 $48,981 $51,121 $52,492 $51,798 $50,303
New Mexico $27,043 $28,549 $30,063 $30,348 $30,347 $30,914 $31,821 $32,534 $33,134 $33,378 $32,491
New York $41,335 $43,044 $43,236 $42,500 $42,663 $44,185 $45,392 $47,626 $50,064 $49,173 $47,882
North Carolina $32,884 $33,964 $33,934 $33,587 $33,619 $34,689 $35,329 $35,936 $36,365 $35,706 $34,934
North Dakota $29,454 $31,542 $31,622 $31,915 $34,109 $33,553 $34,534 $34,916 $37,451 $40,854 $40,005
Ohio $33,873 $34,892 $35,061 $35,184 $35,344 $35,748 $35,814 $36,575 $36,898 $36,363 $35,511
Oklahoma $28,331 $30,237 $31,664 $31,690 $31,981 $32,872 $34,088 $35,867 $35,908 $37,612 $34,636
Oregon $33,513 $35,193 $34,960 $34,621 $34,773 $35,558 $35,591 $36,821 $37,108 $36,748 $35,621
Pennsylvania $35,458 $37,162 $37,548 $37,864 $38,166 $39,028 $39,292 $40,508 $41,386 $41,167 $40,632
Rhode Island $35,268 $36,819 $37,622 $38,433 $39,178 $39,920 $39,934 $41,248 $42,283 $41,815 $41,257
South Carolina $29,464 $30,630 $30,802 $30,902 $31,003 $31,574 $32,104 $33,066 $33,536 $33,136 $32,376
South Dakota $31,870 $33,234 $33,901 $33,686 $35,824 $36,700 $36,576 $36,044 $38,546 $40,332 $39,161
Tennessee $32,457 $33,506 $33,524 $33,723 $34,045 $34,794 $34,690 $35,190 $35,416 $35,038 $34,412
Texas $32,852 $34,552 $35,388 $34,570 $34,643 $34,984 $36,325 $37,703 $38,220 $39,629 $36,931
Utah $29,066 $30,198 $30,635 $30,538 $30,344 $30,999 $32,194 $33,784 $34,873 $34,243 $32,412
Vermont $33,196 $34,803 $35,740 $35,980 $36,755 $37,972 $37,765 $39,079 $40,092 $40,122 $39,527
Virginia $37,888 $39,565 $40,147 $40,409 $41,424 $42,474 $43,556 $44,719 $45,531 $44,871 $44,063
Washington $38,630 $40,067 $39,622 $39,513 $39,936 $41,318 $41,179 $42,662 $44,415 $44,134 $42,112
West Virginia $25,936 $26,938 $27,753 $28,494 $28,497 $28,711 $28,861 $30,005 $30,269 $30,950 $31,226
Wisconsin $34,574 $35,823 $36,335 $36,644 $36,913 $37,585 $37,586 $38,566 $39,058 $38,710 $38,364






Appendix E: Percent of Population Under Federal Poverty Level 2000 to 2010. 
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 0.1610 0.1560 0.1650 0.1660 0.1710 0.1610 0.1700 0.1660 0.1690 0.1570 0.1750
Arizona 0.1390 0.1560 0.1370 0.1420 0.1540 0.1420 0.1420 0.1420 0.1420 0.1470 0.1650
Arkansas. 0.1580 0.1700 0.1540 0.1530 0.1600 0.1790 0.1720 0.1730 0.1790 0.1730 0.1880
California. 0.1420 0.1370 0.1280 0.1300 0.1340 0.1330 0.1330 0.1310 0.1240 0.1330 0.1420
Colorado. 0.0930 0.0870 0.0960 0.0970 0.0980 0.1110 0.1110 0.1200 0.1200 0.1140 0.1290
Connecticut. 0.0790 0.0770 0.0730 0.0750 0.0810 0.0760 0.0830 0.0830 0.0790 0.0930 0.0940
Delaware. 0.0920 0.0930 0.0980 0.0820 0.0870 0.0990 0.1040 0.1110 0.1050 0.1000 0.1080
Florida. 0.1250 0.1280 0.1250 0.1280 0.1310 0.1220 0.1280 0.1260 0.1210 0.1320 0.1490
Georgia. 0.1300 0.1260 0.1170 0.1270 0.1340 0.1480 0.1440 0.1470 0.1430 0.1470 0.1650
Idaho. 0.1180 0.1140 0.1200 0.1380 0.1380 0.1450 0.1390 0.1260 0.1210 0.1260 0.1430
Illinois. 0.1070 0.1110 0.1120 0.1160 0.1130 0.1190 0.1200 0.1230 0.1190 0.1220 0.1330
Indiana. 0.0950 0.1010 0.0980 0.1090 0.1060 0.1080 0.1220 0.1270 0.1230 0.1310 0.1440
Iowa. 0.0910 0.1000 0.0970 0.1120 0.1010 0.0990 0.1090 0.1100 0.1100 0.1150 0.1180
Kansas. 0.0990 0.0950 0.1130 0.1210 0.1080 0.1050 0.1170 0.1240 0.1120 0.1130 0.1340
Kentucky. 0.1580 0.1640 0.1540 0.1560 0.1740 0.1740 0.1680 0.1700 0.1730 0.1730 0.1860
Louisiana. 0.1960 0.2000 0.1910 0.1880 0.2030 0.1940 0.1980 0.1900 0.1860 0.1730 0.1730
Maine. 0.1090 0.1010 0.1060 0.1110 0.1050 0.1230 0.1260 0.1290 0.1200 0.1230 0.1230
Maryland. 0.0850 0.0930 0.0810 0.0810 0.0820 0.0880 0.0820 0.0780 0.0830 0.0810 0.0910
Massachusetts. 0.0930 0.0960 0.0870 0.0890 0.0940 0.0920 0.1030 0.0990 0.0990 0.1000 0.1030
Michigan 0.1050 0.1010 0.1060 0.1100 0.1140 0.1230 0.1320 0.1350 0.1400 0.1440 0.1620
Minnesota. 0.0790 0.0690 0.0780 0.0850 0.0780 0.0830 0.0920 0.0980 0.0950 0.0960 0.1100
Mississippi. 0.1990 0.1820 0.1860 0.1990 0.1990 0.2160 0.2130 0.2110 0.2060 0.2120 0.2190
Missouri. 0.1170 0.1120 0.1170 0.1190 0.1170 0.1180 0.1330 0.1360 0.1300 0.1340 0.1460
Montana. 0.1460 0.1340 0.1460 0.1460 0.1420 0.1420 0.1440 0.1360 0.1410 0.1480 0.1510
Nebraska. 0.0970 0.0960 0.1030 0.1100 0.1080 0.1100 0.1090 0.1150 0.1120 0.1080 0.1230
Nevada 0.1050 0.0990 0.0970 0.1180 0.1150 0.1260 0.1110 0.1030 0.1070 0.1130 0.1240
New Hampshire 0.0650 0.0530 0.0600 0.0640 0.0770 0.0760 0.0750 0.0800 0.0710 0.0760 0.0850
New Jersey 0.0850 0.0790 0.0790 0.0750 0.0840 0.0850 0.0870 0.0870 0.0860 0.0870 0.0940
New Mexico 0.1840 0.1800 0.1770 0.1890 0.1860 0.1930 0.1850 0.1850 0.1810 0.1710 0.1800
New York 0.1460 0.1310 0.1340 0.1310 0.1350 0.1420 0.1380 0.1420 0.1370 0.1360 0.1420
North Carolina 0.1230 0.1310 0.1410 0.1420 0.1400 0.1520 0.1510 0.1470 0.1430 0.1460 0.1630
North Dakota 0.1190 0.1160 0.1210 0.1250 0.1170 0.1210 0.1120 0.1140 0.1210 0.1200 0.1170
Ohio. 0.1060 0.1110 0.1100 0.1190 0.1210 0.1250 0.1300 0.1330 0.1310 0.1340 0.1520
Oklahoma 0.1470 0.1380 0.1550 0.1500 0.1610 0.1530 0.1650 0.1700 0.1590 0.1590 0.1620
Oregon. 0.1160 0.1320 0.1340 0.1320 0.1390 0.1410 0.1410 0.1330 0.1290 0.1360 0.1430
Pennsylvania. 0.1100 0.1050 0.1070 0.1050 0.1090 0.1170 0.1190 0.1210 0.1160 0.1210 0.1250
Rhode island 0.1190 0.1070 0.1200 0.1070 0.1130 0.1280 0.1230 0.1110 0.1200 0.1170 0.1150
South Carolina 0.1410 0.1440 0.1340 0.1420 0.1410 0.1570 0.1560 0.1570 0.1500 0.1570 0.1710
South Dakota 0.1320 0.1150 0.1160 0.1140 0.1110 0.1100 0.1360 0.1360 0.1310 0.1250 0.1420
Tennessee. 0.1350 0.1350 0.1430 0.1450 0.1380 0.1450 0.1550 0.1620 0.1590 0.1550 0.1710
Texas. 0.1540 0.1510 0.1500 0.1560 0.1630 0.1660 0.1760 0.1690 0.1630 0.1580 0.1720
Utah. 0.0940 0.0880 0.0860 0.1050 0.1060 0.1090 0.1020 0.1060 0.0970 0.0960 0.1150
Vermont. 0.0940 0.1070 0.1040 0.0850 0.0970 0.0900 0.1150 0.1030 0.1010 0.1060 0.1140
Virginia. 0.0960 0.0920 0.0930 0.0990 0.0900 0.0950 0.1000 0.0960 0.0990 0.1020 0.1050
Washington. 0.1060 0.1160 0.1080 0.1140 0.1100 0.1310 0.1190 0.1180 0.1140 0.1130 0.1230
West Virginia 0.1790 0.1860 0.1720 0.1720 0.1850 0.1790 0.1800 0.1730 0.1690 0.1700 0.1770
Wisconsin 0.0870 0.0890 0.0980 0.0970 0.1050 0.1070 0.1020 0.1100 0.1080 0.1040 0.1240






Appendix F: Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity 2000 to 2010. 
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 0.0020 0.0023 0.0023 0.0019 0.0009 0.0030 0.0017 0.0025 0.0010 0.0021 0.0021
Arizona 0.0018 0.0040 0.0046 0.0030 0.0033 0.0033 0.0032 0.0030 0.0046 0.0049 0.0046
Arkansas 0.0032 0.0034 0.0037 0.0018 0.0030 0.0041 0.0047 0.0037 0.0034 0.0039 0.0036
California 0.0036 0.0028 0.0028 0.0040 0.0038 0.0039 0.0032 0.0035 0.0040 0.0044 0.0041
Colorado 0.0042 0.0034 0.0045 0.0039 0.0040 0.0035 0.0053 0.0028 0.0034 0.0043 0.0038
Connecticut 0.0030 0.0018 0.0036 0.0018 0.0016 0.0023 0.0027 0.0029 0.0021 0.0030 0.0029
Delaware 0.0013 0.0025 0.0013 0.0013 0.0017 0.0015 0.0016 0.0019 0.0014 0.0020 0.0030
Florida 0.0030 0.0031 0.0027 0.0030 0.0029 0.0030 0.0028 0.0034 0.0036 0.0037 0.0044
Georgia 0.0026 0.0027 0.0023 0.0022 0.0033 0.0037 0.0033 0.0044 0.0040 0.0059 0.0044
Idaho 0.0041 0.0044 0.0043 0.0031 0.0035 0.0045 0.0047 0.0037 0.0046 0.0037 0.0045
Illinois 0.0022 0.0024 0.0027 0.0024 0.0025 0.0027 0.0026 0.0018 0.0024 0.0026 0.0024
Indiana 0.0038 0.0030 0.0023 0.0024 0.0025 0.0023 0.0029 0.0021 0.0024 0.0028 0.0028
Iowa 0.0025 0.0039 0.0032 0.0020 0.0034 0.0024 0.0034 0.0031 0.0026 0.0019 0.0023
Kansas 0.0024 0.0025 0.0033 0.0033 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0022 0.0025 0.0025 0.0023
Kentucky 0.0018 0.0019 0.0033 0.0029 0.0028 0.0026 0.0018 0.0024 0.0032 0.0036 0.0025
Louisiana 0.0032 0.0029 0.0020 0.0026 0.0040 0.0026 0.0032 0.0030 0.0044 0.0026 0.0043
Maine 0.0028 0.0034 0.0026 0.0025 0.0028 0.0040 0.0036 0.0042 0.0027 0.0038 0.0034
Maryland 0.0033 0.0029 0.0022 0.0035 0.0036 0.0029 0.0042 0.0027 0.0032 0.0023 0.0029
Massachusetts 0.0012 0.0016 0.0015 0.0019 0.0022 0.0019 0.0023 0.0035 0.0024 0.0028 0.0033
Michigan 0.0022 0.0025 0.0022 0.0025 0.0028 0.0019 0.0023 0.0016 0.0029 0.0028 0.0030
Minnesota 0.0024 0.0019 0.0020 0.0035 0.0027 0.0028 0.0031 0.0029 0.0031 0.0021 0.0022
Mississippi 0.0038 0.0038 0.0034 0.0021 0.0022 0.0038 0.0039 0.0052 0.0030 0.0036 0.0017
Missouri 0.0020 0.0024 0.0022 0.0027 0.0023 0.0023 0.0019 0.0025 0.0024 0.0015 0.0027
Montana 0.0041 0.0050 0.0031 0.0045 0.0072 0.0056 0.0049 0.0060 0.0040 0.0053 0.0047
Nebraska 0.0021 0.0034 0.0033 0.0034 0.0031 0.0034 0.0023 0.0028 0.0031 0.0027 0.0020
Nevada 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0027 0.0028 0.0026 0.0035 0.0033 0.0030 0.0038 0.0038
New Hampshire 0.0025 0.0022 0.0026 0.0025 0.0028 0.0021 0.0028 0.0021 0.0028 0.0027 0.0028
New Jersey 0.0020 0.0022 0.0023 0.0024 0.0027 0.0024 0.0030 0.0024 0.0026 0.0028 0.0033
New Mexico 0.0042 0.0045 0.0031 0.0036 0.0056 0.0050 0.0045 0.0035 0.0025 0.0058 0.0026
New York 0.0029 0.0031 0.0026 0.0031 0.0025 0.0024 0.0028 0.0033 0.0035 0.0040 0.0034
North Carolina 0.0032 0.0030 0.0027 0.0037 0.0026 0.0026 0.0023 0.0020 0.0032 0.0023 0.0025
North Dakota 0.0040 0.0043 0.0018 0.0025 0.0042 0.0022 0.0032 0.0029 0.0025 0.0028 0.0032
Ohio 0.0028 0.0020 0.0020 0.0018 0.0022 0.0025 0.0027 0.0022 0.0019 0.0019 0.0027
Oklahoma 0.0029 0.0022 0.0029 0.0037 0.0030 0.0047 0.0041 0.0043 0.0034 0.0030 0.0047
Oregon 0.0045 0.0040 0.0033 0.0028 0.0037 0.0032 0.0033 0.0038 0.0035 0.0037 0.0038
Pennsylvania 0.0014 0.0017 0.0017 0.0014 0.0022 0.0016 0.0018 0.0017 0.0015 0.0014 0.0020
Rhode Island 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013 0.0020 0.0032 0.0024 0.0028 0.0021 0.0025 0.0024
South Carolina 0.0022 0.0019 0.0016 0.0026 0.0027 0.0024 0.0025 0.0018 0.0026 0.0025 0.0023
South Dakota 0.0034 0.0036 0.0036 0.0034 0.0032 0.0030 0.0031 0.0041 0.0029 0.0030 0.0043
Tennessee 0.0020 0.0025 0.0013 0.0029 0.0028 0.0026 0.0023 0.0025 0.0044 0.0033 0.0036
Texas 0.0028 0.0033 0.0039 0.0036 0.0043 0.0037 0.0035 0.0030 0.0029 0.0037 0.0045
Utah 0.0028 0.0035 0.0025 0.0030 0.0030 0.0034 0.0038 0.0029 0.0034 0.0040 0.0036
Vermont 0.0036 0.0039 0.0031 0.0028 0.0032 0.0042 0.0055 0.0038 0.0042 0.0027 0.0037
Virginia 0.0017 0.0018 0.0020 0.0025 0.0026 0.0028 0.0022 0.0028 0.0022 0.0020 0.0027
Washington 0.0029 0.0023 0.0035 0.0023 0.0033 0.0042 0.0023 0.0027 0.0022 0.0027 0.0024
West Virginia 0.0020 0.0018 0.0012 0.0015 0.0026 0.0020 0.0017 0.0019 0.0008 0.0017 0.0035
Wisconsin 0.0015 0.0045 0.0024 0.0028 0.0027 0.0034 0.0027 0.0027 0.0029 0.0017 0.0030
Wyoming 0.0051 0.0042 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0042 0.0048 0.0032 0.0043 0.0027 0.0033  
Note.  Printed with permission: See Fairlie (2014).  
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Appendix G: GSP as a Percentage of GDP in the United States 2000 to 2010. 
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alabama 0.7625 0.7487 0.7516 0.7642 0.7693 0.7882 0.7857 0.7733 0.7622 0.7659 0.7607
Arizona 0.8809 0.8760 0.8726 0.8704 0.8865 0.8732 0.8900 0.8985 0.8987 0.8706 0.8213
Arkansas 0.7376 0.7180 0.7136 0.7213 0.7367 0.7502 0.7652 0.7691 0.7618 0.7811 0.7823
California 1.0568 1.0912 1.0727 1.0747 1.0863 1.0933 1.1040 1.1130 1.1174 1.1211 1.1043
Colorado 1.1090 1.1306 1.1230 1.0999 1.0826 1.0646 1.0750 1.0553 1.0529 1.0671 1.0687
Connecticut 1.3256 1.3588 1.3596 1.3359 1.3281 1.3726 1.3672 1.3877 1.4213 1.4074 1.3826
Delaware 1.4633 1.4561 1.4333 1.3733 1.3718 1.3927 1.3666 1.3595 1.3322 1.2622 1.3467
Florida 0.8655 0.8604 0.8674 0.8739 0.8785 0.8835 0.8998 0.8996 0.8890 0.8570 0.8284
Georgia 1.0340 1.0202 1.0140 0.9946 0.9818 0.9653 0.9634 0.9396 0.9279 0.9066 0.8992
Idaho 0.7358 0.7846 0.7539 0.7542 0.7522 0.7522 0.7598 0.7639 0.7617 0.7581 0.7447
Illinois 1.1041 1.1055 1.0994 1.0872 1.0814 1.0763 1.0685 1.0772 1.0749 1.0608 1.0657
Indiana 0.9287 0.9252 0.9017 0.9116 0.9243 0.9253 0.8975 0.8895 0.9014 0.9023 0.8699
Iowa 0.8732 0.8906 0.8758 0.8921 0.9134 0.9523 0.9525 0.9411 0.9628 0.9453 0.9637
Kansas 0.9027 0.8963 0.8981 0.8987 0.9013 0.8791 0.8793 0.8877 0.9103 0.9233 0.9128
Kentucky 0.8515 0.7995 0.8016 0.8084 0.8060 0.7984 0.7969 0.7973 0.7774 0.7831 0.7744
Louisiana 0.9722 0.9128 0.9294 0.9303 0.9491 0.9538 0.9763 1.0031 0.9475 0.9523 1.0003
Maine 0.7952 0.8038 0.8114 0.8265 0.8283 0.8316 0.8085 0.8001 0.7908 0.7981 0.8103
Maryland 1.0304 1.0245 1.0528 1.0669 1.0667 1.0799 1.0852 1.0812 1.0881 1.1094 1.1374
Massachusetts 1.1769 1.2286 1.2352 1.2216 1.2301 1.2315 1.2231 1.2195 1.2405 1.2528 1.2587
Michigan 0.9716 0.9507 0.9199 0.9346 0.9343 0.9054 0.8955 0.8675 0.8536 0.8295 0.7921
Minnesota 1.0515 1.0771 1.0718 1.0808 1.0972 1.0967 1.0908 1.0619 1.0473 1.0615 1.0517
Mississippi 0.6741 0.6547 0.6490 0.6481 0.6605 0.6534 0.6466 0.6524 0.6569 0.6679 0.6669
Missouri 0.9449 0.9354 0.9263 0.9216 0.9230 0.9133 0.8992 0.8829 0.8714 0.8897 0.9006
Montana 0.7253 0.7168 0.7300 0.7351 0.7470 0.7482 0.7525 0.7524 0.7733 0.7720 0.7769
Nebraska 0.9298 0.9368 0.9496 0.9527 0.9877 0.9753 0.9690 0.9728 0.9740 0.9927 1.0261
Nevada 1.1208 1.0870 1.0666 1.0592 1.0550 1.0887 1.1128 1.0908 1.0723 1.0300 0.9578
New Hampshire 0.9549 0.9712 0.9648 0.9762 0.9902 0.9868 0.9826 0.9722 0.9636 0.9604 0.9823
New Jersey 1.1774 1.1893 1.1931 1.1981 1.2005 1.1882 1.1838 1.1889 1.1960 1.2098 1.1957
New Mexico 0.8661 0.8542 0.8612 0.8647 0.8674 0.8852 0.8569 0.8419 0.8283 0.8355 0.8552
New York 1.1671 1.1718 1.2100 1.2015 1.1841 1.1924 1.2158 1.2259 1.2306 1.2231 1.2771
North Carolina 0.9647 0.9540 0.9467 0.9451 0.9409 0.9316 0.9400 0.9454 0.9295 0.9233 0.9277
North Dakota 0.7900 0.7976 0.8211 0.8574 0.8948 0.8691 0.8750 0.8902 0.9076 0.9909 1.0347
Ohio 0.9569 0.9479 0.9345 0.9468 0.9442 0.9393 0.9289 0.9123 0.8988 0.8980 0.8843
Oklahoma 0.7597 0.7604 0.7857 0.7808 0.7803 0.7806 0.7855 0.8095 0.8153 0.8453 0.8465
Oregon 0.8212 0.8597 0.8387 0.8423 0.8512 0.8997 0.8864 0.9333 0.9447 0.9934 1.0128
Pennsylvania 0.9435 0.9402 0.9560 0.9562 0.9560 0.9480 0.9381 0.9340 0.9402 0.9554 0.9660
Rhode Island 0.9149 0.9203 0.9340 0.9501 0.9637 0.9771 0.9685 0.9768 0.9471 0.9372 0.9671
South Carolina 0.8271 0.8139 0.8114 0.8126 0.8169 0.7894 0.7809 0.7691 0.7675 0.7589 0.7466
South Dakota 0.7870 0.8126 0.8068 0.8994 0.9069 0.9065 0.8940 0.8729 0.8986 0.9422 0.9810
Tennessee 0.9041 0.8797 0.8758 0.8887 0.8937 0.8959 0.8766 0.8654 0.8411 0.8477 0.8402
Texas 1.0143 0.9992 1.0119 1.0036 0.9785 0.9829 0.9634 0.9776 0.9934 0.9966 1.0076
Utah 0.8681 0.8638 0.8749 0.8664 0.8576 0.8617 0.8699 0.9019 0.9276 0.9014 0.8996
Vermont 0.8059 0.8175 0.8357 0.8491 0.8656 0.8731 0.8642 0.8540 0.8420 0.8567 0.8652
Virginia 1.0582 1.0457 1.0652 1.0555 1.0634 1.0745 1.0838 1.0725 1.0647 1.0708 1.0969
Washington 1.1578 1.1274 1.0888 1.0859 1.0767 1.0531 1.0795 1.0765 1.1152 1.1268 1.1243
West Virginia 0.7399 0.7163 0.7179 0.7171 0.7038 0.6979 0.6977 0.6933 0.6846 0.7097 0.7271
Wisconsin 0.9469 0.9378 0.9387 0.9454 0.9519 0.9509 0.9433 0.9358 0.9283 0.9239 0.9287
Wyoming 1.1195 1.1211 1.1906 1.1822 1.1873 1.1892 1.2025 1.3016 1.3340 1.4445 1.4490  
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